Introduction: Analytic Philosophy and Philosophical History

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During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. In this introduction, the growing interest in the history of analytic philosophy is put into context. The introduction has two parts. In the first part, the traditionally uneasy relationship between analytic philosophy and history of philosophy is explored. This is done in several ways: by acknowledging the bias against studying the history of philosophy often associated with analytic philosophy (section 1.1); by establishing that, nevertheless, analytic philosophers have engaged with the works of historical figures in a number of ways (1.2); and by exploring, against that background, various forms in which analytic philosophy and 'philosophical history' may be combined fruitfully (1.3). In the introduction's second part, a survey of work on the history of analytic philosophy from the last 25 years is provided (2.1), together with abstracts for the new essays in this volume (2.2), and both are supplemented by a representative bibliography (2.3).

1 History of philosophy in the analytic tradition

1.1 Analytic philosophy's anti-historical self-image

Considered as a general movement, analytic philosophy has long had an uneasy relationship with historically oriented approaches to philosophy. One might say that it has had an a-historical, or even anti-historical, image of itself. While this self-image has been challenged and revised in recent years, it remains influential. In this and the next section, the uneasy relationship between analytic philosophy and history of philosophy will be reconsidered, starting with an extreme anti-historical attitude that can still
be encountered among analytic philosophers occasionally. After that, it will be illustrated that much more nuanced attitudes have played a role in the analytic tradition as well.

Expressions of an extreme anti-historical bias in analytic philosophy can be found, among others, in remarks that have been attributed to several well-known analytic philosophers. Thus, W.V.O. Quine is reported to have said: ‘There are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy’. When introduced to a phenomenologist, thus to someone working in a more historically inclined tradition, John Searle supposedly declared: ‘I am an analytic philosopher. I think for myself.’ And Gilbert Harman allegedly had the following blunt note on his door: ‘Just say no to the history of philosophy’. If taken seriously, what such remarks suggest is that doing analytic philosophy and studying the history of philosophy are separate endeavors, or stronger, that the two are in tension with, and perhaps even fundamentally opposed to, each other.

It is hard to be sure how seriously to take such remarks. One might view them more as quips, infused with a sense of humor, than anything else. They were also uttered in informal conversation. Sometimes the sources of the attributions are philosophical opponents, so that they should be taken with a grain of salt for that reason as well. Then again, occasionally one can find remarks with strong anti-historical implications also in print. To mention just one example, Jerry Fodor has boasted about his ‘ignorance of the history of philosophy’ and his ability to write a ‘book on Hume without knowing anything about him’. However much one is inclined to discount such remarks, as tongue-in-cheek humor or gentle provocations, the resonance they had, and still have, reveals something about the analytic tradition. At the same time, so far we are only dealing with slogans or epigrams, thus with little of philosophical substance.

What is usually seen as providing such substance, especially within analytic philosophy, is arguments. How might an analytic philosopher argue that studying the history of philosophy can be dismissed or largely discarded? One relevant line of thought relies on the distinction – familiar from the works of Reichenbach, Carnap, Popper, and others – between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’. The argument is then that, while historical investigations may have a place in tracing the discovery of ideas and theses, their justification should be seen as separate and as proceeding non-normatively. In this context, history and psychology are sometimes put in the same camp, as related ways of studying the discovery of ideas. Frege’s anti-psychologist writings are one source of this general perspective. As he put it:

The historical mode of investigation, which seeks to trace the development of things from which to understand their nature, is certainly legitimate; but it also has its limitations. [...] We imagine, it seems, that concepts originate in the individual mind like leaves on a tree, and we suppose that their nature can be understood by investigating their origin and seeking to explain them psychologically through the working of the human mind. But this conception makes everything subjective, and taken to its logical conclusion, abolishes truth. (Frege, 1884, p. VII)

Frege goes on to distinguish the analysis of concepts, thoughts, and inferences from the study of ‘either the history of our knowledge of concepts or of the history of meanings of words’ (ibid.). And like many analytic philosophers after him, he takes the former to be his task while putting the latter aside.

Bringing in Frege also suggests a second, though not unrelated, argument for discounting work on the history of philosophy. What is it, first and foremost, that allows philosophers to analyze concepts and to evaluate corresponding arguments since Frege? It is the availability of a new tool: modern logic. Not only is this an extremely powerful tool for such purposes; much earlier philosophy was also systematically misled, or had its progress blocked, by not having at its disposal – or so this second line of thought continues. The latter is especially prominent in Bertrand Russell’s writings on metaphysics and epistemology, and many of his followers have adopted it since then. Not coincidentally Frege’s and Russell’s works in logic, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are then taken to constitute the very beginning of ‘analytic philosophy’. At times, analytic philosophers even act as if it was only then that philosophy really started, or at least the kind of philosophy worth taking seriously.

But within analytic philosophy, it is not just formal logic that has been seen as having changed philosophy fundamentally. For instance, the method of linguistic analysis, based on ordinary language and common sense, was taken to be equally revolutionary, in the 1940s and 50s, by Wittgenstein and other ‘ordinary language philosophers’ (Austin, Ryle, Strawson, and others). The early work of Russell’s colleague G.E. Moore is often taken to be a main source for this second strand in analytic philosophy, which situates the origins of the tradition again at about one hundred years ago. And jumping forward all the way to the present for another example, experimental philosophy has been hailed as having a similarly revolutionary effect in recent years, i.e., as allowing for the dismissal of large parts of earlier philosophy, including much of analytic philosophy. Experimental philosophers see the latter as relying on naïve appeals to ‘intuition’, to be replaced by different, more empirically grounded work.

Now, this basic posture – the dismissal of earlier work in the name of a radical new beginning – is far from novel in philosophy. As Charles Taylor has noted:

There is an ideal, a goal that surfaces from time to time in philosophy. The inspiration is to sweep away the past and have an understanding of
things which is entirely contemporary. The attractive idea underlying this is that of liberation from the dead weight of past errors and illusions. (Taylor, 1984, p. 17)

Descartes’ new start for philosophy in the seventeenth century, based on his method of radical doubt, comes to mind prominently. Descartes’ approach was also tied to the rise of modern science, and as Taylor continues, ‘one great model for this kind of thing is the Galilean break in science’ (ibid.). Thus, with Galilei, Descartes, and their followers all previous Scholastic philosophy was finally swept away (or so the story about the beginning of ‘modern philosophy’ goes). While a romantic reaction against privileging science followed in the eighteenth century, using it as the model to emulate for philosophy played again a big role in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At that point, not only analytic philosophers had the goal of finally making philosophy ‘scientific’, but also Husserl, thus inaugurating phenomenology. And the same theme recurred again in later ‘continental philosophy’, e.g., when the structuralist tradition in France tried to make the study of language and the mind more ‘scientific’. In all these cases, a new method was supposed to make what came before largely dispensable (and in all of them, the break was not so clean and complete as typically assumed, as careful historical research has shown since then).

At the same time, continental philosophy is often taken to provide main examples of the opposite perspective too, i.e., of philosophical historicism – the view that studying the history of philosophy is crucial, or even essential, for philosophy, Kant is an interesting, somewhat ambivalent, case in this connection (which partly explains his enduring appeal to both analytic and continental philosophers). On the one hand, he remarks in his Prolegomena (in words reminiscent of Quine):

There are scholars to whom the history of philosophy is itself their philosophy; the present Prolegomena are not written for them. They will have to wait until those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason have finished their business, and thereupon it will be their turn to apprise the world of what happened. (Kant, 1783, Preface)

Elsewhere, Kant adds (along Searle’s lines) that we cannot learn to philosophize except by engaging in it ‘automatically’, since only this gives us ‘rational knowledge’; he also insists on a strict distinction between ‘solidity’ and ‘genesis’ (a main source of the justification-discovery dichotomy). On the other hand, the text from which these quotations are taken – the Critique of Pure Reason – ends with a chapter called ‘The History of Pure Reason’, which assigns an important role to coming to terms with previous philosophical thinkers. Kant also introduced into philosophy the immensely influential historical distinction between ‘empiricists’ and ‘rationalists’.

Several of Kant’s successors took the idea of a ‘history of reason’ very seriously indeed, most famously Hegel. According to Hegel, philosophy is not only always ‘its time apprehended in thought’, we also have to think through its whole history, its overall ‘dialectical’ development, to arrive at ‘absolute truth’. Thus Hegel’s well-known dictum: ‘Philosophy is the history of philosophy’. In the twentieth century, the same basic conviction occurs again in Heidegger, although with a twist. Heidegger does not think that we can arrive at the truth through a synthesis of Western philosophy’s history. Rather, we have to think through that history to be able to break away from it, i.e., find radically different ways of thinking. Still, this involves an intense engagement with history. A third form of philosophical historicism takes Hegel’s idea that philosophy is ‘its time apprehended in thought’ in a more relativist and pessimistic direction. Here the view is that philosophy is always so closely tied to its original context that all we ever get are self-contained, self-justifying worldviews. None of them represents the truth any more than the others, and the idea of a progressive ‘history of reason’ is an illusion.

All three forms of historicism just mentioned, or the works of their proponents more generally, can be seen as part of the backdrop for the rise of analytic philosophy. In the cases of Hegel and Heidegger, this is well known. Moore and Russell, while initially attracted to the Neo-Hegelianism prominent in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century (Bradley, McTaggart, and others), rebelled against it around 1900, thereby turning British philosophy in the ‘analytic’ direction. Carnap, who had read Heidegger’s works and gone to public lectures by him in the 1920s, criticized him strongly in the 1930s. And while the criticisms by Moore, Russell, and Carnap focused on logical and metaphysical aspects, Karl Popper articulated a direct attack on ‘historicism’ in its Hegelian form in the 1940s and 50s. For all these critics, the problem with strong forms of historicism is that they are methodologically suspect. Opposition to them is then another explanation for, and an integral part of, analytic philosophy’s anti-historical self-image. Such opposition extends to later ‘continental philosophers’, including many post-structuralist and post-modernist thinkers, insofar as they have inherited historicist views.

So far I have made explicit several slogans and some arguments by analytic philosophers against studying the history of philosophy. I have also contrasted anti-historical approaches in analytic philosophy with some strongly historicist ones in continental philosophy. In doing so, I have not tried to be comprehensive. I have also painted with a broad brush. On closer inspection, some of these positions would, no doubt, reveal themselves to be more nuanced, harder to classify, and partly compatible with each other. But establishing that would require careful historical investigation – the very task whose value is in question. As analytic philosophers tend to assume they have found a different, more powerful, and fundamentally a-historical
methodology (or several of them), this task was not seen as important until relatively recently.

1.2 From philosophical legends to rational reconstructions

Analytic philosophy is over one hundred years old now. Thus it has a significant history of its own, i.e., an extended temporal development that invites systematic reflection. Increased attention to that history has brought the question of how to relate the history of analytic philosophy and studying the history of philosophy closer to home; since how should analytic philosophy relate to its own history? Actually, in some sub-fields of analytic philosophy historically oriented work gained momentum already earlier. In the philosophy of science in particular, the issue of how to connect, or integrate, history and philosophy became central from the 1960s on. One major event in that connection was the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), frequently seen as a challenge to the anti-historical attitude of the logical empiricists. But several of the latter, including Carnap, actually welcomed Kuhn’s work with open arms, as is well established by now. Others, like Philipp Frank and Hans Reichenbach, had paid attention to both the history of science and the philosophy of science already in the 1940s and 50s. Moreover, since the 1980s and 90s, serious attention to history by philosophers of science has extended to the history of the philosophy of science itself.

The general view of analytic philosophy as a- or anti-historical is misleading and has exceptions in other respects as well. On the one hand, a number of influential analytic philosophers, such as Peter Strawson and Wilfrid Sellars, developed their views in explicit, thorough engagement with Kant’s philosophy. Indeed, engagement with historical figures extended through Leibniz, Descartes and others, all the way back to Ancient philosophy, as Gilbert Ryle’s work on Plato illustrates. Current philosophers like Robert Brandom, Tyler Burge, John McDowell, and Charles Parsons illustrate that phenomenon further. On the other hand, work on the history of analytic philosophy has been done by several well-known participants, including J.O. Urmson, A.J. Ayer, Michael Dummett, and Scott Soames. Others, like Richard Routley, have added methodological reflections on how to approach the history of philosophy more generally, although such reflections are still relatively rare. And if we go beyond metaphysics and epistemology, which are often seen as the core areas of analytic philosophy, to moral, social, and political philosophy, attention to the history of philosophy is even more widespread (cf. historically oriented works by H. Frankfurt, J. Schneewind, Q. Skinner, J. Rawls, B. Williams, and others).

Contrary to the stereotypical view, it is not even true that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy saw no role for historical considerations. Freges most philosophical book, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884), does not just contain the criticism of historicist approaches mentioned above; its whole first third is devoted to a discussion of both contemporary and earlier thinkers (e.g., Kant, Leibniz and Hume), thereby providing important motivation for Frege’s project. For Russell the case is even clearer. Among others, his early engagement with Leibniz, in *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1902), had a lasting impact on him. Finally, even someone like Quine uses historical, or quasi-historical, considerations at points. As an illustration, consider how he presents Carnap (or a caricature of the early Carnap) as the culmination of the empiricist/positivist tradition in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). Doing so is arguably a core part of Quine’s classic essay, i.e., indispensible for its main argument. (It drastically limits the range of alternatives Quine has to refute while promoting his own approach.)

What happens in a text like Quine’s is not that a detailed historical account of an earlier figure is developed; Quine does not engage in history of philosophy in that sense. Crucial is, instead, how he sets up the dialectic situation in terms of a few (quasi-)historical ‘asides’, thus setting up a certain narrative. Quine’s followers elaborated this narrative further into what one might call a philosophical legend – a (quasi-)historical tale that is not examined critically but shapes people’s philosophical outlook. Here it is the legend of Quine having refuted, not just Carnap, but logical positivism as a whole, thereby inaugurating, together with Kuhn, a post-positivist era. Likewise, there is the legend of Russell, together with Moore, having refuted British Hegelianism, with (a caricature of) F.H. Bradley as its representative. There is also the legend of Frege’s logic being totally unprecedented, in the sense of having simply sprung from his brow. Note again that accepting the latter two legends is integral for analytic philosophy’s self-understanding as a radically new kind of philosophy.

Such legends have lasting effects, although not necessarily in bad ways as they can motivate novel, fruitful work. But if assumed uncritically, they distort analytic philosophers’ perceptions of previous figures (more or less, depending on the case). At the same time, there is again the question of how seriously to take these legends (parallel to the anti-historical slogans discussed earlier). More generally, one can ask which exact role they should be seen as playing or what kind of status they are supposed to have. Do they constitute actual historical claims, to be evaluated accordingly; are they better seen as guideposts or philosophical heuristics; or something else? This issue would seem to deserve serious attention, both historically and philosophically. My basic point in this context is that (quasi-)historical assumptions such as these arguably do philosophical work. If this is true, not only Strawson or Russell but also Quine and others are ‘doing analytic philosophy historically’ (in a minimal, relatively a-historical way).

To pursue this point further, let me now distinguish between several different forms that attention to the history of philosophy can take. Neither Strawson, Sellars, or Ryle, nor Russell or Frege, and much less
Quine, practice what one might call *contextual history* of philosophy, with careful *historical reconstruction* at its core (nor did Kant for that matter who, like Frege, based his corresponding claims on textbook accounts). The latter would involve a sustained effort to do several things: to place the historical figures in question—not only Kant and Plato, but also Carnap, Russell, and Frege—in their original context; to carefully probe the background against which they developed their views; and to acknowledge differences to today. What analytic philosophers typically offer, instead, are engagement with these figures as *contemporaries*, i.e., as interlocutors assumed to have the same projects, questions, and assumptions as we do. All that matters, then, is that we analyze their concepts in an ‘anti-psychologistic’ manner and that we evaluate their thesis and arguments in a ‘justification-centered’ way.

This is clearly one form of engaging with historical figures philosophically. It can lead, and has led, to philosophical insights (as many of the cases mentioned illustrate). So as to have a label for it, we can talk about the *rational reconstruction* of past philosophers and developments. One great strength of such reconstruction is that it makes salient philosophically relevant aspects (concepts, theses, and arguments). On the other hand, features of a past thinker’s views that seem jarring are discounted or simply ignored, since the focus is on what can be ‘reconstructed rationally’. The main weakness of rational reconstruction is directly related to such a selective focus. Not only is the approach misleading if mistaken for historical reconstruction; the views of earlier figures may be distorted so much that the fruitfulness of the approach is limited also for its own purposes, especially in terms of not critically examining basic assumptions.

As we have seen, analytic philosophers often embrace rational reconstruction. By doing that, they are not entirely a-historical; but on the spectrum of more or less historically attuned approaches they are far on one side. Sometimes analytic philosophers also assume that rational reconstruction is the only way in which one can engage fruitfully with a figure such as Plato or Kant. And when it comes to paradigmatic analytic philosophers like Frege, Russell, and Carnap—who are taken to have set the very agenda still pursued today and to have provided us with the very tools still in use—engagement with them tends to be seen as involving no reconstruction at all. We can simply read their writings ‘straight’, or so the implicit, uncritical conviction. It may even appear strange to try to approach Russell, say, in a more contextual or historically reconstructive way. What would be the point, especially for philosophical purposes? It makes more sense to evaluate where someone like him got things right and where wrong, to record the successes while putting aside the rest, and thus, to accumulate the achievements we have so far. It is such an attitude, together with the underlying neglect of the weaknesses and limits of the method of rational reconstruction, which makes analytic philosophers still frequently appear a- or even anti-historical.

1.3 The varieties of philosophical history

Rational reconstruction can be fruitful, as already acknowledged, especially in cases where there is sufficient overlap between the background assumptions in play. But in other cases, the approach is more problematic. Moreover, by insisting on it exclusively—as the only way of doing history of philosophy—we limit ourselves unnecessarily. It is convictions such as these that can motivate taking *historical reconstruction* seriously philosophically. But then the question arises: What would that involve? To answer this question, note first that one can provide a historical reconstruction for various purposes, most obviously as a contribution to the discipline of history. In that case, we might talk of doing historical reconstruction as *history*. In what follows, my focus will be on historically oriented work done as *philosophy*, or in other words, on what may be called ‘philosophical history’.

Earlier, I made some suggestions about the sources of analytic philosophers’ a- or anti-historical attitude, as well as about how this attitude might be seen as justified (in terms of the discovery-justification distinction, the availability of a-historical tools, and reactions against radical forms of historicism). But other factors are most likely involved as well. In particular, what might play a role are certain stereotypes about doing history of philosophy. One example would be to think that such work can, or at least often does, address only historical questions (of the ‘when, where, and who’ form), or more specifically, that no philosophical evaluation is involved (no attention to ‘why’ questions in the relevant sense). This would mean that historical reconstructions are only possible, or are typically only pursued, as *history*. They are then often dismissed as mere ‘history of ideas’, or as ‘anti-quaran history’ (history for the sake of the historical record).

One particular version of antiquarian history is ‘doxographic’ history: the simple listing of what past thinkers thought or wrote. Doxographic history can be useful philosophically, namely when it is taken as the basis for further analysis. It is more problematic when the views of past thinkers are reported and then accepted, pretty much directly, on the basis of mere authority (because they were held by thinkers ‘too deep and subtle to be approached critically by us’). This is the kind of ‘heteronomous’ thinking, or lack of thinking, that both Kant and Seale reject. It also falls under the following critical verdict by Arthur Schopenhauer (Hegel’s contemporary and fierce opponent):

> History has always been a favourite study among those who want to learn something without undergoing the effort required by the real branches of knowledge, which tax and engross the intellect. (Quoted in Glock 2008, p. 93)
If doing history of philosophy amounted to nothing more, there would indeed be reason to dismiss it. However, a large amount of more sophisticated work in the history of philosophy should long have undermined that stereotype.

There are subtler assumptions that may also be associated, implicitly, with investigating the history of philosophy, or more specifically, the history of analytic philosophy, thus again discrediting it in the eyes of some. Let me briefly mention two examples. First, there is the view that, to study its history, one must be convinced that analytic philosophy is moribund or already dead (cf. the calls for various kinds of 'post-analytic' philosophy). This constitutes a form of nihilism, or of the view that the only task left is to record analytic philosophy's follies, its contributions to the 'graveyard of ideas'. A second example is to assume that historical considerations are able to replace philosophical ones, not just to supplement them. This might be based on some general skepticism about philosophy. Or the claim could be that philosophy can be reduced to psychological, sociological, or political factors, which can then be studied historically. Determining sociological mechanisms, say, for the acceptance of philosophical claims would then take the place of their logical analysis and justification. Here we are dealing with a descendent of the psychologistic/historicism views rejected by Frege.

Many analytic philosophers will dismiss such nihilist, skeptical, or reductionist views (as unjustified or self-undermining). Alternatively, one can treat them as substantive philosophical claims that require examination and further evaluation. Perhaps one can also re-interpret the second in a less exclusive way, so that it might be combined fruitfully with more 'analytic' approaches. In any case, I would think that it is only a small minority of philosophers working on the history of analytic philosophy that holds such views. And while there may be a good number of historians of analytic philosophy who are motivated in part by the conviction that the analytic tradition has taken some unfortunate turns recently, this does not necessarily mean that they take analytic philosophy, or philosophy more generally, to have no future. In fact, reflecting on its history, in a self-conscious and philosophically insightful way, can constitute an attempt at putting it back on track. Or more generally, it can be an attempt to enrich analytic philosophy rather than to replace it.

This brings us to my main concern. Assume that we reject the stereotypes and controversial views just mentioned. Assume, in other words, that we want to engage with philosophy historically but not along such lines. Are there any alternatives to rational reconstruction, especially ones that are genuinely historical and philosophical? There are three reasons, I would suggest, which make this question especially urgent for historians of analytic philosophy today. First, it has become questionable whether Frege, Russell, or Carnap, say, share their basic concepts, questions, and projects fully with us. Second, it has become problematic that there really is one set of basic assumptions shared by all contemporary analytic philosophers, thus giving it a unified focus and agenda. Third, the boundaries between the analytic and neighboring traditions, such as pragmatism and phenomenology, have come to appear somewhat arbitrary as well.

Once more, are there any alternatives to rational reconstruction, including ones that would allow investigating such worries and suspicions further? In the rest of this section, I will discuss—tentatively and in a preliminary way—two approaches that would seem to fit the bill. The first is to let rational reconstruction and historical reconstruction correct each other, while the second is to engage in historical reconstruction as philosophy. Before describing each of these alternatives further, let me stress one point: My goal is not to establish that philosophy has to be done historically (as is assumed in strong forms of historicism); nor do I reject rational reconstructions in general. Rather, my concern is whether there are other forms of 'philosophical history', in addition to rational reconstruction, that could be used and, if so, what might be gained.

My first alternative approach brings us back to rational reconstruction, but not just by itself. As indicated above, the main weakness of this approach is that, by not questioning whether a past philosopher used the same concepts, relied on the same basic assumptions, or pursued the same projects as we do, we may distort his or her views too much even for the good of the rational reconstruction. Now, being aware of that weakness can lead us to a way of avoiding it, at least to some degree. Namely, why not confront our rational reconstruction with a historical reconstruction (done as history), thereby keeping the former honest? To be really effective, such a confrontation may have to occur repeatedly, in which case the correcting — also in the other direction, by keeping the historical side philosophically honest — would take several rounds. But that is fine. One might even have in mind a continuing dialectic between rational and historical reconstructions, i.e., a sustained back-and-forth between them.

How should such an enriched procedure be assessed, i.e., what are its strengths and weaknesses? The procedure presupposes that we have the two ingredients at hand, i.e., we already know how to do rational and historical reconstruction. The idea is to combine the strengths of both, while correcting their respective distortions. But how exactly is that supposed to work? For example, it may be fairly clear in which way historical reconstructions can help with respect to the distortions rooted in stereotypes or quasi-historical legends. Yet how can it convince us to go beyond the basic philosophical assumptions typically held fixed in rational reconstructions? In other words, how are we to use historical methods to refine underlying, often only implicit philosophical convictions? The more general difficulty here is this: How can we prevent the two sides in our new procedure from remaining too external to each other? Would it not be better to combine, or synthesize, rational and historical reconstruction more thoroughly, in one procedure? That thought leads to my second suggestion.
As a second alternative to rational reconstruction, we can try to do the following: We study an earlier philosopher without simply assuming that he or she shares all relevant background assumptions with us. Instead, we carefully recover — using tools borrowed from history, philology, as well as from philosophy (archival research, close textual exegesis, and attention to context) — what the philosopher’s core concepts, basic assumptions, and main project actually were. We also refrain, at least initially, from evaluating the recovered ideas by using current standards. What we do, on the other hand, is to think them through internally, i.e., to evaluate them by using the standards and the understanding of the time. The latter is what makes the approach philosophical (not just ‘historical reconstruction as history’, but ‘historical reconstruction as philosophy’). It is also what makes it a form of ‘historicism’, albeit a relatively modest one.37

One main strength of this second alternative is that it can bring to light philosophical assumptions that are different from ours, thus de-familiarizing us from the latter in fruitful ways.38 It may also make us realize that certain views of a past philosopher that we initially discarded make sense after all, or even, that they provide the key to the philosopher’s positions. One worry and potential weakness is this: Does this approach presuppose that we can get at past thinkers completely on their own terms, thus giving a ‘fully proper’ interpretation; and if so, is that realistic? In other words, can we simply ignore all present concerns in it? One might respond that it seems clearly possible, as examples illustrate, to put aside the latter to some degree; and if done self-consciously, that should be enough for most purposes. But now a converse worry, or tension, emerges: The more we bracket present concerns (moving away from rational reconstruction), the less relevant the results will be for current philosophy, won’t they?

That tension might suggest looking for a further alternative, one in which an even more thorough integration of logical analysis and historical understanding is achieved. But what form could that take? Should we think of it as a more sophisticated form of rational reconstruction, open to calling its own assumptions into question? Or should we consider a subtler version of historical reconstruction as philosophy (my second alternative), where we balance evaluating past philosophers on their own terms more with current concerns and use current standards? Or again, should we try to combine rational reconstruction and historical reconstruction as philosophy (a hybrid of my two alternatives)? Actually, these suggestions all point in the same general direction. The basic goal would be to use historical, context-sensitive tools as well as those of rational reconstruction and analysis to bring to light ideas of current philosophical interest.

With respect to any resulting approach, if applied successfully, it would make sense to speak of ‘philosophical history’ or of ‘doing philosophy historically’. How exactly the historical tools are used will vary. Similarly it will vary in which way, or when exactly, current philosophical concerns are brought to bear. Further hybrid forms may also be possible, since the boundaries between the approaches discussed so far are not sharp. (They are more like ideal types, including rational reconstruction.) In any case, each such approach should be applicable to the analytic tradition and to other developments in philosophy. What, then, would make something an instance of ‘doing analytic philosophy historically’? The combination of two things: that the primary focus is on a figure or theme in the analytic tradition; and that the study is guided, to a significant degree, by concerns from analytic philosophy, past or present.

Finally, let me return to a question touched on repeatedly along the way: Why might an analytic philosopher want to ‘do analytic philosophy historically’? Why all the extra effort, in other words? One quick answer is: to counteract the distortions and other limiting effects of stereotypes, quasi-historical legends, and rational reconstructions. Another answer has already come up as well: to de-familiarize us from our current concepts and assumptions so as to be able to question them fruitfully. Further benefits include: to recognize fine, otherwise missed nuances in the views of past philosophers, especially ones that can still play a role today; to understand better, and partly to recover, what the agenda of analytic philosophers was, is, and should be; to motivate corresponding projects further, by becoming aware of their original contexts, their developments, and possible extensions; and to evaluate more accurately the importance, as well as the limits, of the results that have already been achieved. This list is far from complete. In fact, it is meant more as a starting point for further discussion than as anything final. Continuing methodological reflections are called for in this area.39

2 Historical reflections on the analytic tradition

2.1 A survey of work on the history of analytic philosophy

Research on the history of analytic philosophy has produced rich results already, especially during the last twenty-five years. These results illustrate several of the points made, more generally and abstractly, in the first part of this introduction. Their presentation has also taken several different literary forms. The two primary forms, for our purposes, are: the research article and the research monograph (including single-authored collections of essays).40 A variant of the research monograph that is historically oriented by nature is the philosophical biography.41 Research articles on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared in mainstream and more specialized journals; but one main venue for publishing them is collections of essays. There are again several variants: collections of newly commissioned essays on a single philosopher or group of philosophers; retrospective collections of classic articles on a significant figure; and collections on more general themes, often
growing out of conferences.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, various survey articles on the history of analytic philosophy have been published, also in wider-ranging works.\textsuperscript{43} At this point in time, 'history of analytic philosophy' is an established subfield within the history of philosophy (with special sessions at conferences, job advertisements, etc.). It is also a fascinating subfield, one that requires no further justification for its practitioners.

What have been some of the main themes and objectives in this connection? One goal has been to counteract the bad effects of stereotypes and other distortions, including those introduced via rational reconstructions, as discussed above. Some methodological debates have also occurred, as prompted by particular cases. Certain rational reconstructions have been challenged more internally; others have been refined, and new ones, for individual philosophers and broader developments, have been proposed. Along all of these lines, neglected or forgotten but arguably important figures have been rediscovered. In addition, the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions has been explored in novel ways. Finally, there have been debates about the direction analytic philosophy should take in the future, given its trajectory so far. I now want to exemplify each of these themes via some paradigmatic cases or clusters of cases.

A first important cluster of work in history of analytic philosophy concerns the 'founding fathers' of the analytic tradition: Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Here Gottlob Frege was studied by himself in various ways, but he also occasioned an early methodological debate. That debate started when Michael Dummett's rich and influential, but also bluntly a-historical, rational reconstruction of Frege's views on logic and language was challenged by Hans Sluga, who opposed it in terms of a much more historically oriented perspective. One of Sluga's main targets was Dummett's claim that Frege's logic was totally unprecedented, i.e., had no roots in earlier philosophy. Other interpreters have challenged Dummett's reading of Frege also in less historical ways. The ensuing debate has produced several different outcomes: refinements of Dummett's position, as developed by him in response to Sluga; alternative rational reconstructions; and alternative historical reconstructions. A more recent, and again largely a-historical, reconstruction of Frege, as developed by Crispin Wright, Bob Hale, and others, concerns his philosophy of mathematics. In that case too, various responses have been offered, including approaches that would qualify as 'philosophical history'.\textsuperscript{44}

While the debate about Frege is largely confined to academic scholarship, Bertrand Russell has long had a more widespread impact, even outside of philosophy, and this is reflected in the writings on him. With respect to the roots and early development of his views, several historically sensitive and philosophically subtle accounts are now available, including some philosophical biographies. They clarify not only his philosophical views and their development, but also his role as a public figure. More recently, Russell's 'refutation' of Bradley and British Neo-Hegelianism has been addressed critically, including its lasting effects on analytic philosophy's self-image. Other historical work on Russell has clarified, and partly corrected, how to view his relationship to Frege, Wittgenstein, and, e.g., to the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong.\textsuperscript{45} Compared to Frege and Russell, G.E. Moore has received less attention, although in his case too, novel light has been shed on the origins, development, and remaining significance of his views. As some of Moore's ideas continue to play an important role in sub-fields such as epistemology and ethics, as well as in debates about philosophical methodology (in several ways), this has led both to rational reconstructions and to more historically based studies of him.\textsuperscript{46}

A second thinker from the analytic tradition who has captured the imagination of people far beyond philosophy is Ludwig Wittgenstein. Like in Russell's case, this has led to some rich biographical studies. With respect to the early Wittgenstein, one lively debate over the last 25 years concerns the clash between 'traditional' or 'metaphysical' readings of his writings (prominently defended by Peter Hacker and his students) and 'resolute' or 'therapeutic' alternatives to them (as introduced by Cora Diamond and defended by others as well), with 'eludicatory' readings attempting to find a middle ground. Which of these interpretations is most appropriate matters not only for understanding Wittgenstein's early views, but also his relationships to Frege, Russell, and to the whole analytic tradition. Moreover, it affects how we should approach Wittgenstein's later writings (including whether or not to see them as part of 'analytic philosophy'). The core of these debates has been how best to characterize Wittgenstein's methodology. One further issue in the recent literature is whether to distinguish not just between 'early' and 'later' Wittgenstein, but perhaps, to recognize 'very late' changes in his views in addition (in notebooks from the last few years of his life).\textsuperscript{47}

I mentioned earlier that research on the history of the philosophy of science has been pursued vigorously for a while now. Sometimes this overlaps with work on other themes in the history of analytic philosophy. One good example is the sustained attention paid to Rudolf Carnap, the Vienna Circle, and the fate of logical empiricism. In fact, such work constitutes a second main cluster in history of analytic philosophy. The philosophical legend of Quine's refutation of Carnap, or of logical positivism as a whole, has been challenged thoroughly. Similarly for other stereotypes – some based on taking A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Method (1936) to be representative of logical empiricism. By now it is clear that Carnap's views have deep Neo-Kantian, partly also Husserlian, roots. They underwent subtle changes, from his early (more positivist) position to a later, significantly modified (more pragmatist) perspective. Accordingly, attention has shifted, first, from Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt to Logische Syntax der Sprache, and then, to his later work on 'explication'. Very recently, the
notion of 'conceptual engineering' has become central for interpreting Carnap.49

Carnap's views do not just depart from crude positivist stereotypes in a number of ways; they were also more embedded in a social and political agenda than was often assumed, especially early on in his career. Wider-ranging work on the Vienna Circle, e.g., on its connections to the Bauhaus movement in architecture, has illustrated that fact. What has emerged along the way is that the Vienna Circle was far less monolithic and dogmatic than often presumed. Various later criticisms of logical positivism already came up within it and were discussed in a pluralistic manner, as the 'protocol sentence debate' from the 1930s illustrates. Recognition of that fact has led to the additional insight that members of the Circle other than Carnap deserve serious, sustained attention as well, so that Quine's reduction of logical positivism to Carnap is misleading in that way too. Otto Neurath, in particular, is now seen as an important figure, partly because of his anticipations of (and, for some, superiority to) Quine's later naturalism.49

Beyond Carnap and Neurath, Moritz Schlick has started to receive careful scholarly treatment; similarly for Hans Reichenbach, the head of the Berlin Group of logical empiricism. And besides the influence of Neo-Kantianism (especially of the Marburg School: Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) and Husserl on them, connections to other figures and movements, also outside of analytic philosophy, are being reconsidered in depth. This includes: the Lvov-Warsaw school of 'Polish Logic', most prominently Alfred Tarski; Henri Poincaré and related conventionalist thinkers; phenomenologically inspired scientists like Hermann Weyl; and American pragmatism (including its German and Austrian offshoots). One recently rediscovered theme in this connection is the development of mathematical logic during the 1920s and 30s, not just in Göttingen (Hilbert and his school), but also in Vienna (Gödel's work, including its relation to Carnap), in Warsaw (Tarski and his co-workers), and elsewhere. And of course, there has long been interest in the philosophy of physics from the early twentieth century; similarly for the philosophy of mathematics from that amazingly fertile period.50

Besides Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap, four analytic philosophers who have received sustained attention so far are: Karl Popper, W.V.O. Quine, Kurt Gödel, and Alfred Tarski. Like Russell and Wittgenstein, Popper was a public intellectual, influential far beyond academic philosophy. Hence, not only his role in the history of the philosophy of science has been re-examined (his relationship to the Vienna Circle, to Kuhn's work, etc.), but also his social and political views. Less widely known outside philosophy, Quine was a hugely influential 'philosophers' philosopher' during the second half of the twentieth century, both by turning many analytic philosophers in a naturalist or pragmatist direction and by opening up the possibility of 'analytic metaphysics' (partly against his own intentions).

All of this is reflected in the literature. The case of Gödel, including the mystique surrounding both his personality and his famous incompleteness theorems, has again led to substantive biographical work. As he was a pivotal figure in logic and the foundations of mathematics for much of the twentieth century, he has been a focal point in that context as well. Tarski, finally, exerted a significant influence not only on logic and the philosophy of language, among others through his interactions with Carnap and Gödel, he also influenced the disciplines of mathematics and linguistics strongly, as various recent studies have shown.51

More briefly now, the literature on the history of analytic philosophy has started to concern itself with the following figures as well: A.J. Ayer, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett, Paul Grice, Carl Hempel, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Frank Ramsey, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars, and Peter Strawson. Curiously, neither J.L. Austin nor Gilbert Ryle has received comparable attention yet (although this is changing); similarly for, e.g., Elisabeth Anscombe, Paul Feyerabend, and Gareth Evans. With figures such as Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and John Searle we still lack the critical distance for doing genuine historical work (also since they are still alive), but this has not prevented rational reconstructions of their views from appearing. In terms of main themes in the history of analytic philosophy, those that have received the most attention so far include: the sense-reference distinction (Frege, Russell, Kripke, and others), the analyticity debate (Carnap versus Quine); rule following and realism (Wittgenstein, Kripke, Putnam); and pragmatic themes (Rorty, Putnam, Branden); similarly for the relationship between analytic philosophy and neighboring traditions, e.g., Austrian philosophy and, related to it, early phenomenology (Bolzano, Brentano, and Husserl). And again, there have been some attempts at general surveys of analytic philosophy's past, as well as discussions of possible directions for its future.52

Let me round off this survey with a few suggestions about what is still missing, and some speculations about what might come next, in research on the history of analytic philosophy. I already mentioned that Austin, Ryle, and 'ordinary language philosophy' have been somewhat neglected. This holds even more for a strand in the philosophy of science that was rooted in their works: that represented by R.N. Hanson, M. Hesse, M. Scriven, S. Toulmin, and others. Both of these groups are overdue for careful historical reconsideration, I would say. Similarly, more attention seems due to the relation between analytic philosophy and some schools in the philosophy of science whose approaches have a strong historical flavor: not just Neo-Kantianism (including, say, Ernst Cassirer's work in the history and philosophy of mathematics) and phenomenology (also including Heidegger, Gadamer, and later figures), but French 'historical epistemology' (e.g., L. Brunschvicg, G. Bachelard, J. Cavaillé, and J. Canguilhem).

The development of several sub-fields of analytic philosophy, too, seems ripe for genuinely historical treatment. Here I would include: metaphysics
the development of measurement technologies in the science of metrology. This perspective is explored in relation to Carnap's long-term interest in scientific measurement, especially his often overlooked 1926 monograph, *Physikalische Begriffsbildung*. The resulting account of Carnap's philosophical attitude is then used to illuminate his side of the famous debate with Quine regarding the analytic/synthetic distinction. The essay ends with a consideration of whether questions in philosophy of technology reveal more telling weaknesses in Carnap's position than do the standard Quinean objections.

Peter Hylton, "Quine and the Aufbau: The Possibility of Objective Knowledge" The third essay also concerns Carnap and Quine, but now with the focus on the latter. Quine interpreted Carnap's *Logischer Aufbau der Welt* as putting forward an empiricist epistemology, along the lines suggested by Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Over the last twenty years or so, this interpretation has been disputed by various interpreters. They have put forward an alternative that emphasizes the neo-Kantian aspects of the *Aufbau* and, in particular, its concern with what makes objective knowledge possible. This essay investigates how we should think about the relationship between Quine's epistemology and that of the *Aufbau*, in the light of this new interpretation. It argues that Quine is engaged in what is in some sense the same enterprise as that which the new interpretation attributes to the *Aufbau* but in very different ways; and that there is something general to be learned about the relation between Carnap and Quine from these differences.

Julia Tanney, "Ryle's Conceptual Cartography" The fourth essay in this volume traces ideas in philosophical logic that ground Gilbert Ryle's work in *The Concept of Mind*. Although he is sometimes mentioned along with Wittgenstein and Austin as an "ordinary language" philosopher, Ryle's affinities and his independent development of notions that are often associated with Wittgenstein and Austin have gone largely unnoticed, especially in discussions of circumstance-dependency or context-sensitivity in the philosophy of language and related areas. In locating Ryle's thoughts in the context of his own elaboration of twentieth-century philosophical logic and in emphasizing his rejection of referential theories of language still assumed in much work today, the essay hopes to make evident the continuing relevance of Ryle's work for a more satisfying understanding of the distinctively conceptual nature of philosophical investigation.

Part II: Broader Themes

In the second part of this volume, the following broader themes come into focus: the philosophy of logic (and Frege's place in its history); the philosophy of mathematics (Frege's and Dedekind's legacies, including their relation); epistemology and the philosophy of psychology (starting with Russell's work on our knowledge of the external world); and the philosophy of language.

2.2 Abstracts for the essays in this volume

Part I: Case Studies

The first part of this volume contains four case studies focused on particular analytic philosophers: Russell (and his role in the rise, as well as for the self-image, of analytic philosophy), Carnap (and the particular form of conceptual engineering practiced by him), Quine (and the relation of his work to Carnap's, as reinterpreted in recent literature), and Ryle (his methodology and the continuing relevance of his philosophy of language). Each of these studieseither continues an earlier debate or pushes research in the history of analytic philosophy in a new direction.

Stewart Candlish, "Philosophy and the Tide of History: Bertrand Russell's Role in the Rise of Analytic Philosophy" This first essay examines the distinction between analytic philosophy and its history by looking afresh at several prominent themes in the most influential writings of Bertrand Russell, from the end of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth century. These include: Russell's early conception of propositions and their constituents; the theory of denoting phrases; the multiple relation theory of judgment and its associated account of truth; the theory of definite descriptions; Russell's view of the status of mathematics; and his treatment of the controversial topic of relations. Overall, the essay exposes some myths, and its attendant dangers, about the origins of analytic philosophy.

Alan Richardson, "Taking the Measure of Carnap's Philosophical Engineering: Metalogic as Metrology" In recent years, a number of scholars, including Richard Creath, A.W. Carus, and Sam Hiller have attributed an engineering conception of philosophy to Rudolf Carnap. This second essay attempts to specify a particular type of engineering sensibility one might attribute to him; it argues that Carnap's attitudes in logic and metalogic were based in
(the analytic/synthetic distinction, not only in terms of the Carnap-Quine debate but also C.I. Lewis' role in it). There is no sharp dividing line between the essays in Parts I and II, as this second group consists of case studies as well, although ones with a somewhat farther reach.

Jeremy Heis, "Frege, Lotze, and Boole" Thirty years ago, Michael Dummett and Hans Sluga engaged in a prolonged controversy over the value of locating Frege's writings in the context of late nineteenth century German philosophy. This essay argues, against Dummett, that, by reading Frege in his historical context, one can judge in a more balanced way the philosophical significance of the new logical language that Frege developed. This historiographic point is illustrated by showing that Frege's criticism of the theory of concept formation implicit in Boolean symbolic logic agrees in significant ways with a criticism given by his contemporary Hermann Lotze. But the essay also argues, against Sluga, that the substantial overlap in their criticisms of Boole should not obscure for us the great philosophical advance that Frege made over Lotze, one that would not have been possible without the invention of Frege's Begriffschrift.

Erich H. Reck, "Frege or Dedekind? Towards a Reevaluation of Their Legacies" Within the analytic tradition, the philosophy of mathematics has long played an important role, ever since the pioneering works of Frege and Russell. Both their and Richard Dedekind's related contributions to the foundations of mathematics are widely acknowledged. The philosophical aspects of Dedekind's contributions have been received more critically, however. In this sixth essay, Dedekind's philosophical reception is reconsidered. At its core lies a comparison of Frege's and Dedekind's legacies, within analytic philosophy and outside it. While the discussion proceeds historically, it is shaped by concerns from current philosophy of mathematics, especially by debates about neo-logicist and neo-structuralist positions. Philosophical and historical considerations are thus intertwined. The underlying motivation is to rehabilitate Dedekind as a major philosopher of mathematics, in relation, but not necessarily in opposition, to Frege.

Gary Hatfield, "Psychology, Epistemology, and the Problem of the External World: Russell and Before" The seventh essay in this volume brings us back to Russell's works. It examines the background to Russell's invocation of psychological considerations in his work on our knowledge of the external world from 1913-14. This background includes the natural realism of William Hamilton, its criticism by J.S. Mill, and the ongoing discussion of the problem of the external world by English philosophers in the 1890s and the following decade, including James Ward, G.F. Stout, S. Hodgson, T. Case, L.T. Hobhouse, and G. Dawes Hicks. In light of this examination, as well as Russell's own description of his 'logical analytic' method, the conclusion is that, on one historically reasonable conception of psychologyism (that deriving from Kant), Russell's appeal to psychology is not psychological, whereas it can be so classed in accordance with the more extreme view (stemming from Frege) that any appeal to the data of experience in epistemology counts as psychologyism.

Thomas Baldwin, "C.I. Lewis and the Analyticity Debate" In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine brackets together C.I. Lewis and Carnap as two pragmatists who, by remaining committed to the analytic/synthetic distinction, have not taken their pragmatism to its proper conclusion. The ensuing debate between Carnap and Quine has been much discussed. In this essay, Lewis's side in this debate is reconsidered, beginning with an account of his pragmatist theory of our a priori conceptual schemes and comparing this with Carnap's empiricist logic of science. In assessing the impact of Quine's arguments on Lewis's position, it is proposed that Kuhn's paradigms indicate an enduring role for a modified version of Lewis's conceptual schemes in philosophy of science; and also, that Wittgenstein's rule-following discussion constitutes a non-Quinean pragmatist approach to logic which connects with some themes from Lewis's writings, though without the odd combination of Platonism and voluntarism which Lewis affirms.

Part III: Methodological Reflections

Finally, the volume contains four essays with sustained reflections on what, from a methodological or historiographic point of view, is involved in studying the history of analytic philosophy and what its benefits might be. This includes: an analysis of the origin and later uses of the notion of rational reconstruction; a reconsideration of the relationship between logical empiricism and the study of the history of science; a critique of some recent work in the history of analytic philosophy as well as the exploration of alternatives to it; and an answer to the question of whether analytic philosophy is moribund, since we are now so much concerned with its history.

Michael Beaney, "Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy: The Development of the Idea of Rational Reconstruction" Analytic philosophers often either scorn or simply ignore the history of philosophy. Where interpretations have been offered of past philosophical works, in what we can call 'analytic' history of philosophy, they have tended to be 'rational reconstructions'. In recent years, however, philosophers trained in the analytic tradition have begun to look at the history of analytic philosophy itself more seriously, thus bringing questions about the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy closer to home. This essay considers some of the philosophical and historiographical presuppositions and implications of this debate, focusing on the idea of rational reconstruction. The latter developed alongside analytic philosophy and holds the key to understanding one
central thread in the relationship between analytic philosophy and history of philosophy.

A.W. Carus, "History and the Future of Logical Empiricism" In studies of the history of the philosophy of science, it has become almost conventional wisdom to regard the differences between Carnap and Thomas Kuhn as resting on misunderstandings and differing rhetorical emphases. This essay argues, in contrast, that the differences were quite fundamental; it was no accident that the acceptance of Kuhn's agenda brought about the demise of logical empiricism. However, room was left in Carnap's conception of 'descriptive pragmatics' for a quite different approach from Kuhn's to the history of science. This opening was exploited by Howard Stein, one of Carnap's students, who used a historical perspective to overcome some of the weaknesses in Carnap's philosophy. Though much less in the limelight than Kuhn and his progeny, Stein's work has had some influence. The resulting body of writings deserves more attention and can be regarded as the basis for a historically informed continuation of logical empiricism.

Michael Kremer, "What Is the Good of Philosophical History?" The next essay in the volume uses Scott Soames's recent work in the history of analytic philosophy as a springboard to examine the value of doing philosophy historically. Soames's work presents a choice between two unsatisfactory conceptions of philosophical history, antiquarianism and presentism. The author of this essay agrees with Soames in rejecting antiquarianism, but draws on general historiography and the historiography of science to show the dangers of Soames's presentism. Following Bernard Williams, a third possibility for understanding the value of philosophical history is developed. Along its lines, work in philosophical history is distinctive in that it is a way of doing philosophy. This requires that we attempt to understand the philosophical past, a task that both presentism and antiquarianism avoid. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of some examples illustrating the value of the approach to philosophical history it recommends, drawn from the work of Cora Diamond.

Hans-Johann Glock, "The Owl of Minerva: Is Analytic Philosophy Moribund?" The current state of analytic philosophy is a combination of triumph and crisis. On the one hand, it is now the dominant force within Western philosophy. On the other hand, there are continuous rumors about the 'demise' of analytic philosophy and complaints about its actual or alleged ills. In view of this situation, the last essay in the volume addresses the following related questions: Has analytic philosophy ceased to be a distinct and potentially vibrant movement? Is the historical turn a manifestation of, or perhaps even a contributing factor to, its demise? Is analytic philosophy in the course of being replaced by a 'post-analytic' philosophy? And should it be superseded by such a movement? The author gives a tentative and qualified 'No!' in answer to all of these questions. To substantiate these answers, he draws not just on classics of analytic philosophy, but also on recent contributions to the burgeoning field of the history and methodology of analytic philosophy.

2.3 Representative bibliography (history of analytic philosophy)

----- (2001): Philosophy in English Since 1945, Oxford University Press


Habicht, G. R. (2008): The Young Carnap’s Unknown Master: Husserl’s Influence on Der Raum und Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey


—, ed. (1999): The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois

Hahn, L.E. & Schilpp, A., eds. (1960): The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois


Notes

I would like to thank Michael Beasney, as editor of the series ‘History of Analytic Philosophy’, both for supporting the present collection from the beginning and for helpful suggestions concerning this introduction. I am also indebted to Jeremy Heis, Pierre Keller, Sally Ness, and Clinton Tolley for various conversations related to the introduction.

1. Talking about ‘the history of philosophy’ is systematically ambiguous: it can refer to a historical development or to the theoretical study of it. I have not adopted a strict terminological distinction in this connection, assuming it will be clear in context what is meant (sometimes both, as in this case).

2. Cf. Glock (2008), pp. 91, 92, and 211, respectively, also for the sources of these remarks. For another illustration, cf. the quote at the beginning of Stewart Candlish’s essay in this volume.

3. For example, the remark attributed to Quine above comes from Machintyre (1984), an article that defends a much more historically oriented approach to philosophy than Quine’s.

4. These remarks are from Fodor’s Home Variations (2003), again as quoted in Glock (2008), p. 92.


6. The theme is introduced in Russell (1900); for a more sweeping application, cf. Russell (1945).

7. Not all ‘ordinary language philosophers’ were dismissive of studying the history of philosophy, though. As two important exceptions, I will come back to Ryle and Strawson below.

8. Cf. Knobe & Nichols (2008) for a manifesto for experimental philosophy. When I was in graduate school (during the 1980s and early 90s), it was cognitive science that played a similar role. Thus a cognitive scientist in my department likely to provoke us students, as well as some of his colleagues, with the declaration that ‘nothing older than five years is worth reading’.


10. Cf. Kant (1781/87), A 836/B 836; and there are similar remarks elsewhere.

11. For Hegel, cf. the Preface to Hegel (1820), also his (1807). For Heidegger, cf. his (1926), (1930), and with respect to his later work, the discussion in Piercy (2009).

12. One early exponent of such views was J.G. Hamann; for a twentieth-century version, cf. Spengler (1923). For the related rise of ‘historicism’ in the discipline of history, cf. Beiser (2012). As is not hard to see, these forms of historicism are in direct conflict with each other; cf. also Bambach (1978).


14. Neo-Kantianism, both in its Marburgian and its Southwestern version, is a different case. It is focused on history of (philosophy and science) as well, but in a less speculative, less pessimistic way. It thus represents a much less radical form of historicism. Similarly for Husserl who, while trying to make philosophy scientific, engaged with history (of science and of philosophy) fruitfully in his later writings. For Neo-Kantianism, cf. Richardson (1998), Friedman (2000), Makreel & Luft (2010), and Beiser (2012); for Husserl, cf. Hyder & Rheinberger (2010).

15. In Foucault’s, Lacan’s, and Derrida’s versions of ‘neo-historicism’, the importance of historical context is again emphasized (in reaction to the anti-historical bent of French structuralism).

16. Cf. Reichenbach (1951) and, especially, Frank (1957). For Carnap’s sympathetic reaction to Kuhn’s work, see Reisch (1991); but compare the essay by A.W. Carus in the present volume.

17. This is witnessed by the founding of HOPOS – the International Society for the History of the Philosophy of Science – in the 1990s; cf. www.hopos.org.


21. The present volume focuses on metaphysics and epistemology (including the philosophy of science, logic, and language). This reflects my own predilections, no doubt, but it also corresponds to where most work on the history of analytic philosophy has been done so far (cf. section 2.1 below).

22. Concerning Quine, Carnap, and the argument in ‘Two Dogmas’, cf. Creeth (2007). There are further cases like Quine’s. To mention just one, the quasi-historical way in which Saul Kripke appeals to (idealized versions of) Frege and Russell in Naming and Necessity (1972) is arguably like Quine’s use of Carnap.

23. For Russell, cf. Candlish (2007), and also Stewart Candlish’s essay in this volume (in which he talks about corresponding ‘myths’); for Frege, cf. the debate between Dummett and Sluga as examined in Jeremy Heis’ essay. I am indebted to Sally Ness for suggesting the phrase ‘philosophical legend’.

24. Similarly for various quasi-historical organizing schemas as used in analytic philosophy, especially in pedagogical contexts. Consider, e.g., the assumption that a ‘linguistic turn’ took place in the 1950s or earlier (cf. Rorty 1967, also Dummett...
As John McDowell puts this point: 'One of the benefits of studying a great philosopher from an alien age is that it can help us to see that we do not have to swim with the currents of our time' (McDowell 1998, pp. 37-38). Similarly, Richard Rorty has emphasized the importance of cultivating a 'healthy skepticism' concerning current philosophy so that we can go beyond it; cf. Rorty (1964).

For further reflections on 'doing philosophical history', see the essays in this volume. Cf. also Rorty et al. (1984), Sorell & Rogers (2005), and more generally, Rée et al. (1978), Hare (1988), Campbell (1992), Gracia (1992), Kräger (2005), Chimirro (2005), Piercey (2009), and Rheinberger (2010).

Further such forms include scholarly editions of an author's writings, e.g., Carnap (forthcoming); editions of philosophical correspondence, e.g., Creagh (1990); selective readers, e.g., Frege (1997); and broader anthologies, e.g., Martinich & Sosa (2001a). More representative examples of each (all from the last 25 years) are included in the bibliography, although it is not meant to be complete.


For the first two sub-forms see, respectively: Open Court's series, Library of Living Philosophers, or the more recent Cambridge Companion series; and Routledge's Critical Assessments of Major Philosophers series. For the third sub-form, cf. Glere & Richardson (1996), Glock (1997), Reck (2002), and Beaney (2007). All relevant volumes of the series by Open Court, Cambridge University Press, and Routledge are listed in the bibliography. For other kinds of volumes, representative samples are provided as well.


Cf. Uebel (1992, 2000), Cartwright et al. (1996), Giere & Richardson (1996), Nemeth & Stadler (1996), Stadler (1996), and Reisch (2005); cf. also Parrini et al. (2003) and Richardson & Uebel (2007). Other publications by the Vienna Circle Institute could also be listed here.


Further reading

— (1783): Prolegomena zu einer reinen kritischen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft von sich selbst erkannt werden soll; English trans., by G. Hatfield, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, 1997