Research Theme: In-between cases of belief and the dispositional approach to believing

Eric Schwitzgebel

Cases in which it is not quite right either to say or to deny that a particular person has a particular belief - what I call "in-between cases of believing" - are pervasive.  Examples include cases of gradual cognitive development, gradual forgetting, self-deception, know-how, recognition without recall, failure to think things through, and situations of low confidence.  I argue that standard representational approaches to belief are ill-equipped to handle such cases and that a dispositional account can manage such cases much more naturally.  Unlike standard dispositional approaches, however, the account I recommend treats as fundamental not only dispositions to behave but also dispositions to have particular conscious experiences.

"Gradual Belief Change in Children" criticizes developmental psychologists for too frequently attempting to assimilate in-between cases of believing to an atomistic model in which the child either really has or really lacks the understanding in question.  "In-Between Believing" describes in detail several cases of in-between believing and argues that a dispositional approach to belief better handles such cases than either a representational or a Bayesian approach.  "A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief" develops the dispositional account of belief in substantial detail and describes its application to in-between cases of belief.  "On Containers and Content, with a Cautionary Note to Philosophers of Mind" warns against atomistic and other features of the container metaphor implicit in talk about mental "content".  The (draft) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Belief" summarizes major themes in the existing literature on belief as I see it.