Philosophy 1: Introduction to Philosophy

In the first segment of the course we will consider skeptical challenges to what is presumed to be commonsense knowledge, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow and that you right now (as you read this) are awake and in a lighted room. Might it be reasonable to doubt such propositions as these? In the second segment of the course we will examine an argument often offered against the existence of the god of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: that if such a god existed, the world would not be so full of evil as it clearly is. In the third segment, we will briefly consider two opposing positions about the nature of the human mind: dualism, which asserts that the mind is independent of the brain (and thus, for example, might possibly continue to exist after the brain has died), and materialism, which asserts that the mind and the brain are the same thing. Finally, we will examine the issue of what it is to be a person. What is it that makes you the same person as the person who enrolled at U.C.R. a few months or years ago? Is it that you have the same body, or the same memories, or the same immaterial soul? Could you conceivably continue to exist after your body has died?

Last taught: Spring 2000.

Philosophy 5: Evil

Unquestionably, the world is rife with evil.  The ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius argued that, nonetheless, evil behavior is contrary to our nature.  The normal heart rebels against it.  Mencius’ opponent, Hsün Tzu, argued for a dimmer view of human nature. 

This course begins with the debate between Mencius and Hsün Tzu, then updates it with an examination of more recent work in history, literature (including film), psychology, philosophy, and primatology.  The course concludes with a brief discussion of whether the prevalence of evil disproves the existence of an omnipotent, benevolent god.

Last taught: Winter 2005.

To be taught: Winter 2006.

Philosophy 110: Asian Philosophy

In this course, we will examine the philosophical tradition in ancient China before unification in 221 B.C. Readings will be drawn from most of the major philosophers of the period, including Confucius, Mo Tzu, Mencius, Chuang Tzu, Lao Tzu, and Hsün Tzu. Particular emphasis will be put on questions about human nature and how life should be lived.

Currently being taught.

Philosophy 130: Theory of Knowledge

In this course, we will examine the history of skepticism and relativism in Western philosophy from ancient to modern times. Readings will include Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, Descartes, Hume, and Feyerabend, among others. Some questions to be addressed are: Are skepticism and relativism coherent positions? What implications, if any, do skepticism and relativism have for how we ought to live our everyday lives?

Last taught: Winter 1999.

Philosophy 134: Philosophy of Mind

Some people have argued that the mind is a special sort of substance, connected only contingently to the brain and possibly able to continue to exist after the body has died. Others assert that mental states are just states of the brain and that there is no special sort of mental substance. In this course, we will consider the arguments for and against these positions and the variety of forms that the positions have taken. We will also consider the implications of these positions for non-human intelligence and life after bodily death.

Last taught: Fall 2004.

Philosophy 137: Philosophy of Science

Since the period of the "scientific revolution" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, science has widely been viewed as employing objective procedures for discovering the truth about the basic laws governing the universe and for revealing, by way of theoretical inference, the unobservable basic entities out of which the universe is composed. In this course, we will examine articulations of aspects of this view by Hempel, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, and Locke, and challenges to it by Carnap, Kuhn, Feyerabend, van Fraassen, Cartwright, and others.

Currently being taught.

Philosophy/Psychology 154: Philosophy of Psychology

This course will treat three topics about which both philosophers and psychologists have had much to say. In the first part of the course, we will address the question of whether prelinguistic infants and non-human animals can be said to have "beliefs" of the sort that we ordinarily ascribe to adult human beings capable of speech. In the second part of the course, we will look at how well we know our own mental states. When I say "I am in pain" or "I am thinking about how that pear got into that narrow-necked bottle," am I saying something about which I could possibly be mistaken? What about when I say that I chose to purchase this pair of socks rather than that other one because I thought the first pair looked better made? The final part of the course will treat the question of whether human nature is good or evil. Do human beings have any natural feelings of repugnancy when confronted with evil, or does a sense of good and evil have to be pounded into us through stern education?

Last taught: Winter 2000.

Philosophy 193: Senior Seminar: "Philosophy of Mind"

This course will involve the close reading of recent seminal papers in philosophy of mind.  Phil 134 is recommended but not required as a prerequisite.

Last taught: Winter 2005.

Philosophy 193: Senior Seminar: "Propositional Attitudes"

Philosophy of mind in the last half-century has been dominated by the (materialist) question of how a mind can arise out of material stuff.  Typically, this question is divided into two parts: first, how can conscious experience arise out of material stuff, and second, how can material stuff exhibit "intentionality", i.e., how can a piece of material be "about" or "directed at" something outside itself?  The first question is the topic of Phil 153, my Philosophy of Mind class.  The second question is the topic of the senior seminar.

"Propositional attitudes" are mental states taking (or potentially taking) "that"-clauses as their objects, e.g., belief, desire, and intention: S believes that P, desires that Q, intends that R.  Philosophers interested in intentionality in the sense described above have typically taken the propositional attitudes as their primary examples.  This class will focus on materialist accounts of the nature of propositional attitudes.  Authors discussed will include Fodor, Dretske, Davidson, Dennett, and Stich, among others.

Taught Spring 2002.

Philosophy 234: Philosophy of Mind

Some people have argued that the mind is a special sort of substance, connected only contingently to the brain and possibly able to continue to exist after the body has died. Others assert that mental states are just states of the brain and that there is no special sort of mental substance. In this course, we will consider the arguments for and against these positions and the variety of forms that the positions have taken. We will also consider the implications of these positions for non-human intelligence and life after bodily death.

This is the graduate companion course to Philosophy 134.

Last taught: Fall 2004.

Philosophy 255B: Proseminar in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Metaphilosophy

This course will treat philosophical method and the epistemology of philosophy. What sort of knowledge can be acquired through philosophy, and how best can that knowledge be attained? In the first two-thirds of the 20^th century, this question was widely debated; it has received less attention in recent years. We will begin by looking at two views of philosophy popular in the middle of the century: the view of philosophy as concerned with clarifying ordinary language and concepts, and the view of philosophy as reforming ordinary language and concepts. In the second half of the course, we will look at more recent views and views contrasting with these two main approaches.

Taught Winter 2000.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Sentiment and Morality

This course will examine two recent books (one by Shaun Nichols, one in draft by Jesse Prinz) that attempt to connect empirical psychological work about moral emotions and “sentiments” with philosophical work in ethics.  Both philosophy and psychology graduate students are welcome.  The course will not assume any particular background knowledge in either field.

Taught Spring 2005.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Introspected Experience

What kinds of conscious experience are revealed through introspection?  Most philosophers and introspective psychologists have recognized experiences falling into at least three broad categories: sensory experience, emotional experience, and imagery (in at least the visual and auditory modalities).  We will discuss basic taxonomic and structural questions about conscious experience, including such questions as: Is there a distinctive phenomenology of thought that is not reducible to sensory, emotional, and imagistic phenomenology?  Is emotional experience essentially experience of one's own physiological state, perhaps supplemented with other, not distinctively emotional phenomenology, or is it sui generis?  Do we have sensory experience of objects or events to which we are not attending?

Readings will be drawn from contemporary and historical philosophy of mind and psychology.  Students will also be expected to do a small amount of "experience sampling" using beepers.

Taught Spring 2004.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Consciousness

You are conscious and your little sister’s stuffed koala bear is not.  One of the central problems in philosophy of mind is to explain how this difference arises.  On traditional dualist views, the difference is due to your having an immaterial soul and that the stuffed koala lacks.  In the last few decades, philosophers of mind have rejected this explanation as incompatible with contemporary science.  Generally, some sort of materialist view is accepted in place of dualism: There are no immaterial substances.  We are composed wholly of fundamental physical particles.  The question then arises how one configuration of fundamental particles (you) could have conscious experience while another (the stuffed koala) does not.  All proposed answers to this question appear to face serious objections.  In this course, we will read two authors who reject the contemporary materialist orthodoxy yet also avoid traditional substance dualism.  David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind is one of the most widely discussed philosophy texts of the 1990s.  Steven Horst’s Mind and the World of Nature is not yet published, and feedback the author receives from participants in the course may influence the final text.

Taught Spring 2003

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Introspection

Philosophers since Descartes have often believed that we have infallible (or "incorrigible") knowledge of some of our mental states, especially our own current conscious experiences. In the twentieth century, this view has come under a range of attacks, though most philosophers and psychologists still believe that there is some kind of "first-person privilege" in reaching judgments about at least certain features of one’s own mental life. This course will examine a broad range of views on this topic, among both philosophers and psychologists.

Taught Fall 2001.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Know-How and the Diffusion of Mind in the World

We will examine the writings of philosophers of mind, such as Gilbert Ryle, John Dewey, Hubert Dreyfus, and Andy Clark, who have used reflection on know-how to challenge internalist and propositional approaches to the mind.

Taught Spring 2001.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Evil and Human Nature

A classic debate in philosophy, frequently traced back to Hobbes and Rousseau but having roots in the ancient Chinese tradition as well, is the debate about whether human nature is good or evil. In the first three weeks of this seminar, we will look at the philosophical origins of this debate in Hobbes, Rousseau, Mencius, and Hsün Tzu. In the remainder of the seminar we will update the debate by looking at relevant examples of contemporary research in a number of disciplines, including social and developmental psychology, history, and primatology.

Taught Fall 1998.

Philosophy 280: Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy: Belief

In this seminar we will examine the nature of belief and knowledge. Particular attention will be paid to cases in which it seems not quite right to describe a person either as fully believing a particular proposition or as fully failing to believe it. Cases of this sort will be drawn from the literatures in philosophy (e.g., self-deception), cognitive psychology (e.g., implicit memory), and developmental psychology (e.g., Vygotsky's "zone of proximal development").

Taught Spring 1998.