The Prospects and Challenges of Measuring Morality

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Short Abstract

This paper considers the prospects and challenges—both practical and ethical—of measuring how generally moral a person is. We outline the conceptual and methodological requirements for measuring general morality and argue that it would be difficult to operationalize a measure that satisfies these requirements. But even if a general measure of morality is not feasible, there is promise in developing measures of more specific manifestations of morality and aspects of moral functioning that do not necessarily reflect overall moral goodness. We advocate caution about what we can and cannot conclude based on various moral assessments.
Long Abstract

The scientific study of morality requires measurement tools. But can we measure individual differences in something so seemingly subjective, elusive, and difficult to define? This paper will consider the prospects and challenges—both practical and ethical—of measuring how moral a person is. We outline the conceptual requirements for measuring general morality and argue that it would be difficult to operationalize morality in a way that satisfies these requirements. Even if we were able to surmount these conceptual challenges, self-report, informant report, behavioral, and biological measures each have methodological limitations that would substantially undermine their validity or feasibility. These challenges will make it more difficult to develop valid measures of general morality than other psychological traits. But, even if a general measure of morality is not feasible, it does not follow that moral psychological phenomena cannot or should not be measured at all. Instead, there is more promise in developing measures of specific operationalizations of morality (e.g., commonsense morality), specific manifestations of morality (e.g., specific virtues or behaviors), and other aspects of moral functioning that do not necessarily reflect moral goodness (e.g., moral self-perceptions). Still, it is important to be transparent and intellectually humble about what we can and cannot conclude based on various moral assessments—especially given the potential for misuse or misinterpretation of value-laden, contestable, and imperfect measures. Finally, we outline recommendations and future directions for psychological and philosophical inquiry into the development and use of morality measures.

Keywords: moral measurement, moral assessment, general morality, overall morality, moral character, moral psychology
The Prospects and Challenges of Measuring Morality

In the TV show *The Good Place* (Schur, 2016), every action during a person’s time on Earth is assigned a positive or negative moral weight (see Figure 1). These points can then be summed up to form a definitive measure of a person’s overall morality from the point of the universe. Imagine what power we’d have if we could objectively catalog a person’s moral goodness in this way. Who should we befriend, marry, hire, lend large sums of money to, trust with our darkest secrets, vote into positions of power, or assiduously avoid? An accurate morality measure would also allow us to evaluate moral improvement strategies (Meindl et al., 2018; Persson & Savulescu, 2013) and resolve debates about whether society is making moral progress (Mastroianni & Gilbert, 2023; Pinker, 2018). When measuring a person’s temperature, we employ thermometers rather than relying on people’s gut feelings or making do with correlates like sweating and shivering. Similarly, it seems desirable to not have to rely on intuitive hunches about whether someone is a good person. Could we instead invent a scientifically valid *moralometer*?

In reality, morality measurement is not as simple as Figure 1 suggests. For example, we do not have a God’s-eye view of a person’s morality, the moral goodness of any particular action might depend on details not captured in such general action descriptions, and positive and negative moral actions or traits might not be amenable to aggregation into a single overall numerical score. We will argue that realistic morality measurement is plagued both by conceptual difficulties in quantifying moral goodness (see Table 1) and by practical challenges in capturing the relevant thoughts, feelings, motivations, and behaviors using available methods for psychological assessment (see Table 2). For these reasons, a valid *general moralometer* could probably never exist. And, given the potential for misuse or misinterpretation of necessarily
imperfect and contestable summary moral assessments of people, we have an ethical responsibility to avoid drawing broad individual-level conclusions based on such measures.

Figure 1
Point System from The Good Place (Schur, 2016)

However, even if an adequate general moralometer is not feasible, it does not follow that morally-relevant phenomena cannot or should not be measured at all. As we discuss below, the conceptual, methodological, and ethical challenges of measuring general morality can often be mitigated when the measurement aims are more modest (e.g., specific operationalizations, virtues, or contexts) or when research aims and conclusions are appropriately calibrated to the strengths of the measure (e.g., if self-report measures are interpreted as capturing moral self-perceptions; see Table 3). Accordingly, we conclude with recommendations for increasing transparency, intellectual humility, and caution in moral measurement (see Table 4).
Conceptual Requirements

To construct a general moralometer, we propose that: (1) There must be general facts about people’s moral goodness; (2) The measure must correctly identify which characteristics are morally good or bad; (3) The measure must correctly weigh different components of morality against each other; and (4) The measure must apply clearly and consistently across people and time. Together, these proposed requirements set an extremely high bar for any measure that claims to capture a person’s general moral goodness. Given the seriousness of such a claim, a high bar seems appropriate.

We begin by introducing two general approaches to constructing a morality measure on the basis of flexible or fixed criteria. We then consider to extent to which flexible and fixed measures plausibly satisfy each of the four conceptual requirements for general morality (see Table 1). Throughout the article, we use the term “target” to refer to the person whose morality is being measured, and the term “judge” to refer to a person who is providing an evaluation of a target’s morality (but note that not all measures involve human judges, e.g., objective behavioral measures). In the case of self-reports, the target and the judge are the same person.

Flexible or Fixed Measures

To construct a morality measure, we can use either (a) flexible criteria based on judges’ understandings of how to evaluate and weight the various facets of morality into a general score, or (b) fixed criteria that deliver a general score based on criteria selected by and weighted by the researchers. Mixed criteria might have both fixed and flexible aspects—for example, creating a weighted average of one flexible participant-determined assessment and several fixed, researcher selected measures, or weighting four different facets of morality equally but permitting judges to reach flexible judgments about each facet individually.
Table 1  
*Conceptual Requirements for Constructing Valid Flexible vs. Fixed Measures of General Morality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual requirement</th>
<th>Flexible</th>
<th>Fixed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There must be general moral facts about a person’s morality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Realism: There must be facts about what is (im)moral; <em>and</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Universalism: The same general things must be (im)moral for different people or in different groups; <em>and</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Generalism: Morality must not depend on highly particular features of specific situations.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The measure must correctly identify which characteristics are morally good or bad.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Judges’ idiosyncratic moral judgments are correct; <em>or</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commonsense ethics, as operationalized by the researchers, is correct; <em>or</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The favored expert ethical framework is correct.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The measure must correctly weigh different components of morality against each other.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unity: Morality must be a coherent construct; <em>and</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commensurability: There must be a common “currency” in which components of morality can be appropriately compared.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The measure must apply clearly and consistently across people, groups, and time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Transparency: It must be clear what is being measured; <em>and</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Equivalence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A fixed measure must capture the same thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviors across people; <em>and</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A fixed measure must have the same moral significance across people; <em>or</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- For flexible measures, judges must use the same criteria to judge a person’s morality; <em>and, depending on the aim</em></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The measure must be psychologically relevant.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
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*Note.* - = Not applicable; ✔️ = Requirement is likely satisfied; ! = Significant difficulty; !! = Major difficulty.

The simplest flexible measure might be a single-item question about a person’s general morality: “How moral are you?” (self-report) or “How moral is [target’s name]?” (informant report), and the response scale might range from 0 (*completely immoral*) to 100 (*morally perfect*). The key feature of a flexible measure is that it does not specify which traits or behaviors
are “good” or “virtuous.” Such a measure defers all questions about the substance of morality to judges’ personal understandings—even if the judge’s understandings differ from the target’s.

An alternative to the flexible, subjective approach is to use a fixed set of criteria, which could be derived from philosophical theories, religious prescriptions, cultural values, or a consensus-based commonsense morality. For example, one might operationalize morality as a composite of moral virtues (e.g., compassion, honesty, fairness, and loyalty; Furr et al., 2022; Helzer et al., 2014), as the extent to which a person embodies utilitarian values, or as a composite based on a person’s meat-eating, environmental, and charitable donation behaviors. This approach is fixed in the sense that a person’s moral temperature is assessed based on the extent to which they align with prespecified criteria—even if that person thinks that such tendencies are morally irrelevant or are even indicative of immorality.

**Are There General Moral Facts?**

Moral measurement requires that there be general moral facts for the measure to capture. Moral relativists, particularists, and skeptics challenge the idea that such facts exist. Moral relativists hold that different things are (im)moral for different people or in different groups or cultures (Gowans, 2021). This isn’t the obvious point that people sometimes judge different things as being (im)moral (discussed below) but the less obvious idea that different things actually are (im)moral for different people or in different groups. Moral particularists believe that morality is not about applying consistent rules; rather, what’s morally right or wrong frequently depends on particular features of specific situations that cannot be fully codified in advance (Dancy, 2017). Moral skeptics (Sinott-Armstrong, 2019) reject the validity of moral claims altogether, viewpoint-relativized or not.
If the most extreme forms of moral relativism, particularism, or skepticism are true, then no moralometer could possibly work because there won’t be general truths about people’s morality, or the truths will be so situation-dependent as to defy any practical attempt at measurement. We assume the falsity of the most extreme forms of moral relativism and skepticism according to which genocide, for example, doesn’t warrant universal condemnation. However, moderate versions of moral relativism and particularism cannot be so easily discounted. Cultures might reasonably differ, for example, on the age of sexual consent (e.g., 16 in Cuba vs. 18 in Turkey), and social groups might reasonably differ in standards of generosity in sharing resources with neighbors and kin. And, in accord with moderate particularism, how morally bad it is to fail to help a stranger or how morally good it is to donate a $100 windfall can vary substantially depending on specific details that are difficult to know from afar or codify in advance (e.g., maybe helping a male stranger is riskier for women, maybe the $100 would help cover necessary dental work for one’s children).

To the extent that moderate versions of moral relativism or particularism are correct, they introduce substantial challenges. Moderate moral relativism and particularism suggest that the farther the researcher or judge stands from the social group or situation of the target, the more likely they are to apply inappropriate standards. Because fixed measures are applied equally to all targets, such measures will be, at best, incomplete or noisy, failing to capture important group- or situation-specific aspects of morality. At worst, fixed measures risk inappropriately importing researchers’ own group-specific standards to different contexts. If so, flexible measures, employed by knowledgeable judges who are sensitive to locally appropriate standards, will have an advantage. However, even flexible measures will fail if they are employed by outgroup judges who employ the wrong standards or are ignorant of relevant situational details.


**How Should We Determine What is Morally Good vs. Bad?**

Assuming that some general facts exist about what is morally good or bad, we need a measure that accurately captures these facts. Should we rely on the moral understanding of the individual, the consensus of many people, or a formal moral framework?

**Idiosyncratic Morality.** Flexible measures assume that the self or informants (“judges”) know the relevant moral facts. This assumption faces the problems of *moral disagreement* (people disagree about what is morally good vs. bad) and *moral ignorance* (even if people agree with each other, they might all be mistaken). Moral disagreement and ignorance pose substantial challenges for measurement equivalence and psychological relevance (issues we discuss below). Here, however, we focus on their implications for the accuracy of flexible moral judgements.

There is clearly some degree of convergence among people on what morality is, both within and between cultures. For example, within U.S. culture, when asked to rate the moral relevance of various personality measures, undergraduate students from two different universities came to almost identical conclusions ($r = .98$) about which traits were more (e.g., compassion, honesty, fairness) vs. less (e.g., anxiety, sociability, creativity) morally relevant (Sun & Goodwin, 2020; see also Fleeson et al., 2023). Between cultures, ancient Chinese philosophers, for example, celebrate familiar virtues and behaviors, such as “trustworthiness” (*xin* 信), “loyalty” (*zhōng* 忠), and “benevolence” (*rén* 仁) (Van Norden & Ivanhoe, 2023).

Nevertheless, there is also considerable diversity in people’s moral judgments (Graham et al., 2016; Meindl & Graham, 2014). For example, whereas political liberals and conservatives both consider harm/care and fairness to be important moral foundations, conservatives also emphasize the importance of respect for authority, loyalty, and purity (Graham et al., 2009). Moral judgments of the same behavior can even go in the opposite direction: Pro-life and pro-
choice activists may both judge themselves to be highly moral when enacting their moral values but would judge each other to be acting immorally. Even worse, people with noxious worldviews might ignorantly rate themselves and their counterparts very positively (e.g., notorious Nazi Adolf Eichmann appears to have thought highly of fellow Nazis’ moral character; Arendt, 1963). More idiosyncratically, particular judges might have particular moral blindspots for reasons specific to their specific individual personalities or histories.

Commonsense Morality. One alternative to relying on idiosyncratic judgments is to defer to what people typically agree upon as being moral or immoral. That is, it is possible to use a consensus-based approach to develop a fixed measure of morality. For example, participants in Sun and colleagues (under review) generally rated traits such as compassion, honesty, fairness, and loyalty as being highly morally relevant. Consensus ratings can then be used to select traits for inclusion in a composite measure.

Such an approach treats commonsense morality as approximately correct. However, institutionalized slavery and the disenfranchisement of women were once considered morally acceptable, and some would argue that commonsense morality similarly fails to recognize currently ongoing moral catastrophes (Enriquez, 2021; E. G. Williams, 2015). Conversely, some practices that were once widely condemned (e.g., homosexuality, having children out of wedlock) are now generally considered to be morally acceptable (at least in Western, liberal, secular cultures). More generally, human cooperative tendencies evolved in small communities in which it was arguably adaptive to have a bias towards the near future while discounting outcomes for future generations (Law et al., 2023; Syropoulos et al., 2023), to restrict one’s altruism to a small circle of kin (Crimston et al., 2016), to be slow to sympathize with larger numbers of people (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997), and to weigh harmful actions more than
harmful omissions (Spranca et al., 1991). Some philosophers would argue that such moral dispositions aggravate the greatest moral challenges of today’s modern world (Caviola et al., 2021; Greene, 2014; Jaeger & van Vugt, 2022; Persson & Savulescu, 2012). If ordinary moral character judgments derive mostly from everyday social interactions (Westra, 2022) rather than the extent to which a person is doing good for the world more broadly, then on some philosophical conceptions of morality, ordinary judgments will omit a large part of morality. For these reasons, treating shared, non-expert intuitions as a reliable guide to moral truth is scientifically and philosophically questionable.

**Ethical Frameworks.** If researchers wish to circumvent the major issues associated with a reliance on participants’ idiosyncratic moral judgments or commonsense morality, they must make—and be prepared to defend—explicit moral commitments as to what a more appropriate fixed standard is. This is a big ask, given that even philosophers and theologians who spend their lifetimes reflecting on such issues do not agree with one another on what the moral truths are (Shafer-Landau, 1994; Yaden & Anderson, 2021). If researchers have an incorrect moral theory, their moral measurements will likely also be misguided.

For example, is being a moral person about consistently making consequentialist decisions that maximize overall benefits and minimize overall harms (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2022), about following deontological rules (e.g., do not lie; do not kill; Larry & Moore, 2021), or about embodying particular virtues (e.g., honesty, compassion, temperance; Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2023)? These ethical frameworks often produce different conclusions about moral goodness. The notorious “trolley problem” case of killing one innocent person to save five others—endorsed by (most) consequentialists but condemned by (most) deontologists—is only the beginning. Complicating the issue, advocates of each framework often disagree about mid-level principles
or particular actions. For example, how much should we consider the consequences for currently existing lives vs. future generations, and is it better to maximize total happiness or average happiness (Caviola et al., 2022; Parfit, 2011)? Which particular deontological rules or virtues are morally relevant? Decisions between general frameworks—and among their variants—could have huge ramifications for moral measurement.

**How Should We Weight Different Aspects of Morality?**

Goods are considered “incommensurable” if there is no fact of the matter about how they should be weighed relative to each other. $20 bills and $10 bills are commensurable: One of the former is worth exactly two of the latter. Unlike the “Point System” in *The Good Place* (see Figure 1), in reality, it is not clear that there is a common “moral currency” upon which moral and immoral characteristics can be readily compared (cf. Weisel & Shalvi, 2022). For example, who is more moral: Tara (who is stingy but fair) vs. Nicholle (who is generous but plays favorites); Justin (who regularly helps others for selfish reasons) vs. Ryan (who has morally pure intentions but rarely follows through); or Anika (who kills a dog) vs. Nathan (who fails to prevent the death of a dog)? And how should peoples’ conduct across the civic, professional, and personal spheres be weighted? There might be no conceptually rigorous way to generate a single numerical score that combines different moral virtues, different psychological components (e.g., thoughts, feelings, motivations, behaviors, and outcomes), acts of commission vs. omission, and conduct within different relational roles.

The extent to which commensurability is an issue depends on your moral theory. Overall, the idea that there is a common feature that makes virtues as disparate as kindness, honesty, and loyalty all instances of “morality” is highly contested (for a simplified overview of proposals, see Table S1; for a review, see Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012). If there is no single “essence”
that unifies morality, then there is arguably no common metric upon which moral and immoral acts can be compared. Even on the seemingly most commensurable of moral theories—classical utilitarianism—accurately comparing moral worth of two actions might be practically infeasible. Classical utilitarian consequentialists would argue that moral acts are commensurable based on the resulting balance of pleasure vs. pain (see also Schein & Gray, 2018). On this view, acts of dishonesty and acts of disloyalty can be converted to a common hedonic metric. However, this assumes that it is possible to assess the hedonic consequences of each act. Because the consequences of an action may involve complex chains of events and unintended consequences, this might be impossible in practice (Dahl, 2023; Lenman, 2000; Schwitzgebel, forthcoming-a). For example, in *The Good Place* (Season 3, Episode 10), a man gave his grandmother a dozen roses in 2009. This ostensibly kind act lost him four moral points because the roses were grown with toxic pesticides, picked by exploited workers, and created profits for a racist billionaire CEO who sexually harasses his female employees. Thus, even on the seemingly most commensurable of moral theories, accurately comparing moral worth of two actions might be practically infeasible.

Again, we favor a moderate view. Plausibly, in many cases there is no single best weighting, but approximate judgments remain possible. As an analogy, health and money are often treated as incommensurable. But even if health and money can’t be precisely weighed against each other, extreme cases permit straightforward decisions. Most of us would gladly accept a scratch on a finger for the sake of a million dollars and would gladly pay $10 to avoid stage IV cancer. Similarly, Stalin was clearly morally worse than Martin Luther King, Jr., even if Stalin had some virtues and King some vices. Severe sexual harassment of an employee is worse than fibbing to your spouse to get out of washing the dishes.
If correct, moderate incommensurability limits the precision of any possible moralometer, whether flexible or inflexible, and to some extent regardless of moral theory, at least in practice. Vices and virtues, and rights and wrongs of different types, will be amenable to only rough comparison, not precise determination in a single common coin.

**Does the Measure Apply Clearly and Consistently Across People, Groups, and Time?**

A measure can only be used to compare people and groups if it retains the same, clear meaning regardless of who is conducting the moral evaluation, and if it applies consistently across people, groups, and time. If a measure produces scores that vary widely and unsystematically depending on either the judge or the target of evaluation, then it is not capturing determinate moral facts about the target. If a measure yields consistent results but those results are difficult to interpret, it likewise fails to constitute a useful moralometer. Flexible measures raise serious challenges concerning both *transparency* (clarity about what is being measured) and *equivalence* (the same features are being measured regardless of judge and target). Fixed measures mitigate these challenges somewhat, but at the potential cost of their moral relevance.

**Inconsistent Standards.** Flexible measures allow judges to use their own moral standards to evaluate a targets’ morality. This flexibility entails a substantial risk that different judges’ moral ratings will be based on different considerations. Consider, for example, two hypothetical targets (Abigail and Chien-Ho) and two judges (Ishtpreet and Barny; see Figure 2). Abigail is more compassionate and fair but less respectful of authority and pure than Chien-Ho. Ishtpreet only cares about compassion and fairness, whereas Barny considers all four domains to be equally morally relevant. Ishtpreet is therefore likely to rate Abigail as being more moral than Chien-Ho, whereas Barny will reach the opposite conclusion. If we apply the simplifying (but of course, disputable) assumption that all four virtues are equally relevant to morality, Barny will be
correct (and Ishtpreet incorrect). Even in less extreme cases where judges agree on which traits are morally relevant, they might not weight the traits similarly.

**Figure 2**

*Moral Disagreement Results in the Use of Different Standards for Judging Morality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Judge</th>
<th>Ishtpreet</th>
<th>Barny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abigail</td>
<td>Cues</td>
<td>++ Compassion ++ Fairness - Respect for authority - Purity</td>
<td>++ Compassion ++ Fairness - Respect for authority - Purity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Cues</td>
<td>Chien-Ho's moral character</td>
<td>Barny's judgment: +++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chien-Ho</td>
<td>Cues</td>
<td>++ Compassion + Fairness + Respect for authority ++ Purity</td>
<td>+ Compassion + Fairness ++ Respect for authority ++ Purity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Cues</td>
<td>Chien-Ho's moral character</td>
<td>Barny's judgment: ++++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Application of Brunswik's (1956) lens model (see Funder, 1995, for an extension). For this hypothetical example, we apply the simplifying assumptions that the four virtues (1) are in fact equally relevant to morality (that is, they are all valid cues) and (2) are commensurable, such that each + counts as one positive moral point, and each – counts as one negative moral point. We also assume that judges either use the cues (as indicated by a line from the cue to judgment) or do not use the cues (as indicated by the absence of such line), even though in reality, judges may use different cues to varying extents. Here, Barny validly utilizes all four cues, whereas Ishtpreet only utilizes two out of the four valid cues. Therefore, Barny achieves higher accuracy than Ishtpreet.

**Lack of Transparency.** Traditionally, “personality traits” were contrasted with “highly evaluative descriptors” (e.g., “good,” “worthy,” “admirable”) that were considered to be too
vague and devoid of descriptive content to be behaviorally informative (Allport & Odbert, 1936; Ashton et al., 2004; Cattell, 1943; Norman, 1967; see also the distinction between “thick” and “thin” evaluative terms in philosophy; Väyrynen, 2021; B. Williams, 2011). Likewise, it is unclear which virtues, thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and contextual features are the inputs for a judge’s flexible “black box” evaluation of a target’s moral goodness. When there are no specific descriptive referents, it is difficult to ascertain whether judges are using appropriate moral standards. Such flexible evaluations also provide no concrete information about how we should expect a “moral” or “immoral” person to think, feel, and act in general or in particular situations. Consequently, the resulting measure is difficult to interpret.

We could ask the judges to provide open-ended justifications of their general flexible moral ratings, or to additionally report on various traits that may have informed their general moral judgments (e.g., Sun et al., under review). Such an approach could help reveal some of the considerations that may have informed these flexible judgments. However, this would provide only a rough approximation of which kinds of moral considerations were involved, and might not reveal how these various considerations were weighed against each other or crucial morally relevant details of the target and their situation. Moreover, judges may not be fully aware of all the considerations and biases (e.g., stereotypes) that influenced their general moral evaluations.

**Costs to Moral Relevance.**

**Actual Moral Relevance.** Fixed measures offer greater transparency about which specific thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are being measured because the criteria and their relative weights are predefined and applied equally to all targets. But—in keeping with moderate relativism and particularism—beneath the seeming consistency of fixed measures can lie substantial moral variability. For example, a fixed moralometer that is based on a specific
weighting of a set of moral virtues for which there is historical and cross-cultural consensus (e.g., compassion, honesty, and fairness) could be used to compare people from two different groups on the average of these virtues. But if the traits carry different moral weights in those different groups, or if some group-specific virtues are not included in that composite (e.g., sexual purity, religiosity), the same fixed moralometer would have a different moral meaning when applied to people from the two groups. Similarly, the moral goodness of donating $10 to charity might differ depending on whether the participant is wealthy, middle class, or impoverished. Therefore, even if a fixed measure captures the same psychological referents at some level of description, there is no guarantee that such a measure can accurately reflect the moral goodness of people in different groups, situations, or across time.

**Psychological Moral Relevance.** Costs to actual moral relevance apply if the moral facts are truly different depending on the group and context (as per moderate particularism and relativism) and a fixed measure is used. However, even if a fixed measure employs the correct conception of morality, if this conception deviates too much from a target’s personal understanding of morality, fixed measures might lack psychological moral relevance (Meindl & Graham, 2014). That is, fixed measures risk dissociation from morality-related psychological processes and consequences such as blame, guilt, and admiration. This concern arises especially when fixed measures are derived from philosophical frameworks or from a culturally- or historically-specific commonsense morality and applied to targets in a different context.

For example, suppose that, after much philosophizing, researchers settle on a utilitarian solution, defining morality as acting in ways that impartially maximize welfare to all beings in the present and future (Kahane et al., 2018). Accordingly, it is morally better to donate $20,000 to help the global poor than to spend that money on your child’s college tuition. A person who is
extremely kind to their loved ones but who never donates to charity is morally worse than someone who is a jerk to the people around them but saves two lives per year by donating 10% of their income to highly-effective charities. It is even selfish to keep both kidneys when only one is needed for survival and the other kidney could save a stranger’s life. Such conclusions might be philosophically well-justified; however, if they represent a substantial departure from ordinary moral intuitions, they will be foreign and unpalatable to the average person. If so, then the measure will fail to capture the psychology of morality as people themselves understand it.

For some purposes, it might not matter that a morality measure lacks psychological moral relevance. However, much of what is interesting about human morality depends on its psychological meaning. For example, people who use pornography while judging this to be morally wrong express greater psychological distress than do those who do not judge it morally wrong (Grubbs & Perry, 2019). Whereas people who are moral in the sense of embodying widely-accepted character traits such as compassion, honesty, and fairness tend to be better-liked and respected (Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016), there appear to be social costs of making utilitarian decisions (Everett et al., 2018; Law et al., 2022). A moralometer that diverges too much from everyday conceptions of morality might cease to be practically useful. Flexible measures have an advantage here, but if judges disagree on what constitutes morality, one judge’s flexible judgment may not be psychologically relevant to other judges.

Summary

In sum, an intimidating array of conceptual challenges emerge in the quest to measure general morality. Researchers who wish to claim that they are measuring the “One True Morality” (Dahl, 2023) must defend the assumptions that there are general moral facts and that the measure accurately identifies and weighs these facts. For the reasons described, any purely
flexible measure will be untenable. Fixed measures are better, but daunting challenges remain. Given the immense philosophical disagreement about such matters, we regard it as unlikely that any proposed moralometer would pass conceptual muster in the view of most theorists. Moreover, in the unlikely situation that all of these requirements were fulfilled, the resulting measure may not be recognizable or accepted as being morally relevant to all people who are being measured.

**Methodological Requirements**

Even if we were able to overcome these conceptual difficulties, additional challenges arise for the practical development of a measure. We see four main classes of methods for constructing a moralometer: self-report, informant report, behavior, and biological markers. Each of these methods raise issues of bias, diagnosticity, and feasibility (see Table 2). Although each of these challenges apply to some extent to the measurement of most psychological traits, we argue that they pose particular challenges for the measurement of morality (an issue we return to in the discussion).

**Four Approaches to Morality Measurement**

**Self-Report**

Self-report is the bread and butter of personality assessment (Soto & John, 2017; Soto, 2019). Therefore, to find out how moral a person is, perhaps we could just ask them. For example, the Moral Characteristics Questionnaire (Furr et al., 2022), contains self-report measures of global moral character, compassion, fairness, honesty, loyalty, respect, and purity.

**Informant Report**

Friends, family members, romantic partners, acquaintances, coworkers, and teachers have many opportunities to observe our behavior and form moral impressions of us. Most self-report
questionnaires can be adapted to the informant perspective, simply by substituting the target’s name (e.g., “Geoff tends to act morally”, 1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly disagree*); Sun & Goodwin, 2020). Therefore, instead of asking people to report on their own morality, we might be able to rely on other people’s impressions.

**Table 2**

*Methodological Requirements for Measuring General Morality using Self-Report, Reputation-Based, Behavioral, or Biological Measures*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological requirement</th>
<th>Self-report</th>
<th>Reputation</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Biology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges have full information about the target’s relevant characteristics.</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges can form an unbiased impression of the target’s traits.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges are willing to truthfully report their impressions of the target.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure has a concrete, specific referent.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure is diagnostic of the target’s general tendencies.</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure is feasible enough to be implemented at scale.</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* - = Not applicable; ✔ = Requirement is likely satisfied; ! = Significant difficulty; !! = Major difficulty. Reputation = assume a best-case scenario where there are multiple judges who know the target from different domains of life.

**Behavioral Measures**

Instead of relying on human judges’ subjective impressions, we could directly observe what people do. Behaviors can be assessed to some extent via self-report or informant report (e.g., Rushton et al., 1981). For the purposes of this discussion, however, we refer specifically to direct observation of “actual behavior” (Baumeister et al., 2007), which we define, in line with Furr (2009), as explicit “verbal utterances (excluding verbal reports in psychological assessment contexts) or movements that are potentially available to careful observers using normal sensory
processes” (p. 372). This is in contrast to implicit or cognitive-attentional measures such as eye movements or reaction times in the Implicit Association Test (Kurdi et al., 2019).

Actual behavior can be measured via (a) lab-based or online behavioral tasks (e.g., the fairness of a person’s dictator game allocations; Zhao et al., 2017; cheating tasks; Gerlach & Teodorescu, 2022; children’s helping, comforting and sharing behaviors; Davidov et al., 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Ziv & Sommerville, 2017), (b) wearable devices (e.g., kindness-related behaviors captured via audio recordings of everyday conversations; Bollich et al., 2016), (c) digital footprints (e.g., hate speech expressed in social media forums; Kennedy et al., 2022), and (d) objective personal records (e.g., transaction records to measure charitable giving or meat-eating; Ebert et al., 2021; Schwitzgebel et al., 2020; arrest and conviction records to measure criminal behavior; Dodge et al., 2015). Whereas some behavioral observation methods still rely on human judgment (e.g., when judging whether a child “comforted” an adult in the lab or whether a person “expressed gratitude” in an audio recording), other behaviors can be objectively captured (e.g., via transaction records).

**Biological Measures**

Finally, given that all psychological traits have a biological basis (DeYoung et al., 2022; Krueger & Johnson, 2021), perhaps we could develop a moralometer based on genetic markers, brain structure and function, or physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance, hormone levels).

**Can Human Judges Be Trusted?**

The validity of self- and informant reports of morality depends on the extent to which a person is able and willing to accurately report on their own or others’ morality (respectively).

**Can Judges Form Accurate Moral Impressions?**
Two factors influence people’s ability to form accurate moral impressions of themselves and of others: the availability of information about relevant thoughts, feelings, motivations, and behaviors, and judgment biases that cause people to form different opinions based on the same information (Vazire, 2010). The broader the trait, the more difficult it is to meet these requirements. For example, assuming that morality comprises multiple traits (e.g., compassion, honesty, and fairness), one must have access to information about and be able to form accurate impressions of each of the constituent traits to correctly assess a person’s general morality.

**Information Availability.** On the ability side, people are in a privileged position of having continuous and relatively direct access to not only their behaviors, but also their thoughts, feelings, motivations, and relevant context. This means that—barring memory lapses (Carlson et al., 2020) or perceptual deficiencies (Wright et al., 2020)—people are less likely than their acquaintances to lack relevant information that could be used to judge their own morality. In contrast, informants are not always with the target and generally have less access to the target’s relevant thoughts, feelings, and motivations. Moreover, because people play different relational roles in our lives, our romantic partners, coworkers, friends, and teachers will each observe us in limited and possibly unrepresentative contexts. Thus, each informant report is based on only a fraction of the information that is available to the self. Such self–other differences are likely exacerbated for certain moral traits (Thielmann et al., 2017). For example, it is arguably more difficult for a person to hide how (un)compassionate they are than how (dis)honest they are, because judging someone’s honesty requires knowing both (a) the truth and (b) the fact that someone is misrepresenting it.

**Judgment Biases.** Despite the self’s informational advantages, self-serving ego-protective biases (Paulhus & John, 1998) may prevent people from being able to admit to
themselves that they have substantial moral shortcomings. According to the Self–Other Knowledge Asymmetry Model (Vazire, 2010), others have an advantage compared to the self when judging highly evaluative traits if the traits are also highly observable. The logic is that other-perceptions are less likely to be distorted by ego-protective biases because there is less at stake when judging others’ morality (vs. our own). Also, excessive focus on internal states (e.g., good intentions) might bias self-evaluations, whereas informants relying on observable moral behaviors might form evaluations founded more on concrete evidence (Klein & Epley, 2017).

However, informants’ ability to form impartial judgments can depend on their relationship with the target. Being well-acquainted with targets is associated with greater accuracy and with less positivity bias, whereas liking them is associated with lower accuracy and greater positivity bias (Wessels et al., 2020). Thus, the ideal informant is someone who knows you well, but does not particularly like you. However, there is generally a tradeoff between familiarity and liking, such that those who are better able to provide an impartial judgment also have less information (Wessels et al., 2020). And, in practice, people tend to select informants who have positive perceptions of them (Leising et al., 2010). Informant reports may therefore be contaminated not by self-serving biases, but by “pal-serving biases” (Leising et al., 2010). In fact, informant reports tend to be even more positive than self-reports (Kim et al., 2019).

Given these differences in bias and information, if informant reports are used, at a minimum, it is important to hold the informant type constant between targets (e.g., using only friends as informants). Given that any single informant has an incomplete and potentially idiosyncratic perspective on a target’s moral behaviors, however, sampling multiple informants across different relational roles (e.g., recruiting one friend, one romantic partner, and one coworker to report on each target) would be ideal. Indeed, a structural advantage of informant
reports over self-reports is that it may be possible to gain more reliable measurements by aggregating across multiple informants. Thus, even if the self and others were equally accurate, an aggregate of multiple informant reports—which reflects the target’s moral reputation—could potentially result in a more accurate moral reading than a single self-report.

**Rating Inversions.** If everyone inflated their self- or informant reports to a similar extent, we could at least draw conclusions about relative morality. However, self- and other-evaluation biases could operate differently for different informants and targets. This would at least add noise and might even sometimes produce rating inversions in which more moral people judge themselves as less moral than do truly less moral people.

First, accurate judgment of one’s own moral character might to some extent depend on having good moral character. For example, moral people might be more willing to non-defensively recognize their own moral weaknesses (Smith & Kouchaki, 2018), whereas less moral people might arrogantly assume that they’re in the right. Similarly, there could be a moral Dunning–Kruger effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), such that the least moral people lack the moral knowledge necessary to understand that they deserve low ratings. For example, someone with little knowledge of the dynamics of sexism might regard themselves as entirely non-sexist, while someone more familiar with those dynamics, and who as a result is objectively less sexist, might see traces of sexism in themselves. Second, if moral people are less able to live up to their lofty moral standards, whereas less moral people aim for and achieve moral mediocrity (Schwitzgebel, 2019), moral people might have harsher self-assessments than do less moral people. Finally, some moral traits, perhaps especially humility, might be inconsistent with high degrees of self-praise (Robinson, 2020).
Similar issues arise for informant reports. If more moral targets are more willing to transparently admit their moral failings, the informants of more moral targets might have more knowledge of moral targets’ less observable moral flaws (whereas less moral targets might successfully hide their immoral behaviors and thoughts). People with low moral standards might also tend to have informants with low moral standards. If less moral people tend to have similarly morally ignorant informants, then we might also see an interpersonal moral Dunning-Kruger effect (e.g., a Nazi whose informants are other Nazis).

**Are Judges Willing to Accurately Report their Impressions?**

Even if people did have perfect knowledge of their own morality, convincing them to candidly report their moral opinions is another matter—especially in non-research contexts where their responses might have real consequences (e.g., a job application or dating app questionnaire). For example, Anglim and colleagues (2017) found that those who completed the HEXACO in the context of a job application (vs. a low-stakes research context) reported much higher levels of sincerity ($d = 0.50$) and fairness ($d = 0.86$). The effects of socially desirable responding need not be unidirectional: To say that you are extremely immoral seems obviously socially undesirable, but describing yourself as “extremely moral” could seem immodest or dishonest (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2020). Social desirability biases may also operate in different ways for different traits and contexts (e.g., someone who is applying to be a salesperson may think it to be strategic to report that she is only 70% honest).

It is not clear that informants would be any more willing to candidly report their moral evaluations of others—especially if they have a negative perception of the target. Even if informants are assured of confidentiality, they may still worry that the targets would find out what they said. Informants may also feel uncomfortable about “telling on” the target, especially
in consequential contexts. Even independent of consequences, the mere act of casting moral judgment on others might feel self-righteous or “mean” (Sun et al., 2022; Yudkin et al., 2023). These issues also aggravate concerns about sampling bias (such that informants who have more negative perceptions of targets would be less likely to respond) and the ability to recruit even one—let alone several—willing informants.

**Does the Measure Have a Concrete, Specific Referent?**

Given the issues of relying on human judgment, could direct behavioral observation or biological measures be the answer? Behavioral measures are appealing because they seem to more directly and objectively reflect a person’s moral conduct. This directness also means that there is less of an inferential gap between the measure and the behavior. Whereas “strongly agreeing” that a person is “moral” or “helpful and unselfish with others” could be interpreted in many ways, transaction records that show that person has spent $2,000 on verifiable charitable donations that year (e.g., Ebert et al., 2021) are concrete and specific. Similarly, biological measures seem to produce an objective measurement (e.g., a genetic profile, the volume of a specific brain region, or skin conductance) that generally cannot be hidden, faked, or distorted by human perception.

**Is the Measure Diagnostic of a Target’s General Moral Tendencies?**

Although describing a person as being “helpful and unselfish with others” is in some respects vague, such a broad question targets the full range of relevant behaviors, as well as the relevant motivations and contextual features. Self- and informant reports of broad moral character traits allow judges to efficiently summarize across large amounts of relevant information about what a person is generally like across multiple situations. In contrast,
behavioral and biological measures present vexing inferential gaps concerning their relevance to general moral character.

**Non-Moral Reasons for Moral Behaviors**

First, people may engage or fail to engage in ostensibly moral behaviors for non-moral reasons. If morality is operationalized using a virtue ethics framework, any assessment that focuses only on behavior (without considering the accompanying thoughts, feelings, motives, and situational constraints) will fail to validly measure a person’s moral character. For example, whereas someone who primarily follows the rules to avoid punishment would cheat when they think they could get away with it, a person who is motivated by considerations of fairness would be more reliably honest. That is, honest behavior can be distinguished from virtuous motivation, and an honest *person* not only acts honestly in fact but would do so in a wide range of conditions and for the right reasons (Miller, 2017; Roberts & West, 2020; Wilson, 2018). Self-report measures can incorporate such motivational requirements in a way that behavioral measures generally cannot (outside the confines of lab experiments that manipulate situational features; e.g., Zhao et al., 2017). For example, the HEXACO fairness measure (Lee & Ashton, 2018) asks people if they would be willing to steal a million dollars *if they knew they could never get caught*, and the Truthful Communication Scale (Furr et al., 2021) includes references to being willing to tell the truth *even if it might hurt someone’s feelings*.

Even if a different moral framework is used, considerations of motivation, intention, and context might still have implications for whether a given behavior reflects a general moral disposition (vs. an exception). For example, many vegetarians are primarily motivated by personal health (rather than animal welfare or the environment; Hopwood et al., 2020). If so, vegetarianism might be a weak indicator of general moral behavior. Someone who donates large
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[72x745]MEASURING MORALITY
[528x745]29
[72x709]sums of money to gain social status might not act generously without social rewards. Some kinds of “moral” behaviors may also reflect environmental context more than morality. For example, some of the behaviors featured in a widely-used “altruism” scale (Rushton et al., 1981) are relevant only to specific contexts (e.g., “I have helped push a stranger’s car out of the snow” only applies in snowy climates) or are subject to confounds (e.g., “I have given a stranger a lift in my car” may be confounded with neighborhood safety).

**Unrepresentativeness of Single Behaviors**

Second, single behaviors observed in the lab (e.g., cheating in a laboratory game) or in everyday life (e.g., donating, meat-eating) are unlikely to be representative of a person’s general moral character, or even their possession of a specific moral virtue. A person who doesn’t engage in the particular moral acts measured in a study could be more moral overall than other people who engaged in the measured behaviors. Moreover, if general morality comprises multiple constituent traits (e.g., honesty, compassion, and fairness), and if the various constituent traits are only moderately correlated, then it is necessary to measure behavioral indicators of each of the constituent traits. Even if several compassion-relevant behaviors were measured, a measure that lacks honesty- or fairness-related behaviors would fail to distinguish someone who is compassionate but dishonest and unfair from someone equally compassionate but much more honest and fair.

We acknowledge that once a reasonable number and range of diagnostic behaviors have been measured, it is more parsimonious to conclude that these behaviors reflect an underlying moral disposition that would also cause the person to enact moral behaviors that were not specifically measured (in line with a reflective latent variable model; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). Per the “duck test” (Block, 1993; Funder, 1995), something that looks, walks, and quacks like
a duck may not be a duck, but it probably is. The burden of proof eventually falls on the skeptic to show otherwise. However, every behavior takes substantial effort to measure, so in practice, it would be infeasible to directly observe more than a handful of relevant behaviors (at least without resorting to self- or informant reports, and accepting the limitations described above).

**Tradeoffs Between Feasibility and Diagnosticity**

Finally, there may also be a tradeoff such that the behaviors that are easiest to observe (*high feasibility*) are less clearly indicative of general moral character (*low diagnosticity*). It is straightforward to observe whether a person misreports the outcome of a coin flip to earn more money (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2020), but it’s disputable whether observations based on such artificial behavioral paradigms—behaviors that are typically targeted at the experimenter or hypothetical “raceless, genderless strangers” (Hester & Gray, 2020; see also Earp et al., 2021; Schein, 2020)—reveal anything about a person’s general moral conduct in the real world (cf. Dai et al., 2018; Kröll & Rustagi, 2016; Schild et al., 2021). Conversely, some of the most morally consequential actions—donating a kidney, heroically saving a life, or killing someone—might be highly diagnostic but unlikely to occur at high enough base rates to be useful for distinguishing among the 90+% of morally typical people. Barring extensive investigations and audits, more common moral violations such as cheating on a spouse, sexual harassment, or underpaying taxes by thousands of dollars would also be difficult to directly measure, given that people typically want to hide such immoral behaviors. Indeed, even attempting to measure such behaviors might constitute an unethical invasion of privacy.

One could also attempt to measure more subtle types of moral behavior. For example, the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR) records brief audio snippets of people’s lives at random or pre-programmed intervals (e.g., 30 s every 10 minutes) for one or two weeks (Mehl et
Human coders can then code these recordings for specific acts that researchers have pre-specified as being morally relevant (e.g., showing sympathy, offering help, criticizing, being condescending; Bollich et al., 2016). Hours of audio recordings provide a good sense of how people generally treat the people around them. However, given that there is still room for interpretation, even teams of three or four coders per person often achieve only modest levels of inter-judge reliability (Bollich et al., 2016; Sun, 2020). In addition, although the EAR is well-suited for capturing traits that are primarily defined by audible behaviors in social interactions (Mehl, 2017; Sun et al., 2020), such as compassion, it is ill-suited for capturing traits that cannot easily be heard (e.g., dishonesty).

**The Inadequacy of Existing Biological Measures**

Compared to direct behavioral observation, it might be tempting to think that some biological measures (e.g., genetic markers, brain structure or function, physiological measures) could be more reflective of broad underlying causal mechanisms that are responsible for a range of moral behaviors—a person’s moral “essence” or “potential”—what they are truly capable of, beyond the surface-level behaviors that have only been observed in a limited number of situations. However, all existing biological measures are—and for the foreseeable future will remain—either too indirect or too noisy to ground meaningful conclusions about general individual-level morality (for more discussion, see the Supplemental Material, Section 2).

**Is the Measure Feasible Enough to be Implemented at Scale?**

Even if it were possible to develop an ideal moralometer, participant burden, unwillingness, privacy, or cost may pose practical barriers to the feasibility of implementing such a measure. Self- and informant-report questionnaires can efficiently summarize large amounts of information about a person’s moral character. Self-report is the most feasible option,
as this method only requires one judge per target. In contrast, informant methods ideally require multiple judges to mitigate ignorance and idiosyncratic variation, recruitment of which can be difficult. When sampling multiple informants, it might also be difficult to ensure that each target is rated by same set of informant types (e.g., one friend, one romantic partner, and one sibling), as not everyone has certain relationships (e.g., romantic partners or siblings). Practical constraints thus limit the feasibility of an ideal moral reputation-based measure.

Behavioral measures are even less feasible. Each of the main methods for behavioral observation require a high level of compliance from the participant and could be perceived as intrusive. Behavioral coding methods (e.g., Bollich et al., 2016) are prohibitively labor-intensive to implement at scale, although advances in artificial intelligence (e.g., automated extraction of behavioral cues from videos; Barto et al., 2017; Mast et al., 2015) may help in the future. Given the difficulty of directly measuring even one behavior, it would be extremely difficult to implement an ideal behavioral moralometer that comprises a composite of several instances of multiple diagnostic behaviors. Such feasibility issues are essentially insurmountable if the goal is to accurately assess an individual’s general morality, which would require observing many behaviors diagnostic of multiple moral traits.

Biological measures are also infeasible. Some are prohibitively expensive (e.g., MRI, cortisol assays) or inconvenient (e.g., EEG, galvanic skin response) to implement at scale. People might also be understandably averse to providing their genetic or neural data for the purposes of moral character assessment.

Summary

In sum, even setting aside broad conceptual issues of the sort discussed in the first half of this article, substantial methodological challenges plague each of these four approaches to
measuring general morality. In combination, these issues make it difficult or even impossible to accurately measure an individual person’s general morality. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, these methods may still be useful for studying morality-related phenomena (see Discussion).

**Discussion**

**How General Are These Conceptual and Methodological Concerns?**

Versions of our conceptual and methodological concerns can be raised for most psychological traits. Thus, it might seem that we have made a case for blanket skepticism about psychological trait measurement. However, we hold that the challenges are less severe for most other traits than for general morality. Consider, for example, extraversion and well-being.

**Extraversion**

Extraversion is the tendency to be outgoing, talkative, assertive, and energetic. Conceptual challenges include that the particular manifestations can vary by individual and group (e.g., Olaru et al., 2019), facets might reasonably be given different weights, and lay conceptions can depart from expert understandings (Kaufman, 2014). Overall, however, there is much less disagreement about the components of extraversion, its measurement, and its coherence as a construct (Wacker & Smillie, 2015) than about general morality.

Methodologically, participants normally have extensive information about their extraverted or introverted tendencies, are able to form fairly accurate impressions of these facts about themselves, and are normally willing to report their impressions. Being a relatively observable and not highly evaluative trait (Vazire, 2010), self-ratings, informant ratings, and behavioral observations tend to correlate relatively well (Connelly & Ones, 2010; Tackman et al., 2020). Self-reports of aspects of extraversion appear to have adequately specific referents (e.g., “Is dominant, acts as a leader”; “Is full of energy”; Soto & John, 2017) and validated
personality questionnaires are diagnostic of the target’s general tendencies in everyday life (Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) and implementable at scale.

Well-being

Philosophers use the term well-being to describe what is intrinsically good for someone and what it means for that person’s life to go well (Chappell & Meissner, 2023). Being a similarly value-laden concept, well-being is perhaps as conceptually controversial as morality. For example, different theories characterize well-being in terms of the balance of positive vs. negative emotions (hedonic theories), getting what you want (desire satisfaction theories), or the attainment of objectively valuable goods such as the capacity for meaningful relationships, authenticity, and self-knowledge (objective list theories; Crisp, 2021; DeYoung & Tiberius, 2023; Margolis et al., 2021; Parfit, 1984). Well-being could also mean somewhat different things in different cultural or religious traditions (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2015; Oishi et al., 1999, 2013; Tiberius, 2004). Nevertheless, self-report measures derived from different theories of well-being tend to converge on similar answers (Disabato et al., 2016; Goodman et al., 2018; Margolis et al., 2021), perhaps because “objective list” goods such as positive social relationships and meaningful activity tend to be widely desired and produce hedonic benefits (Bishop, 2015; Chappell & Meissner, 2023). If so, this limits the measurement impact of the different conceptualizations. Nevertheless, well-being might be best measured as relativized to particular theories and contexts (Alexandrova, 2017).

To the extent well-being depends on internal experience and individual desires, self-report will arguably be a better option than informant reports or behavioral measures. People are probably not as motivated to misrepresent their well-being as their morality. But concerns can still be raised about the accuracy of self-report. For example, some people—especially in the
U.S.—might overreport their happiness (Haybron, 2008). If well-being is operationalized in terms of desire satisfaction, accurate measurement might require that people know what their true desires are, their relative weights, and the extent to which they are satisfying these desires. Self-knowledge of this sort might not be perfect (DeYoung & Tiberius, 2023). People’s well-being judgments are also susceptible to judgment biases such as recent salient events and their current mood (Conner & Barrett, 2012). Despite these issues, researchers appear to be mostly justified in assuming that self-reports of well-being are approximately accurate, in part because of the convergence among different self-report measures of well-being and in part because self-report well-being measures tend to correlate as expected with other psychological and situational variables (Diener et al., 2018).

The Ethics of Measuring Morality

Would it be a good thing for a half-decent moralometer to be widely available, even if the results were only approximate? People could use moralometers to make better decisions about who to trust or avoid, and a great deal of harm could arguably be avoided if a moralometer was used to ensure that only highly moral people are elected into positions of power. The widespread availability of moralometers might even help improve the population’s morality by helping researchers assess which interventions work or by encouraging people to become more moral via the social rewards or punishments associated with the routine use of moralometers in the personal, professional, and civic spheres. But we advocate caution because any tool that is taken seriously as an accurate measure of general moral character has substantial potential for misuse.

First, given the conceptual challenges described above, some forms of moral disagreement will be reasonable. Anyone whose conception of morality reasonably diverges from the conception employed in the construction of the hypothetical general moralometer would
then likely be unjustly misjudged. Second, any realistic measure will have substantial inaccuracies. If decision-makers employ the measure in a high-stakes context (e.g., hiring, educational admissions, loans, immigration, dating), inaccurate moralometer readings could cause truly moral people to be unfairly excluded from opportunities. Moreover, unless the moralometer is based wholly in something that cannot be faked—such as one’s genome or genuine motivations—people will find ways to exploit its inaccuracies.

Even if the test were perfectly accurate, it’s not clear that people should be excluded from important social opportunities on the basis of a low moralometer score, independent of committing actual specific wrongs or crimes. For example, in the film (and short story) *Minority Report* (Dick, 1956; Steven Speilberg, 2022), the Precrime police division tracks down and incarceraates people before they can commit a murder that was foretold by psychics. Some philosophers have argued that such “prepunishment” is ethically acceptable or even required when we know or believe beyond reasonable doubt that the criminal event will occur (New, 1992). However, others object on the basis that prepunishment fails to respect people as moral agents with the capacity to refrain from immoral acts (Smilansky, 1994).

But don’t we already always morally evaluate the people around us? Employers judge employees, dating-app users judge first dates, and voters judge politicians. Such judgments are probably highly inaccurate and subject to systematic biases (e.g., racial stereotypes; Welch, 2007). Wouldn’t a half-decent moralometer then improve the accuracy of what we already do? To this objection, we reply that a moralometer presented as a scientific tool risks aggravating the problems of misjudgment. First, reasonable people often have appropriate epistemic humility, feeling uncertain about their initial moral judgments and thus being at least somewhat open to new evidence. In contrast, a “science-backed” moralometer risks inappropriately inflating
people’s confidence and thus their likelihood of acting without seeking further evidence. Second, currently, even if one person unfairly judges you to have a bad moral character, the next person might judge you more positively. This distributes the inaccuracies across the population (though imperfectly, given some systematic biases). The biases of a moralometer, however, will be highly systematic (e.g., if all employers use the same moralometer).

**What Kinds of Moral Psychological Phenomena Can Be Validly Measured?**

So far, we have painted a pessimistic picture of the conceptual, methodological, and ethical challenges of measuring a person’s general morality. But, despite the daunting challenges, we are not complete pessimists about the measurement of moral psychological phenomena. Morality deserves scientific study, and scientific study requires measurement tools. Therefore, in Table 3, we propose several more tractable alternatives to measuring general morality. For each of these alternatives, the conceptual and methodological challenges discussed above can either be circumvented to a significant extent or no longer apply.

First, although we have argued that claims about measuring the One True Morality are unwarranted, it may be reasonable to draw conclusions that are circumscribed to specific operationalizations of morality. Conceptually, measuring “general morality” requires choosing the correct ethical framework. No such requirement applies if researchers specify that they are measuring “deontological rule adherence, operationalized as the fulfilment of five specific duties” or “commonsense morality, operationalized by an equally-weighted set of moral virtues that people typically consider to be morally relevant in North America in 2023,” and calibrate their conclusions accordingly. Even if the link between commonsense morality (for example) and objective moral truth turns out to be tenuous, we can still learn something about the
psychological causes and consequences of commonsense morality in a particular cultural-historic context.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternatives to “General Morality”</th>
<th>Example(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific operationalizations of morality</td>
<td>Deontological rule adherence, operationalized as the fulfilment of five specific duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality in line with a specific philosophical framework</td>
<td>An equally-weighted composite of benevolence, respectfulness, general morality, dependability, loyalty, honesty, interpersonal fairness, and fraud avoidance (Sun et al., 2023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonsense morality, as defined by what is consensually considered to be morally relevant within a particular population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific manifestations of morality

Specific virtues

Compassion, honesty, moral courage, fairness, loyalty

Specific behaviors

Charitable donations, expressing sympathy, cheating on one’s partner

Moral traits or behaviors within a specific context/role

Wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence expressed while parenting vs. working (Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015)

Moral psychological components that do not necessarily reflect actual moral goodness

Subjective moral perceptions of one’s own or others’ general morality based on flexible measures that do not specify moral content

The General Morality subscale of the MCQ (Furr et al., 2022)

Morally-motivated behavior based on moral convictions (irrespective of whether it is in fact a morally good behavior)

Moral vegetarianism (Hopwood et al., 2020), pro-life/pro-choice activism (Vanderford, 1989), violent opposition to compromise over issues considered sacred (Ginges et al., 2007) Moral Foundations Questionnaire – 2 (Atari et al., 2023); Moral Expansiveness Scale (Crimston et al., 2016); Two-Dimensional Utilitarianism Scale (Kahane et al., 2018)

Moral values capturing the considerations that shape people’s moral judgments

Using pornography or eating meat despite believing that doing so is immoral (Grubbs et al., 2019; Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2014)

Moral (in)congruence in aligning one’s behaviors with one’s own moral values (irrespective of whether these values are in fact morally good)

Second, it is more feasible to meet the requirements discussed above (see Tables 1–2) when the goal is to measure more specific manifestations of morality. Researchers measuring, for example, compassion or honesty, still face substantial conceptual and methodological
challenges. However, those challenges are typically less severe, in part because there is less room for reasonable conceptual disagreement about compassion and honesty than about general morality, and the measurement targets are narrower (for further discussion, see Supplemental Material, Section 3, and Tables S2–S3). Challenges of weighting can be further reduced if the goal is to measure moral conduct within specific contexts (e.g., in the workplace vs. at home), or specific moral behaviors (e.g., charitable donations), without attempting to generalize to a person’s overall moral character. For example, if the aim is to understand which psychological, relational, and situational variables predict a specific (im)moral behavior such as having ever cheated on a partner, this single behavior does not need to be diagnostic of the targets’ general moral tendencies—or even their general tendency to be honest. Taking a more specific approach would not only be more tractable, but might also be more useful. For example, in partner selection or hiring, we are probably more interested in whether that person will be compassionate or honest to me, or compassionate towards their coworkers or patients (Law et al., 2022; Lukaszewski & Roney, 2010). Though risks of moral misjudgment remain, these possible harms can be limited to judgments of a specific or contextualized trait.

Third, many aspects of moral functioning that do not necessarily reflect objective moral goodness nevertheless have important intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup consequences. Subjective perceptions of others’ morality are more important than perceptions of competence or warmth in impression formation (Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016). Pornography users are more distressed if they believe that using pornography is morally wrong than if they experience no such moral incongruence (Grubbs et al., 2019). Strong moral convictions can drive opposite behaviors (e.g., pro-choice vs. pro-life activism; Vanderford, 1989) and cause violent opposition to compromise over sacred values (Ginges et al., 2007). Such moral psychological
phenomena can be captured using self- and informant-reports that are appropriately described as reflecting moral perceptions, moral (in)congruence, and morally-motivated behavior, respectively, without claiming that they reflect actual moral goodness. And, when the focus is on subjective perceptions, we no longer need to assume that judges have formed a complete and unbiased picture of their own or others’ morality. For example, if the aim is to compare the moral self-perceptions of people in two demographic groups, greater self-enhancing bias and ignorance of moral facts in one group might be potential explanations of accurately observed patterns of higher self-opinion in that group, rather than sources of measurement error.

**Recommendations for the Responsible Use and Interpretation of Morality Measures**

Clearly, some approaches to moral measurement are more (e.g., measuring specific acts of compassion) vs. less (e.g., flexible measures of general morality) tenable. What is important is that researchers exercise thoughtfulness and intellectual humility when developing and communicating the results of moral measurement. Accordingly, we propose five recommendations for the responsible use and interpretation of moral measures (see Table 4).

1. **Engage with the Diversity of Moral Thought**

One potential pitfall is that a moralometer based on personal predilections (Meindl & Graham, 2014) might be presented as capturing the “One True Morality.” Even multiple psychologists working together might still have a narrow outlook, given the field’s lack of political and cultural diversity (Arnett, 2016; Duarte et al., 2015; Henrich et al., 2010; Inbar & Lammers, 2012; Redding, 2001). Engaging with the diversity of moral thought across philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions—as well as the complexities and debates within even a single tradition—will likely help psychologists better recognize the assumptions and limitations of their measures, enabling the creation of better-founded measures.
### Table 4

**Recommendations for the Responsible Use and Interpretation of Morality Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Engage with the diversity of moral thought across various philosophical,</td>
<td>To encourage appropriate epistemic humility and create more well-founded measures of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious, and cultural traditions.</td>
<td>morality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Make value claims and assumptions transparent.</td>
<td>To facilitate critique of those values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prioritize interpretability.</td>
<td>To allow others to understand and evaluate the measure for themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Measure more specific aspects of moral functioning and calibrate conclusions</td>
<td>Conceptual and methodological requirements are more attainable or less relevant when the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accordingly.</td>
<td>measurement goals are more specific. Calibrating conclusions will help prevent misinterpretation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Avoid drawing broad individual-level conclusions.</td>
<td>To avoid the ethical issues with moral misjudgment, especially given inevitable measurement error.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Make Value Claims and Assumptions Transparent**

Science—and especially moral psychology—is inevitably value-laden (Alexandrova, 2017; Fowers, 2022; Prinzing, 2021). Indeed, an important part of the value and interest of moral psychology research is its capacity to reveal to us why people behave in ways that are in fact morally good or bad, with the non-value-neutral aim of transforming society for the better. Instead of attempting to be “value-neutral,” researchers should explicitly acknowledge the values and assumptions built into their operationalization of morality. Being transparent and explicit about those values will facilitate critique of those values and more productive dialogues about the merits of various conceptualizations of morality.

3. **Prioritize Interpretability**

Researchers should prioritize interpretable measures of morality. If people cannot understand how the moralometer generates its evaluations, it will be difficult to understand what the moralometer is capturing and to trust or challenge its results (Purcell & Bonnefon, 2023; von...
Eschenbach, 2021). One potential downside is that making the “answer key” available could help people learn how to look good on the test, but this can be mitigated by adhering to our fifth recommendation not to draw conclusions about individuals.

4. **Measure Specific Aspects of Moral Functioning and Calibrate Conclusions Accordingly**

As discussed above, various conceptual and methodological challenges can either be circumvented to a significant extent or no longer apply when the measurement goals are more modest (see Table 3). Instead of measuring general morality, researchers should measure specific operationalizations of morality (e.g., commonsense morality), specific manifestations of morality (e.g., specific acts of compassion), or other aspects of moral functioning that do not necessarily reflect actual moral goodness (e.g., moral self-perceptions, moral incongruence). We encourage researchers to clarify the measurement aim, to assess the extent to which conceptual and measurement challenges (see Tables 1–2) arise given that aim, and to calibrate interpretations and conclusions accordingly by using more precise labels than “general morality” (see Table 3).

5. **Avoid Drawing Broad Individual-Level Conclusions**

Even if there are general facts about a person’s moral character, the measurement issues we’ve discussed are sufficiently severe that correlations between any realistic measure and the real underlying trait are likely to be small to medium sized at best (Doris, 2021; Mõttus, 2022). Drawing conclusions about individuals’ moral character based on any realistic measure is therefore likely to substantially mischaracterize many people’s actual morality. In any context with real stakes, that risks unfairly wronging the people who are being evaluated. We don’t entirely rule out the possibility of developing a general moralometer that is accurate enough for some limited scientific research purposes. Noisy and inaccurate measures—as long as they are not entirely inverted or devoid of signal—might sometimes be useful in drawing conclusions at
the aggregate level. However, there are certainly also occasions in which group-level conclusions might be sufficiently harmful or offensive (e.g., dubious claims about civic dishonesty among Chinese people; Cohn et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2023) that they should be avoided unless they pass a very high methodological bar.

**Future Directions**

Advances in philosophical and psychological research will inform the development of more valid approaches to moral measurement and our understanding of how to minimize the ethical risks. Moral philosophers might look for areas of consensus and disagreement among different background theories from philosophical and religious traditions across many cultures. This will help researchers understand what aspects of morality are relatively uncontroversial and which aspects need to be interpreted in a relativized way. With enough open communication between people who begin with divergent views, one mightoptimistically hope for increasing convergence about what is morally good in the long term (e.g., Parfit, 2011; Pinker, 2018).

Ethical work also remains to be done exploring the conditions under which it is defensible to reach conclusions about individuals’ or groups’ morality based on imperfect measures with a scientific imprimatur (Mau, 2019).

Future psychological work can help better establish the extent to which a person’s standing on one virtue is diagnostic of their standing on other virtues (Jackson et al., 2023; Landy & Bartels, 2018). This information will help determine whether researchers could rely on one or two particularly central features (e.g., selfishness, greed) to draw some general conclusions about a person’s morality if measurement resources are constrained. Understanding the discrepancy between actual and perceived psychological moral unity could also reveal patterns of bias in people’s moral judgments. For example, if people believe that compassion,
honesty, and loyalty are strongly correlated when they are not, people might overweight information about one dimension (e.g., compassion) when judging a person’s standing on another dimension (e.g., honesty).

Given the relative feasibility of self-report and reputation-based measures, there is a critical need to develop methods to separate out evaluation from substance in person perception (Leising et al., 2015; Meindl et al., 2015; Peabody, 1967; Pringle et al., under review). Another priority is development of unobtrusive behavioral measures that cannot easily be faked (e.g., predictions based on the abundant digital footprints that people leave in a digitally-connected world; Ebert et al., 2021; Harari et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2008; Park et al., 2015), bearing in mind that such measures must be consistent with ethical standards of privacy and consent (Matz et al., 2022). Even if such efforts are unlikely to result in a moralometer that is accurate enough to justify broad, individual-level conclusions, incremental advances in the measurement of morality will still facilitate scientific discovery.

Conclusions

We probably cannot develop a conceptually sound and methodologically valid moralometer that gives an accurate reading of a person’s general moral goodness. However, it doesn’t follow that we should stop assessing psychological moral phenomena. Our goal in this paper has been to highlight the unique, value-laden complexities of morality measurement, outlining steps that could improve the validity of moral measures and their more accurate interpretation, while encouraging epistemic humility and caution. We are optimistic that by working together, philosophers and psychologists will continue to make conceptual and methodological progress towards improving the measurement of morality.
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Supplemental Material

1. Perspectives on the (Dis)unity of Morality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table S1</th>
<th>Summary of Proposals for and Arguments Against the Unity of Morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morality is unified on the basis of…</td>
<td>Argument against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical utilitarianism: The resulting balance of pleasure vs. pain.</td>
<td>Other consequentialists appeal to a broader range of goods, and accurately evaluating all relevant consequences might be infeasible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontology: A single all-encompassing rule (e.g., Kant’s maxim of universalizability).</td>
<td>Other deontologists see morality as involving adherence to multiple possibly conflicting rules or obligations (Stocker, 1992; Tessman, 2014; Williams, 1965).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotelian virtue ethics: You can have one virtue if and only if you have them all (Russell, 2009).</td>
<td>Other virtue ethicists reject the unity-of-virtues approach (Badhwar, 1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological components</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content (e.g., harm to others; Schein &amp; Gray, 2018; a “dark core” of utility maximization along with disutility infliction; Moshagen et al., 2018; “obligatory concerns with others’ welfares, rights, fairness, and justice”; Dahl, 2023).</td>
<td>Not all moral judgments are based on harm (Graham et al., 2011); not all moral behaviors involve utility maximization or utility infliction; not all moral concerns are obligatory (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenology: How it feels or seems to make a moral judgment.</td>
<td>Different moral judgments are associated with different moral emotions (Rozin et al., 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force: Moral wrongness is authority-independent, serious, and harm-based (Turiel, 1983).</td>
<td>There are some moral judgments that are not authority-independent (Sinnott-Armstrong &amp; Wheatley, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form: A moral judgment is prescriptive, universalizable, and overriding (Hare, 1981).</td>
<td>Moral judgments need not always be overriding or prescriptive (Sinnott-Armstrong &amp; Wheatley, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function: Morality evolved to solve a particular problem (e.g., limits on sympathy; Warnock, 1971; cooperation; Curry et al., 2019)</td>
<td>It seems likely that different moral judgments serve different functions (Sinnott-Armstrong &amp; Wheatley, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brain mechanisms (Moll et al., 2005)</td>
<td>Different moral judgments rely on different neural systems (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2016).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The Prospects of a Biological Moralometer

Genetic, neural, and physiological measures—at least as they currently exist—are either too indirect, too narrowly targeted, or too noisy to serve as reliable indicators of individual-level general moral tendencies. First, consider genetic measures. Psychological traits are determined not only by genes but also by a lifetime of learning, experiences, and environmental influences (Bouchard, 2004). A person who entirely turns around their life, transforming themselves from a morally terrible person into an admirable one, will measure the same on a genetically based moralometer before and after the transformation. Empirically, the predictive power of polygenic scores has been estimated to range from 2% of the variance in self-reported callous-unemotional traits (Wertz et al., 2018) to 11% of the variance in self-reported empathy (Warrier et al., 2018). As indicators of the theoretical upper limit of a genetic moralometer, the most predictive polygenic score in the behavioral sciences (for a review, see Plomin & von Stumm, 2022) predicts 15% of the variance in tested school performance at age 16 (Allegrini et al., 2019). Even for the straightforward physical phenotype of height—which is both more easily measurable and more highly heritable than most psychological traits (Bouchard, 2004; Silventoinen, 2003)—polygenic scores explain approximately 22% of the variance in observed adult height in the United Kingdom (You et al., 2021). Thus, it seems unlikely that a genetic moralometer could ever achieve the level of accuracy required to draw firm conclusions about an individual person’s morality.

If genetic measures are too distal, could the structure and function of a person’s brain be a valid marker of their morality? The most definitive ($N = 1,105$, preregistered) study to date provides compelling evidence that relations between personality traits and morphometric (brain structure) regions of interest tend to be null-to-small (largest $R^2 = .057$ and mean $R^2 = .003$;
Hyatt et al., 2022). Turning to brain function, there is some suggestive evidence that, compared to healthy controls, the right amygdala of altruistic kidney donors is larger and more responsive to fearful facial expressions (Marsh et al., 2014), whereas the reverse is true for psychopaths (for a review, see Blair, 2013). Compared to matched control participants, altruistic kidney donors also show greater self–other overlap in neural representations of pain and threat (Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2018). Some researchers have also found it possible to predict self-reported levels of two morally-relevant traits—agreeableness (around $r = .20$) and conscientiousness (around $r = .30$)—from resting EEG activity (Jach et al., 2020). However, such effect sizes are too small to draw meaningful conclusions about individual-level morality. For example, an effect size of $d = 0.93$ (Marsh et al., 2014) corresponds to a 64.6% overlap between extraordinary altruists and healthy controls in their right amygdala volume (Magnusson, 2023). Moreover, in a meta-analysis of the associations between trait empathy and neural responses, none of the 15 studies had a sample of more than 30 participants (Lamm et al., 2011). Since large studies often reveal much smaller correlations than small studies (Carre et al., 2013; Bjørnebekka et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013), such small sample sizes suggests that existing effect size estimates are likely inflated (Allen & DeYoung, 2015). Although investigations could eventually provide insight into the neural mechanisms that underpin morality, for the foreseeable future it is unlikely that such measures could provide accurate assessments of a particular person’s morality.

Other physiological measures seem similarly unpromising. For example, “lie detector” tests based on indicators of autonomic arousal (e.g., heart rate, respiration, and skin conductance) are the closest thing we have to a physiological measure of a person’s honesty. However, the validity of such tests has long been controversial (Saxe & Ben-Shakhar, 1999) because the measured pattern of physiological reactions is not unique to deception. An honest person could
be nervous even when telling the truth, and a dishonest psychopath could “beat” the lie detector because of their decreased fear responses (Lykken, 1978).

3. Conceptual and Methodological Requirements for Measuring Specific Moral Traits

In the body of the article, we argue against the possibility of an accurate, methodologically valid general moralometer. The question arises to what extent similar concerns apply to the measurement of specific moral traits. We suggest that similar conceptual and methodological concerns do apply, though less severely. To illustrate this, we consider how these concerns apply to two prototypical moral traits—compassion and honesty.

If the goal is to measure a specific moral dimension such as compassion or honesty, then:

(1) There must be general facts about people’s compassion or honesty; (2) The measure must correctly identify which characteristics are (un)compassionate or (dis)honest; (3) The measure must correctly weigh different components of compassion or honesty against each other; and (4) the measure must apply clearly and consistently across people and time. As with general morality, we can employ a method that relies on judges’ subjective, flexible understanding of what it means to be compassionate or honest and how to weigh their various facets, or use a measure that applies the same prespecified, fixed criteria. Table S2 expresses our sense of the relative seriousness of the conceptual challenges for general morality vs. these two example traits.
Table S2
Conceptual Requirements for Constructing Valid Flexible vs. Fixed Measures of General Morality (M) vs. Compassion (C) or Honesty (H)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual requirement</th>
<th>Flexible M</th>
<th>C/H</th>
<th>Fixed M</th>
<th>C/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There must be general moral facts about a person’s morality/compassion/honesty.</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism: There must be facts about what is (im)moral/(un)compassionate/(dis)honest; and</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivism: The same general things must be (im)moral/(un)compassionate/(dis)honest for different people or in different groups; and</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalism: Morality/compassion/honesty must not depend on highly particular features of specific situations.</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The measure must correctly identify which characteristics are (im)moral/(un)compassionate/(dis)honest.</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges’ idiosyncratic moral judgments are correct; or Commonsense ethics, as operationalized by the researchers, is correct; or The favored expert ethical framework is correct.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The measure must correctly weigh different components of morality/compassion/honesty against each other.</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity: Morality/compassion/honesty must be a coherent construct; and Commensurability: There must be a common “currency” in which components of morality/compassion/honesty can be appropriately compared.</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The measure must apply clearly and consistently across people and time. Transparency: It must be clear what is being measured; and Equivalence: A fixed measure must capture the same thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviors across people; and A fixed measure must have the same moral significance across people; or For flexible measures, judges must use the same criteria to judge a person’s morality/compassion/honesty; and, depending on the aim The measure must be psychologically relevant.</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
<td>! !</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. - = Not applicable; ✔ = Requirement is likely satisfied; ! = Significant difficulty; !! = Major difficulty.
Are There General Moral Facts?

We assume that there are facts about compassion and honesty, so that the realism condition is satisfied. For compassion and honesty, even more so than for general morality, the most extreme forms of relativism and particularism are implausible: Needlessly torturing babies is not compassionate in any culture or context. However, as with general morality, moderate forms of relativism and particularism create conceptual challenges. The actions that constitute compassion or honesty might substantially vary between groups or depending on fine details of the situation. In a particular social context, is a white lie considered dishonest? In a large city, does not stopping to help constitute a failure of compassion? Fixed measures risk insensitivity to cultural and contextual variability in appropriate standards of honesty and compassion. Flexible measures can better avoid inappropriate rigidity, but only if employed by judges who are knowledgeable of group norms and relevant contextual details.

How Should We Determine What is (Im)moral, (Un)compassionate, or (Dis)honest?

Idiosyncratic Understandings. As with flexible measures of general morality, disagreement on what constitutes compassion or honesty could lead to inaccuracies. However, whereas one might debate whether sexual purity is morally good or bad, it would be difficult to argue that lying and stealing are in fact “honest” or that supporting a friend in need is “uncompassionate.” Conceptual disagreement is therefore likely to be more limited for familiar, specific moral traits than for general morality. Still, in some cases, disagreements (e.g., about how to weight behaviors in different life domains; Cokelet, 2018) could lead to ratings reversals.

Commonsense Understandings. Commonsense understandings of compassion and honesty might suffer from the same biases that apply to commonsense understandings of morality described above. For example, a 19th century United States citizen’s understanding of
compassion might have conveniently excluded the treatment of slaves. Nevertheless, given the more limited range of reasonable disagreement regarding the application of “compassionate” and “honest” than of “moral”, commonsense understandings are likely to be more accurate for the specific concepts of compassion and honesty than for the broader concept of morality.

**Ethical Frameworks.** Alternatively, researchers can employ an ethical framework to avoid the pitfalls of idiosyncratic and commonsense understandings of compassion and honesty. For example, a consequentialist might suggest that honesty is best measured by observable behaviors or by the extent to which one’s actions lead others to form accurate beliefs. A deontology might operationalize honesty as the extent to which a person abides by a rule (e.g., to never lie). Virtue ethicists might emphasize the importance of having the right, virtuous motivation (Miller, 2017; Roberts & West, 2020; Wilson, 2018) and the optimal balance between excess and deficiency on a trait (Ng & Tay, 2020). While this characterization is somewhat simplistic, it illustrates that even in measuring the specific traits of compassion and honesty, researchers cannot avoid conceptual commitments (Wright et al., 2020)

**How Should We Weight Different Aspects of Morality?**

Compassion and honesty, like general morality, have multiple facets, and different psychological and philosophical definitions emphasize different features. Compassion researchers vary in their emphasis on understanding and emphasizing with others’ emotions, recognizing the interconnectedness of human beings, deep awareness of others’ suffering, caring about others’ welfare, feelings of pity or concern for others’ suffering, and the desire to alleviate others’ suffering via altruistic behaviors (Bloom, 2017; Gilbert, 2017; Goetz et al., 2010; Nussbaum, 1996). According to Miller (2017), honesty comprises at least five different types of behaviors: An honest person is disposed to reliably tell the truth, to not steal, follow the rules in a
situation when they are fair and appropriate, keep reasonable promises, and to give a complete presentation of the facts. Some conceptualizations of honesty also emphasize features of value-adherence (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), truth-seeking and intellectual honesty (Guenin, 2005) and encouraging others to form accurate beliefs (Cooper et al., 2023).

To measure a person’s general compassion or honesty, these various facets of compassion and honesty need to be commensurable into a single metric, and we must decide how to weigh these facets. Arguably, the components of compassion can be interpreted as reflecting a good-willed responsiveness to other living beings (Cokelet, 2018), and the components of honesty reflect a concern with fostering beliefs that accurately reflect reality (Miller, 2017; Wilson, 2018). However, it’s unclear how various facets (e.g., truth-telling vs. refraining from stealing), thoughts, feelings, motivations, behaviors, omissions, consequences, and conduct within different roles should be precisely weighted. For example, is a person more “compassionate” if they care deeply about others’ welfare but rarely act on these sympathetic feelings, or if they do helpful things without feeling much emotional concern (for similar debates about the definition of altruism, see (Pfattheicher et al., 2022)? How diagnostic are single failures (e.g., a single data fabrication arguably constitutes absence of research honesty while a single failure of compassion might not constitute an absence of compassion; Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). Researchers need to make theoretical decisions about how to weigh the subcomponents of even specific moral traits, and these answers may only be approximations.

**Does the Measure Apply Clearly and Consistently Across People and Time?**

As with general measures of morality, specific measures of compassion or honesty can only succeed if they retain the same, clear meaning regardless of who is conducting the moral evaluation, and if they apply consistently across people, groups, and time. Each of these
downsides is likely to be less serious for measures of compassion or honesty than for general morality. It is likely that there is less disagreement about what constitutes compassion or honesty than about what constitutes morality more broadly construed. This means that flexible judgments of compassion and honesty are less problematic because judges are more likely to rely on similar inputs and people would be more likely to have a general sense of what these inputs were. Greater definitional agreement also means that such measures are likely to retain more of their actual and psychological moral relevance when applied across people, groups, and time. It also seems less likely that researchers’ fixed definitions of compassion or honesty (compared to general morality) would be unrecognizably alien to the people who are being measured.

Methodological Challenges Measuring Specific Moral Traits

Methodologically, too, similar troubles arise for the measurement of particular moral traits, such as compassion and honesty, as arise for general morality, though often in less severe form (see Table S3). For example, whereas ego-protective biases (or biased attitudes toward friends) might make it difficult to recognize one’s own (or one’s friends’) lack of compassion or honesty, it might be easier to recognize a deficit in a specific virtue than in general overall morality. To assess a specific moral trait such as compassion, one only needs information about and the ability to form an accurate impression of a person’s compassion. Similarly, single-shot behavioral measures of, for example, willingness to lie to an experimenter for money are more likely to reveal something about their honesty than about their general morality.
### Table S3

**Methodological Requirements for Measuring General Morality, Compassion, or Honesty using Self-Report, Reputation-Based, Behavioral, or Biological Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological requirement</th>
<th>General Morality</th>
<th>Compassion</th>
<th>Honesty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges have full information about the target’s relevant characteristics.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges can form an unbiased impression of the target’s traits.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges are willing to truthfully report their impressions of the target.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure has a concrete, specific referent.</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>!!</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure is diagnostic of the target’s general tendencies.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>!!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measure is feasible enough to be implemented at scale.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>!!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** SR = Self-report, Rep. = Reputation, Behav. = Behavior, Bio. = Biological measures. - = Not applicable; ✓ = Requirement is likely satisfied; ! = Significant difficulty; !! = Major difficulty. Reputation = assume a best-case scenario where there are multiple judges who know the target from different domains of life.
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