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Notes for myself:

Hesse

Wimsatt

How dispositional stereotypes change

Talk about how stereotypes might change and vary. We should not take the first thing that comes to mind for the belief that beer is in the fridge as the eternal standard against which to judge the accuracy of belief ascriptions. Especially for the more peripheral dispositions, there may be a need to revise and refine.