The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind
Eric Schwitzgebel
Department of Philosophy
University of California
Riverside, CA
92521
eschwitz at domain:
ucr.edu
November 7, 2011
The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind
Abstract:
Crazyism
about X is the view that something it would be crazy to believe must be among
the core truths about X. In this essay,
I argue that crazyism is true of the metaphysics of
mind. A position is “crazy” in the intended
sense if it is contrary to common sense and we are not epistemically
compelled to believe it. Views that are crazy
in the relevant sense include that there is no mind-independent material world,
that the United States has a stream of conscious experience distinct from the
experiences of the individuals composing it, that chimps or the intelligent-seeming
aliens of science fiction fantasy entirely lack conscious experience, that
mental events are casually inefficacious.
This is by no means a complete list. Well developed metaphysical theories will inevitably
violate common sense, I argue, because common sense is incoherent in matters of
metaphysics. No coherent and detailed
view could respect it all. With common
sense thus impaired as a ground of choice, we lack the means to justifiably select
among several very different metaphysical options concerning mind and
body. Something bizarre must be true
about the mind, but which bizarre propositions are the true ones, we are in no good
position to know.
The
Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind
Mysterians
about the mind – Colin McGinn (1989, 2004), Noam
Chomsky (2009) – say that we will probably never know how conscious experience
arises from the brain. But here’s one
thing we do generally know, according to them: Whatever the process involved,
it’s “natural”. No hand of God, no
immaterial souls required. But I wonder,
if we know as little as they say, why rule out deities and immaterial souls? If the soul seems a strange and unnatural
thing, alien to our science, well, our science is an impoverished tool for
penetrating the mysteries of the universe, they say. A turtle might find strange and unnatural a
container ship and might find almost ethereal a schedule of amortization. If we are but somewhat upgraded turtles, our
sense of bizarreness, incomprehensibility, unnaturalness, is no rigorous index
of reality.
In this essay I propose a more deeply
skeptical mysterianism about the mind than that of McGinn and Chomsky.
On my view, it is probably the case that something it would be crazy to believe
– something bizarre and undeserving of credence – is among the core
metaphysical truths about the mind. And
immaterial souls aren’t ruled out.
i.
Bizarre
views are a hazard of metaphysics. The
metaphysician starts, seemingly, with some highly plausible initial commitments
or commonsense intuitions – that there is a prime number between 2 and 5, that
I could have had eggs for breakfast, that squeezing the clay statue would
destroy the statue but not the lump of clay – thinks long and hard about what,
exactly, they imply, and then ends up positing a realm of abstract Platonic
entities, or the real existence of an infinite number of possible worlds, or a
huge population of spatiotemporally coincident things on her mantelpiece.[1] I believe that there is not a single
broad-ranging exploration of the fundamental issues of metaphysics that does
not, by the end, entangle its author in seeming absurdities (sometimes
advertised as “surprising conclusions”).
Rejection of these absurdities then becomes the commonsense starting
point of a new round of metaphysics, by other philosophers, which in turn
generates a complementary bestiary of metaphysical strangeness. Thus are philosophers happily employed.
I see three possible explanations of why
philosophical metaphysics is never thoroughly commonsensical:
First explanation. A thoroughly commonsensical metaphysics
wouldn’t sell. It would be too boring,
perhaps. Maybe a famous philosopher
can’t say only obvious things. Or maybe
it would lack a kind of elegant serviceability or theoretical panache. Or maybe it would conflict too sharply with
what we know from science. The problem
with this explanation is that there should be at least a small market for a
thoroughly commonsensical philosophy, even if that philosophy is gauche, staid,
and scientifically stale. Common sense
might not be quite as fun as Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence (1883-1888/1967) or
Leibniz’s windowless monads (1714/1989); it might not be as elegantly useful as
Lewis’s possible worlds (1986) or as scientifically current as __________
[insert ever-changing example]; but a commonsensical metaphysics ought to be
attractive to at least a certain portion of philosophers. At least it ought to command attention as a
foil. It oughtn’t be so downmarket as to be entirely invisible.
Second explanation. Metaphysics is very difficult. A thoroughly commonsensical metaphysics is
out there to be discovered; we simply haven’t found it yet. If all goes well, someday someone will piece
it all together, top to bottom, with no serious violence to common sense
anywhere in the system. I fear this is
wishful thinking against the evidence.
In the next several sections I will discuss the case of the metaphysics
of mind in particular.
Third explanation. Common sense is incoherent in matters of
metaphysics. Contradictions thus
inevitably flow from it, and no coherent metaphysical system can respect it
all. Although ordinary common sense
serves us fairly well in practical maneuvers through the social and physical
world, common sense has proven an unreliable guide in cosmology and probability
theory and microphysics and neuroscience and macroeconomics and evolutionary
biology and structural engineering and medicine and topology. If metaphysics more closely resembles items
in the second class than in the first, as it seems to, we might excusably doubt
the dependability of common sense as a guide to metaphysics.[2] Undependability doesn’t imply incoherence, of
course. But it seems a natural next step
in this case, and it would tidily explain the historical fact at hand.
On the first explanation, we could
easily enough invent a thoroughly commonsensical metaphysical system if we
wanted one, but we don’t want one. On
the second explanation, we do want one, or enough of us do, but we haven’t yet
managed to pull it off. On the third
explanation, we can’t have one. I hope
you’ll agree with me that the third has at least some prima facie merit. In sections iii-viii I will further explore
the role of common sense in the metaphysics of mind.
Common sense might be culturally
variable. So whose common sense do I
take to be at issue in this argument? I
suspect it doesn’t matter. All
metaphysical systems in the philosophical canon, I’m inclined to think, conflict
both with the common sense of their milieu and with current Western common
sense. Much of the human worldview is
stable over time, especially in Western societies since the early modern
period. Eternal recurrence, windowless
monads, and the real existence of an infinitude of possible worlds were never
part of any society’s common sense.
Some readers will disagree about the
existence of the phenomenon I aim to explain; they will think that there is a
thoroughly commonsensical metaphysics on the market. To some extent, I’m simply taking as a
premise that there is none, and I’m inviting you to agree based on your own
reading of historical and contemporary metaphysics. Maybe the premise will appeal better, though,
if I highlight its intended scope. It
concerns only broad-ranging explorations of fundamental metaphysical issues,
especially the issues where seeming absurdities congregate: mind and body,
causation, identity, the catalogue of entities that really exist. Some skating treatments and some deep
treatments of narrow issues might dodge the charge.
Who might count as a thoroughly
commonsensical metaphysician? Aristotle,
I’ve sometimes heard. Or Scottish
“common sense” philosopher Thomas Reid.
Or G.E. Moore, famous for his “Defence of
Common Sense” (1925). Or “ordinary
language” philosopher P.F. Strawson. But Aristotle didn’t envision himself as
developing a commonsensical view: In the introduction to the Metaphysics Aristotle says that the
conclusions of sophisticated inquiries, such as his own, will often seem “wonderful”
to the untutored and contrary to their initial opinions (4th c.
BCE/1928, 983a; θαυμαστόν:
wonderful in the sense of tending to cause wonder, or amazing); and Aristotle
generally conceives his project as in part to distinguish the true from the
false in common opinion. Moore, though
fierce in wielding common sense against his foes, seems unable to preserve all
commonsense commitments when he develops his positive views in detail, for example
in his waffling about “sense data” (1953, 1957). Strawson struggles
similarly, especially in his 1985 book, where he can find no satisfactory
commonsense account of mental causation.
Reid I will discuss briefly in section vi.
The argument of this section is an
empirical explanatory or “abductive” argument. The empirical fact to be explained is that
all existing metaphysical systems are bizarre in some of their major
features. An attractive possible
explanation of this fact, I submit, is that common sense is incoherent on
matters metaphysical, so that no self-consistent and detailed metaphysical
system can satisfy all commonsense constraints.
ii.
Let’s
call a position bizarre if it’s
contrary to common sense. And let’s say
that a position is contrary to common sense just in case a majority of people
without specialized training on the issue confidently, but perhaps implicitly,
believe it to be false. Claims about
common sense are empirically testable, but not always straightforwardly so. It might, for example, sometimes be difficult
to clarify the target claim – e.g., that there is a “Platonic realm” – without
either mangling the target view or altering the respondent’s attitude toward
it; and what is implicitly believed may be only tenuously connected to explicit
questionnaire responses. The best first
pass measure of commonsensicality might be specialists’ own impressions about
the degree of conflict between positions in their field and non-specialists’
attitudes, as remembered from their training and reinforced in their teaching,
with contentious cases to be referred for more systematic empirical study.
To call a position bizarre is not
necessarily to repudiate it. General
relativity is bizarre. Various bizarre
things are true about the infinite. It’s
bizarre yet true that a black and white disk will look colored if spun at the
right speed. Common sense errs, and we
can be justified in thinking so. However,
we are not ordinarily justified in accepting bizarre views without compelling
evidence. In the matters it traverses,
common sense serves as an epistemic starting point that we reject only with
sufficient warrant. To accept a bizarre
view on thin grounds – for example, to think that the world was probably
created five minutes ago, or that you are constantly cycling through immaterial
souls, or that the universe was sneezed out by the Great Green Arkleseizure (assuming you have no special warrant for
these views) – seems crazy. I stipulate,
then, the following technical definition of a crazy position: A position is crazy if it is bizarre and we are not
epistemically compelled to believe it.
One needn’t, of course, be clinically
insane to accept crazy views, and not all crazy views are as crazy as the three
just listed. Many philosophers and some
scientists embrace positions contrary to common sense and for which the
evidence is less than compelling. In
fact, to convert a position from crazy to merely bizarre might be the highest
form of academic success. Copernicus,
Darwin, and Einstein all managed the conversion – and in the case at least of
Copernicus common sense eventually relented.
Intellectual risk-takers nurture the crazy and see what marvels
bloom. The culture of contemporary
Anglophone academia, perhaps especially philosophy, overproduces craziness like
a plant produces seeds.
Crazyism
about a topic, in the sense intended in this essay, is the view that something
crazy must be among the core truths about that topic. Crazyism can be
justified when we have good reason to believe that one among several bizarre
views must be true but where the balance of evidence leaves no individual view decisively
supported over all the others. We might
find ourselves rationally compelled to believe that either T1, T2, T3, or T4
must be true, where each of the T’s is crazy.
Crazyism
might be justified in interpreting quantum theory. The “many worlds” and “many minds”
interpretations, for example, sharply conflict, it seems likely, with what most
people would judge to be common sense.[3] And it also seems that the balance of
evidence does not compellingly favor either of these views over all
competitors. Thus, the views are crazy
in the sense defined. If the same holds
for all viable interpretations of
quantum theory, then crazyism appears justified in
that domain.[4]
I believe that any well developed
materialist metaphysics will be crazy, in the intended sense of the term. So also, I believe, will any well developed
dualist metaphysics. So also, I believe,
is idealism (well developed or not). And
so also are positions that reject all three of these views or aim to reconcile
or compromise among them. But some
metaphysical theory of this sort must be true – that is, either some form of materialism, dualism, or idealism must be true or some sort of rejection or compromise
approach must be true. If so, crazyism is warranted in the metaphysics of mind.
iii.
Materialism
has enjoyed such a good vogue in Anglophone philosophy recently that it might
not seem to be crazy. And, indeed, it is
not part of my thesis that materialism is crazy. Rather, my thesis is that any well developed materialist metaphysics
will be crazy. Maybe materialism per se
is sufficiently vague and noncommittal as to provide no shock to common sense. However, I do think that working out the details of a materialist view will
inevitably force choices among major violations of common sense, and no one
conjunction of violations will merit belief over all rivals. I offer this assertion as an empirical
conjecture about the epistemic status of current theories and theories likely
to arise in the near to medium-term future.
The materialist (or “physicalist”)
position is difficult to characterize precisely.[5] This is perhaps a problem for the view – though
if so, I’m inclined to think that the problem is just a manifestation of a more
general problem I will discuss in section xii.
As a working approximation, let’s characterize materialism as the view
that everything in the universe is composed of, or reducible to, or most
fundamentally, material stuff, where “material stuff” means things like elements of the periodic
table and the various particles or waves or fields that interact with or
combine to form such elements, whatever those particles, waves, or fields might
be, as long as they are not themselves intrinsically mental. The two historically most important
competitor positions are idealism and substance dualism, both of which assert
the existence of an immaterial soul.
It’s a striking sociological fact about
materialism that, after a long history as a minority position, rather suddenly
in the 1950s and 1960s a young generation of Anglophone philosophers of mind
adopted it as orthodoxy – Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, David
Lewis, J.J.C. Smart, Fred Dretske, Donald Davidson,
John Searle[6],
David Armstrong, Sydney Shoemaker, and many others. Maybe this sudden generational shift
reflected progress, like the progress of science. It’s also possible that it was the broad
swing of a pendulum. We don’t yet have,
I suspect, the historical distance to know.
iv.
Materialism
per se might be contrary to common
sense.
Materialism is almost certainly a
minority view in our current culture and historically across human cultures. People have a widespread, and maybe deep,
tendency to believe that they are more than just material stuff. I doubt most readers need convincing of this sociological
fact, but for completeness see this note.[7] Not all unpopular views violate common sense,
however. Even if materialism per se,
abstractly put, is bizarre, I doubt that it’s robustly, thumpingly
bizarre. I don’t stake my argument on
its bizarreness. Unstable, tepid
bizarreness is not what crazyism is about.
Certain apparent consequences of materialism – of materialism per se, prior to tough
choices – might be robustly bizarre.
This would explain anti-materialist philosophers’ fondness of these
consequences as an argumentative lever.
Consider Leibniz’s mill:
Moreover,
we must confess that the perception, and
what depends on it, is inexplicable in
terms of mechanical reasons, that is, through shapes and motions. If we imagine that there is a machine whose
structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it
enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as one
enters into a mill. Assuming that, when
inspecting its interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we
will never find anything to explain a perception (1714/1989, p. 215 [§ 17],
emphasis in original).
When
the view is so vividly displayed, something in most people, I think, resists
the materialist’s reduction of experience to bumping matter. If you see nothing bizarre in Leibniz’s mill,
maybe science and philosophy have stolen a bit of your common sense (possibly a
good thing). Other thought experiments work
similarly. Consider “zombies”: It seems
we can conceive of entities physically and behaviorally identical to us but
entirely lacking conscious experience or “phenomenology”.[8] Conceivability may or may not imply
possibility; the thought experiment has power regardless. It draws the mind to think that materialism
leaves something out. Consider also
Frank Jackson’s (1986) “Mary”, the super-scientist confined to a black and
white room, who can seemingly learn all the physical facts about the world,
including about the physics and physiology of color perception, yet remain
ignorant of some experiential facts, such as what it’s like to see red. Such thought experiments seem to tap into a
folk psychological “explanatory gap” between physical properties or events and
the colorful phenomenology of conscious experience; people seem to want to
reach for something immaterial to bridge the two.[9] Maybe, then, it’s part of common sense to
suppose that any materialist metaphysics will be incomplete.
v.
Regarding
materialism per se, I think it’s unclear exactly where the boundaries of common
sense lie. However, I believe that any well developed materialist metaphysics
of mind – that is, any plausible materialist metaphysics with specific
commitments about the necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing mental
states – will inevitably astound common sense.
If it seems otherwise in reading Putnam or Lewis or Smart, that’s
because materialist philosophers are often vague on the issues from which
bizarreness springs.
If materialism per se conflicts with
majority belief and presents a seeming explanatory gap, all the more so, it
seems likely, will specific materialist accounts of consciousness. Francis Crick (1994), for example, equates
human consciousness with synchronized 40-hertz oscillations in the subset of
neurons corresponding to an attended object.
Nicholas Humphrey (2011) equates consciousness in general with reentrant
feedback loops in an animal’s sensory system.
Such views are not just tepidly unintuitive. Crick and Humphrey both repeatedly emphasize
that non-specialists vigorously resist their views. Common sense fights them hard. And common sense fights them hard not just
because of the details, although the details make the bizarreness vivid. Crick writes that his view “is so alien to
most people alive today that it can truly be called astonishing” (p. 3).
Another reason to anticipate sharp
conflicts between common sense and well developed forms of materialism is that,
as I mentioned in section i, common sense has tended
to fare poorly beyond practical contexts.
Drawing the dismal induction, it would be surprising if common sense
weren’t grossly wrong about some major aspect of the metaphysics of mind –
especially considering implications for pathological and science fiction and
deep-sea cases. Philosophers friendly to
materialism would be wise, it seems, not to insist on a thorough conformity to
common sense. Indeed they should be
eager, like Crick and Humphrey, to abandon poorly founded aspects of common
sense.[10]
Early returns in the experimental study
of folk attributions of mental states to corporations, robots, and peculiar
entities suggest that folk psychology is not a paradise of rigorously
principled materialism.[11] Materialists have ample reason already to
suspect serious flaws in the folk psychological materials from which
commonsense judgments must ultimately be constructed. For example, Brian Fiala,
Adam Arico, and Shaun Nichols (forthcoming) argue for
a dual-process explanation of the folk psychology of consciousness attribution. They postulate a “low road” cognitive process
that attributes consciousness to entities with eyes, non-inertial motion
trajectories, and apparently contingent interaction, and they postulate a “high
road” cognitive process grounded in deliberate reasoning, including consciously
endorsed theories. Suppose this
dual-process model is broadly correct.
One might doubt that either
the low-road or the high-road process will map nicely onto any plausible well
developed materialist metaphysics. Even
if one process does by happy circumstance map well, the other process – or
still some third process, maybe a socio-emotional one – might well still prove
powerful enough to generate conclusions contrary to the first and yet felt to
have the force of common sense.
I will now illustrate by discussing two
specific issues on which I suspect well developed materialist views will be
forced into bizarreness.
Mad
pain, Martian pain, and beer can pain. Who in the universe can feel pain? To judge from the literature, there are
currently four viable materialist answers: beings with brains like our own,
beings that react to the world in patterns similar to our own, some hybrid
view, or some further-mysterious-property view.
To evoke a further mysterious property is not to have a well developed
view in the sense of this essay, so let’s set such gestures aside. The remaining three views all appear to have
bizarre consequences. To insist on
brains, that is, on similarity to our own interior physical or biological
configuration, seems terribly chauvinistic if we hope to have the whole
universe in view and not just our little section of it: Couldn’t a being – an
octopus or a space alien? – feel pain despite stark interior differences from
us?[12] Suppose space aliens arrive tomorrow. They decode English from our television
broadcasts and converse fluently with us, behaving much as we do – including
withdrawing, screaming, writhing, protesting, avoiding, and revenging when
damaged with sharp objects. They write
novels and medical treatises about their agonies, and there’s no reason to
doubt their sincerity. I venture that it
would seem bizarre to most people – a weird philosopher’s quibble – to insist
that to really be experiencing pain they must also have brains like our own.
As described, these aliens are functionally similar to us, similar in
having pain states that play human-like causal roles in their mental economies,
and thus (barring the truly fantastic) they must have enough internal structure
to underwrite that functional similarity.
Thus functionalism beckons: Maybe the beings in the universe who
experience pain are just the beings in the universe who have states that play
the causal/functional role of pain. But
such functionalism engenders equally bizarre conclusions, as highlighted by Ned
Block (1978/1991) and John Searle (1980, 1984, 1992). If mentality is all about causal or
functional patterns, then weird assemblies of beer cans and wire, powered by
windmills and controlling a marionette, could presumably have conscious
experience if arranged the right way; and systems composed of rulebooks, slips
of paper, and monolingual English speakers could understand Chinese; and
genuine mentality might even be possible for economic systems manipulated by
wealthy hobbyists, if the fifth derivative of the balance of payments can be
made to play the right abstractly defined functional role. Similarly bizarre are some consequences on
the flip side: If pain is all about causal or functional role, then no one
could feel pain without possessing some state that is playing the normal causal
or functional role of pain. But it seems
simple common sense that one person might enter an experiential state under one
set of conditions and might tend to react to it in one way, while another
person, or the same person later, might tend to enter the same type of
experiential state under very different conditions and have very different
reactions. Madness, pathology,
disability, drugs, brain stimulation, personality quirks, and maybe radical Sartrean freedom, can amply scramble, it seems, the actual
and counterfactual causes and effects of any experiential state. So while the brain-oriented view of the
previous paragraph seems to be neural chauvinism, insisting that pain is all
about causal role appears to be functional chauvinism. It both attributes pain where it seems
bizarre to do so (to beer can systems) and denies possibilities that it seems
bizarre to deny (that a person could feel pain for weird reasons and with weird
effects).
Maybe both views are too simple. Maybe we can thread the needle by
hybridizing: Beings who experience pain are beings in states with one of a
variety of possible biological or physical configurations – just those
biological or physical configurations that normally
play the causal role of pain, even if things sometimes go haywire. The word “normally” here can be understood in
various ways. Maybe what matters is that
the being possesses some type of physical or biological configuration that plays
the required causal role in the right population (e.g., Lewis 1980). Or maybe what matters is that the configuration played that role, or was selected to play
that role, in the developmental or evolutionary history of the organism (e.g., Tye 1995, 2009). But
the appeal to normality implies that pains no longer “supervene” locally:
Whether I’m in pain now depends on how my current biophysical configuration is
seated in the broader universe – on who else is in my group, or on events in
the past. If normality turns upon the
past, then you and I might be molecule-for-molecule identical with each other
now, screaming and writhing equally, equally cursing our maker, but because of
differences in personal or evolutionary history, I am in pain and you are not. This would seem to be action at a historical
distance. If pain depends, instead, on
what is currently normal for my species or group, that could change with
selective genocide or with a speciation event beyond my ken. Strange forms of anesthesia! While local nonsupervenience
is plausible for relational properties – whether I have an uncle, whether I’m
thinking of coffee cup A or qualitatively identical coffee cup B – it is
bizarre for pain.
The issue appears to present a trilemma for the materialist: Either accept neural
chauvinism (no Martian pain), accept flat-footed functionalism (beer can pain
and no mad pain), or deny local supervenience
(anesthesia by speciation or genocide). Maybe
some materialist view can evade all three horns; they don’t seem logically
exhaustive. But if so, I don’t see the
view out there yet. It is, I think, a
reasonable guess that no plausible, well developed materialist view can
simultaneously respect all our commonsense judgments about this cluster of
issues.[13]
The
consciousness of the United States. It would be bizarre to suppose that the
United States has a stream of conscious experience distinct from the conscious
experiences of the people who compose it.
I hope you’ll agree.[14] (By “the United States” here, I mean the
large, vague-boundaried group of people who are
compatriots, sometimes acting in a coordinated manner.) Yet it’s unclear by what materialist standard
the United States lacks consciousness. Nations,
it would seem, represent and self-represent.
They respond (semi-)intelligently and self-protectively, in a
coordinated way, to opportunities and threats.
They gather, store, and manipulate information. They show skillful attunement to
environmental inputs in warring and spying on each other. Their subparts (people and subgroups of
people) are massively informationally interconnected
and mutually dependent, including in incredibly fancy self-regulating feedback
loops. These are the kinds of capacities
and structures that materialists typically regard as the heart of mentality.[15] Nations do all these things via the behavior
of their subparts, of course; but on materialist views individual people also
do what they do via the behavior of their subparts. A planet-sized alien who squints might see
individual Americans as so many buzzing pieces of a somewhat diffuse body
consuming bananas and automobiles, invading Iraq, exuding waste.
Even if the United States still lacks a
little something needed for consciousness, it seems we ought at least
hypothetically to be able to change that thing, and so generate a stream of
experience. We presumably needn’t go
nearly as far as Block does in his famous “Chinese nation” example (1978/1991)
– an example in which the country of China implements the exact functional
structure of someone’s mind for an hour – unless we suppose, bizarrely, that
consciousness is only possible among beings with almost exactly our psychology
at the finest level of functional detail.
If we are willing to attribute consciousness to relatively
unsophisticated beings (frogs? fish?), well, it seems that the United States
can, and does sometimes, act with as much coordination and intelligence, if on
a larger scale.
The most plausible materialistic attempt
I’ve seen to confine consciousness within the skull while respecting the
broadly functionalist spirit of most materialism is Andy Clark’s (2009) and Chris
Eliasmith’s (2009) suggestion that consciousness
requires the functional achievements possible through high bandwidth neural
synchrony. However, it’s hard to see why
speed per se should matter. Couldn’t
conscious intelligence be slow-paced, especially in large entities? And it’s hard to see why synchrony should
matter either, as long as the functional tasks necessary for intelligent
responsiveness are successfully executed.
Alternatively, one might insist that
specific details of biological implementation are essential to consciousness in
any possible being – for example, specific states of a unified cortex with
axons and dendrites and ion channels and all that – and that broadly mammal-like
or human-like functional sophistication alone won’t do. As in the case of pain, however, it seems bizarrely
chauvinistic to regard consciousness as only possible in beings with internal
physical states very similar to our own, regardless of outwardly measurable
behavioral similarity. Or is there some
very specific type of behavior that all conscious animals do but that the
United States, perhaps slightly reconfigured, could not do, and that is a
necessary condition of consciousness?
It’s hard to see what that behavior could be. Is the United States simply not enough of an
“entity” in the relevant sense? Well,
why not? What if we all held hands?
In his classic early statement of
functionalism, Putnam (1965) simply rules out, on no principled grounds, that a
collection of conscious organisms could be conscious. He didn’t want his theory to result in swarms
of bees having collective conscious experience, he says. But why not?
Maybe bee swarms are dumber and represent less than do individual bees –
committees collectively act and collectively represent less than do their
members as individuals – but that would seem to be a contingent, empirical
question about bees. To rule out swarm
consciousness a priori, regardless of swarm behavior and swarm structure, seems
mere prejudice against beings of radically different morphology. Shouldn’t a well developed materialist view eventually
jettison unprincipled folk morphological prejudices? We resist, perhaps, attributing consciousness
to noncompact beings and to beings whose internal
workings we can see – but most materialist theories appear to imply, and
probably part of common sense also implies, that such differences aren’t
metaphysically important. The
materialist should probably expect that some entities to which it would seem
bizarre to attribute conscious experience do in fact have conscious experience. If materialism is true, and if the kinds of
broadly functional capacities that most materialists regard as central to
conscious mentality are indeed central, it may be difficult to dodge the
conclusion that the United States has its own stream of conscious experience,
in addition to the experiences of its individual members.[16]
That’s the kind of bizarreness I’m
talking about. These two examples
illustrate it, but if one or both examples fail, I hope that the general point
is still plausible on broad, inductive grounds. The more we learn about cosmology,
microphysics, mathematics, and other such foundational matters, both cosmic and
a priori, the grosser the violations of common sense seem to become. The materialist should expect no lesser weirdness
from the metaphysics of the mind.
vi.
One
alternative to materialism is dualism, the view that people are not wholly
material entities but rather possess an immaterial soul in addition to their
material bodies.[17] (By “dualism”, unqualified, I mean substance dualism, which posits an
immaterial soul. “Property dualism” I
will discuss briefly below.) Although
dualism has merits as a first pass at a commonsense metaphysics of mind, from
the 17th century to the present, the greatest philosophers of the
Western world have universally found themselves forced into bizarre views when
attempting to articulate the metaphysics of immateriality. I regard this history as significant
empirical evidence that a well developed metaphysics of substance dualism will
unavoidably be bizarre.
Attempts at commonsense dualism founder,
it seems, on at least two broad issues: the causal powers of the immaterial
mind and the class of beings with immaterial minds.
The causal powers issue can be posed as
a dilemma: Does the immaterial soul have the causal power to affect material entities
like the brain? If yes, then material
entities like neurons must be regularly and systematically influenced by
immaterial events. A neuron must be
caused to fire not just because of the chemical, electrical, and other physical
influences on it but also because of immaterial happenings in spiritual
substances. Either events in the
immaterial realm transfer some physical or quasi-physical push that makes the
neuron behave other than it would without that immaterial push – which seems to
violate ordinary ideas about the sorts of events that can alter the behavior of
small, material, mechanistic-seeming things like the subparts of neurons – or
the immaterial somehow causally operates on the material despite the fact that
material events would transpire in exactly the same way absent that influence,
which seems an equally strange view.
Suppose, then, the other horn of the dilemma: The immaterial soul has no
causal influence on material events. If
immaterial souls do anything, they engage in rational reflection. On a no-influence view, such rational
reflection could not causally influence the movements of the body. You can’t make a rational decision that has
any effect on the physical world. This
again seems bizarre by the standards of ordinary common sense. I’ve skated quickly here over some complex
issues, but I hope that the informed reader will find that it rings true to say
that dualists have perennially faced trouble accommodating the full range of
commonsense opinion on mental-physical causation, for approximately the reasons
outlined.[18]
The scope of mentality issue can be
posed as a quadrilemma: Either (a.) among Earthly
animals, only human beings have immaterial souls and they have those souls from
birth (or maybe conception); or (b.) there are sharp boundaries in phylogeny
and development between ensouled and unensouled creatures; or (c.) whether a being has an
immaterial soul isn’t a simple yes-or-no matter but rather a gradual affair; or
(d.) panpsychism is true, that is, every being has,
or participates in having, an immaterial soul.
Each possibility violates common sense in a different way. Since on a substance dualist metaphysics of
mind, the immaterial soul is the locus of mentality and conscious experience,
option (a) denies dogs and apes mentality and conscious experience, contrary to
what seems to be the clear opinion of most of humankind. Option (b) requires sudden saltations in phylogeny and development, which seems
bizarre given the smooth gradation of differences in behavioral capacity, both
developmentally and across the range of non-human animals, and given the work
the immaterial soul must do if it’s not to be otiose. Option (c) appears incomprehensible from a
commonsense point of view: What would it mean to sort of, or kind of, or
halfway have an immaterial soul? (Would
you sort of go to Heaven? Even Dog
Heaven, which might be a “sort of” Heaven, seems to require dichotomously
either that dogs are materially instantiated there or that they have some
immateriality that transcends the grave.)
And despite a certain elegance in panpsychism,
the idea, in option (d), that even vegetables and bacteria and proteins and
thermostats have immaterial souls, or alternatively that they participate in a
single grand immaterial soul, seems bizarre on the face of it.[19]
I don’t intend the arguments of the past
two paragraphs as a priori metaphysical arguments against dualism. Rather, they constitute a proposed diagnosis
of an empirically observed phenomenon: the failure of Descartes, Malebranche,
Spinoza, Leibniz, Bayle, Berkeley, Reid, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, et al., up
to and including contemporary substance dualists like Popper and Eccles (1977)
and Foster (1991) to develop non-bizarre views of the metaphysics of
immateriality. Some of these thinkers
are better described as idealists than as substance dualists, but the mire of
issues they faced was the same, and my explanation of their attraction to
bizarre metaphysics is the same: Common sense is a jumble.
You might feel that there exists a well
developed substance dualist metaphysics that violates common sense in no major
respect and thus is not bizarre in the sense I’ve been using the term. I can’t treat every philosopher on a
case-by-case basis, but let me briefly mention two: Reid, who enjoys some
reputation as a commonsense philosopher, and Descartes, whose interactionist substance dualism has perhaps the best
initial intuitive appeal.
Reid’s explicit and philosophically
motivated commitment to common sense often leads him to refrain from advancing
detailed metaphysical views – which is of course no harm to my thesis. However, in accord with my thesis, on those
occasions where Reid does develop views on the metaphysics of dualism, he
appears unable to sustain his commitment to common sense. On the scope of mentality, Reid is either
silent or slides far down toward the panpsychist end:
He attributes immaterial souls to vegetables (esp. in 1774-1778/1995, 3.X), but
it’s unclear whether Reid thinks such immateriality is sufficient for mentality
(leading to panpsychism) or not (in which case Reid
did not develop a criterion for non-human mentality and so his view is not
“well developed” in the relevant sense).
On causal powers, Reid holds material events to be causally
epiphenomenal: Only immaterial beings have genuine causal power. Physical objects cannot produce motion or
change, or even to cohere into shapes, without the regular intervention of
immaterial beings (1774-1778/1995; 1788/2010).
Reid recognizes that this view conflicts with the commonsense opinions
of ordinary people – though this mistake of the “vulgar” does them no harm (see
1788/2010, IV.3). Despite his commitment
to common sense, Reid explicitly acknowledges that on some issues human
understanding is weak and common sense errs (see also 1785/2002, I.1).
Descartes, too, can’t quite keep
friendly to common sense regarding causal powers and animal souls. He advocates interactionist
dualist approach to causal powers on which activities of the soul can influence
the brain. This view is, perhaps,
somewhat less jarring to common sense than some of the other options. But interactionist
dualism does, as noted above, suggest a rather odd and seemingly unscientific view
of the behavior of neurons, which is perhaps part of why so many of Descartes’s dualist successors rejected interactionism. It is also, perhaps, slightly strange to
imagine the immaterial soul becoming drunk or caffeinated.[20] On the distribution of immaterial souls,
Descartes occupies the extreme opposite pole from the panpsychist:
Only human beings have minds. Non-human
animals, despite their evident similarity to human beings in physiology and in
much of their behavior, have no more thought or sensory experience than does a
cleverly made automaton. That Descartes’s opponents could imagine Descartes, in Leiden,
flinging a cat out a window as he asserts that animals are mere machines, is
testament to the sharp division between Descartes’s
and the common person’s view about the consciousness of cats. (See Grayling 2005, p. 135, for a recent
account of this apocryphal event.) Descartes’s interactionist dualism,
on inspection, is no great monument of common sense.
I conclude that we have good grounds to believe
that any well developed dualist metaphysics of mind will conflict sharply with
common sense on some central issues.
vii.
The
third historically important position is idealism, the view that there is no
material world at all but only a world of minds or spirits, in interaction with
each other or with God, or wholly solipsistic.
In the Western tradition, Berkeley (1710-1713/1965) and maybe Hegel
(1807/1977) are important advocates of this view; some non-Western and mystical
thinkers also appear to embrace idealism.[21] As Berkeley acknowledges, idealism is not the
ordinary view of non-philosophers: “It is indeed an opinion strangely
prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all
sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being
perceived by the understanding” (PHK §4).
No one, it seems, is born an idealist.
They are convinced, against common sense, by metaphysical arguments or
by an unusual religious or meditative experience. Idealism also inherits the same bizarre
choices about causation and the scope of ensoulment
that trouble dualist views: If a tree falls, is this somehow one idea causing
another? Do non-human animals exist only
as ideas in our minds or do they have minds of their own; and if the latter,
how do we avoid the slippery slope to panpsychism?
The bizarrenesses
of materialism and dualism may not be immediately evident, manifesting only when
details are developed and implications clarified. Idealism, in contrast, is bizarre on its
face.
viii.
There
might be an alternative to classical materialism, substance dualism, or
idealism; or there might be a compromise position. Maybe Kant’s transcendental idealism (1781/1787/1998)
is such an alternative or compromise, or maybe some sort of Russellian
(1921, 1927) or Chalmersian (1996) neutral monism or
property dualism is. However, I think we
could hardly accuse Kant, Russell, or Chalmers of articulating a commonsense
view of the metaphysics of mind, even if there are aspects of their views that
accord with common sense better than do some of the competitor views. Chalmers, for example, offers no good
commonsense answer to the problems of immaterial causation and the scope of
immateriality, tentatively favoring epiphenomenalism and panpsychism:
All information processing systems, even thermostats, have conscious experience
or at least “proto-consciousness”, but such immaterial properties play no
causal role in their physical behavior.
The attractions of Kant, Russell, and Chalmers lie, if anywhere, in
their elegance and rigor rather than their commonsensicality.
Alternatively, maybe there’s no
metaphysical fact of the matter here. Maybe
the issue is so ill-conceived that debate about it is hopelessly misbegotten (Carnap 1928/1967; maybe Searle 1992, 2004[22]). Or maybe asking metaphysical questions of
this sort takes us too far beyond the proper bounds of language use to be
meaningful.[23] But this type of view, too, seems
bizarre. The whole famous mind-body
dispute is over nothing real, or nothing it makes sense to try to talk
about? There is no fact of the matter
about whether something in you goes beyond the merely physical or
material? We can’t legitimately ask
whether some immaterial part of you might transcend the grave? It’s one thing to allow that facts about
transcendent existence might be unknowable – an agnostic view probably within
the bounds of commonsensical options – and it’s one thing to express the view,
as some materialists do, that dualists speak gibberish when they invoke the
immaterial soul; but it’s quite another thing, a much more radical and
unintuitive thing, to say that there is no legitimate sensible interpretation
of the dualist-materialist(-idealist) debate, not even sense enough to allow
the materialist coherently to express her rejection of the dualist’s
transcendent hopes.
ix.
I
am making an empirical claim about the history of philosophy and offering a
psychological explanation for this putative empirical fact. The empirical claim is that all existing well
developed accounts of the metaphysics of mind are bizarre. The psychological explanation is that common sense
is incoherent with respect to the metaphysics of mind. Common sense, and indeed I think simple
logic, requires that one of four options be true: materialism, dualism,
idealism, or a compromise/rejection view.
And yet common sense conflicts with each option, either on its face or
implicitly as revealed when metaphysical choices are made and implications
pursued. If common sense is indeed
incoherent in the metaphysics of mind, then the empirical claim can be modally extended:
It is not possible to develop a metaphysics of mind that is both coherent and
non-bizarre by the standards of current common sense, if that view involves
specific commitments on tricky issues like fundamental ontology, mind-body
causation, and the scope of mentality.
Call this thesis universal
bizarreness.
Crazyism
requires conjoining universal bizarreness with a second thesis, universal dubiety, to which I will now
turn. The universal dubiety thesis is
just the thesis that none of the bizarre options compels belief. At a moderate grain of specificity – say,
with three starkly different variants of each of the four broad metaphysical
positions – we are left with only dubious choices. No commonsensical or well justified option
remains.
The universal dubiety thesis requires
specification of a range of options, lest universal dubiety be either too
difficult or too easy to defend.
(Imagine only two options, radical solipsism vs. denial of radical
solipsism; or imagine a thousand options including Terrifically Awesome Theory
and Terrifically Awesome Theory with a Minor Plausible Twist.) I am reluctant to stand behind a firm taxonomy
of moderate-grain options, but I will suggest an artificially symmetric list of
thirteen and then a principle of option construction. Consider then, three versions of materialism:
a liberal one in which conscious experience extends widely through the universe
including to fairly simple creatures and/or to aggregate entities like the
United States, a conservative one in which conscious experience is much more
narrowly confined, and an eliminativist one in which
the concept of consciousness is too problematic for this liberal/conservative
distinction to make sense. And consider
three versions of dualism: one with mental and material causal interaction, one
in which material events causally influence but are not causally influenced by
immaterial events, and one in which some intervening agency (e.g., God) ensures
the regular conjunction of material and mental events that are not independently
efficacious. And consider three versions
of idealism: God-orchestrated Berkeleyianism,
grand-world-mind idealism, and solipsism.
And consider three compromise or rejection positions: neutral monism on
which there’s only one kind of stuff but it can have both material properties
and immaterial properties, transcendental idealism on which beyond the circuit
of our experience there are unknowable things-in-themselves not possessed of
material properties (e.g., not distributed in space), and broken-concept rejectionism.
Finally consider a catch-all thirteenth position tantamount to the
denial of any version of the previous twelve.
These thirteen positions, I submit, are very different from each other –
or at least, let’s say, eleven of them are (allowing the possibility that two
positions collapse into minor or terminological variants of others). These eleven-plus positions will be bizarre
in very different ways. And though they
are not all epistemically equal, I will argue below
that it is probably not epistemically rational to
regard any one of the positions as more likely to be true than false – that is,
as more likely than all the competitor positions combined.
As I said, I’m not committed to this particular
taxonomy. What’s important is that the
positions involve very different metaphysical stories, with very different bizarrenesses. The
advocate of universal dubiety should be at liberty to construct a taxonomy of
choice in accord with a principle of very large differences.[24] Universal dubiety is the view that there is
at least one such taxonomy in which no option merits credence above 50%.
x.
An Argument from
Authority and Maybe Peers.
Let’s assume that you, reader, are not
among the world’s leading metaphysicians of mind. And let’s assume that you’re drawn toward
some particular metaphysics of mind other than David Chalmers’s
property dualism. It seems likely that
David Chalmers, who is one of the
world’s leading metaphysicians of mind, and who is by all accounts highly
intelligent and well read, could run argumentative rings around you, including pointing
out relevant considerations of which you are now unaware. Any unbiased referee would call a knockout in
the first or second round. Given that
fact, how confident should you be in your opinion? Or suppose you’re drawn toward something like
the Chalmers view after all. Likely
David Lewis could have run rings around you, defending his version of
materialism. Last summer, I described
various metaphysical options to my then eleven-year-old son (yet another David). Davy immediately adopted one position against
all others, and he refused to be budged by my counterarguments. It seems a kind of epistemic failing – although
also, in a different way, a kind of intellectual virtue that will serve him
well in his education – for Davy to be confident in his view. He barely even understood the issues, much
less had a deep appreciation of the arguments.
If you or I stand confidently against the giants, armed only with our
weaker comprehensions, are we so different from Davy? Some of us might happen to have the right view,
maybe even because we are sensitive, as others of us are not, to the real
considerations that decisively favor it; but in some epistemically
important sense that’s just luck.
Suppose that’s a fair assessment of the
epistemic situation in your own case in particular. What should you do about it? Read enough philosophy to become one of the
world’s leading metaphysicians? Even if
that weren’t hopelessly impractical, it wouldn’t settle what your attitude should
be right now, which is the question.
Should you simply, then, bow to expert opinion, as one might bow to the
expert opinion of a chemist about the electronegativity
of fluorine? That doesn’t seem right
either. For one thing, there is no
consensus expert opinion to bow to. For
another, on an issue as central to one’s worldview as mind and body (especially
because of its connection to religious belief), and as subject to preconception
and bias even among experts, it may be wise not to cede one’s intellectual
autonomy. I recommend this: Spread your
confidence distribution broadly enough that your credence in your own favored
view (at a moderate grain of specificity) does not exceed your estimation of
the likelihood of all other competing positions combined. For those of us who are not among the world’s
leading metaphysicians of mind, the sweet spot between autonomous
self-confidence and appropriate intellectual humility is, I submit, somewhat
south of a 50% credence in that favored view.
If I’m fortunate, some readers will be
among the world’s leading metaphysicians of mind. To you, this argument does not apply. However, there may be a parallel argument
cast in terms of disagreement among epistemic peers.[25] I’m not sure the argument from peers
rationally compels a credence below 50% for your favorite moderately specific
metaphysics of mind, though I’m inclined to think that it most cases it
does. Even if it doesn’t, though: On the
assumption that expert readers spread their opinions diversely among several of
the more popular metaphysical options, most expert readers must be wrong.
The force and scope of my universal
dubiety claim is this: Probably, on empirical grounds, we are not currently epistemically warranted, nor will we in the
near-to-medium-term future be warranted, in assigning greater than 50% credence
to any one metaphysical option, at a moderate grain of specificity. For the argument from authority and maybe
peers the scope of the “we” is important.
By “we” I mean the philosophical community as a whole and most of the
notional readership of this essay. Implacable,
long-term disagreement among the best-informed experts, with no one option accepted
by a majority of experts and no foreseeable hope of resolution, is good reason
to accept the universal dubiety thesis.
The present argument might seem to
generalize to most of philosophy. I’m
inclined to think it does generalize, but not as much one might think. In areas of progress and discovery (logic,
historical interpretation, evaluation of the consequences of specific
argumentative moves, empirically driven inquiries, newly opened issues) the
peers version, at least, breaks down: One might have good grounds for thinking
oneself early to the discovery. And
perhaps non-experts, too, can avail themselves of those same grounds. The argument will also fail to generalize to issues
on which pluralism is warranted – cases in which multiple conflicting
approaches can have approximately equal merit, such as perhaps in the
articulation of visions of the good life or in goal-relative pragmatic
recommendations for the adoption of particular conceptual structures. What’s left, perhaps, are only the grand,
timeless, factual disputes that continually defy us and on which the experts
are widely dispersed. These disputes can
probably be counted on two hands.
Is the argument objectionably
authoritarian or defeatist? I hope
not. I am not saying: You’re not
entitled to an opinion where the experts (or your peers) disagree. One may still have a favored view. I hope you do. One might even “accept” that view, in the pragmatic
sense of treating the view as a basis for action and further reflection.[26] I advise not deference or despair but rather
autonomy thoroughly salted with a sense of one’s limitations. The failures of millennia of philosophical
ambition, and the discord among thousands of currently-living PhD’s, should
humble us all.
xi.
A No-Method Argument.
There is no conscious-ometer. Nor should
we expect one soon. There is also no
material-world-ometer. The lack of these devices problematizes
the metaphysics of mind.
Samuel Johnson kicked a stone. Thus, he said, he refuted Berkeley’s idealism
(Boswell 1791/1980, p. 333). Johnson’s
proof convinces no one with an inkling of sympathy for Berkeley, nor should
it. Yet it’s hard to see what empirical
test could be more to the point. Carnap (1928/1967, p. 333-334) imagines an idealist and a
non-idealist both measuring a mountain; there is no experiment on which they
will disagree. No multiplicity of
gauges, neuroimaging equipment, or particle
accelerators could give stronger empirical proof against idealism than
Johnson’s kick. Similarly, Smart, in his
influential defense of materialism, admits that no empirical test could
distinguish materialism from epiphenomenalist
substance dualism (1959, p. 155-156); there is no epiphenomenal-substance-ometer.
Why, then, should we be
materialists? Smart appeals to Occam’s
razor: Materialism is simpler. But
simplicity is a complex business.[27] Arguably, Berkeley’s idealism is simpler than
either dualism or materialism and solipsism simpler yet. And anyhow, simplicity is at best one
theoretical virtue among several, to be balanced in the mix. If most of the metaphysical contenders are
empirically indistinguishable, then it seems we must turn to some combination
of common sense and abstract theoretical virtue to settle the issue. Abstract theoretical virtues like simplicity
will, I suggest, attach only indecisively, non-compellingly, to the genuine
metaphysical contenders. I’m not sure
how to argue for this other than to invite you sympathetically to feel the abstract
beauties of some of the contending views other than your favorite. If the arguments of the first several
sections of this essay are correct, common sense is also incapable of furnishing
compelling grounds for choice of a single winner among the options.
We might still imagine at least a
conscious-ometer that we could press against a human
or animal head to decide among, say, relatively conservative vs. moderate vs.
liberal materialistic views of the abundance or sparseness of consciousness in
the world. But even this is too much to
hope for, I think, in the near to medium term.
Is a frog conscious? That is, does
a frog have a stream of phenomenal experience?
Is there something it’s like to be a frog? If two theorists of consciousness disagree
about this matter, no output from an fMRI scanner or
similar is likely to resolve their disagreement – not unless they share much
more in common than conservatives and liberals about the abundance of
consciousness generally do share. Nor
can a frog report its experience or lack of experience in any straightforward
way. Similarly intractible,
I think, is the dispute about whether, for example, people have constant
tactile experience of their feet in their shoes.[28] If so, we have no firm grounds of choice
between approaches to consciousness that are relatively liberal (perhaps even
as liberal as panpsychism) and approaches that are
relatively conservative (perhaps even as conservative as restricting
consciousness to adult human beings in their more self-aware moments). Nor, I think, do we have good grounds to deny
that liberal and conservative views are different enough to constitute very
different metaphysical pictures. Maybe
some disputes among materialists are merely terminological (certain forms of
functionalism vs. certain forms of identity theory?). Not the abundance dispute, though; at least
not always. Either there’s something
it’s like to be a frog, or there isn’t, or somewhere in-between, or the
question is somehow broken. These are
substantially different positions, each with some ineliminable
plausibility and no broadly acceptable means of empirical test.
Thus I suggest: Major metaphysical
issues of mind are resistant enough to empirical resolution that none, at a
moderate grain of specificity, empirically warrants a degree of credence exceeding
that of all competitors; and this situation is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. Neither do these
issues permit resolution by appeal to common sense (which will rebel against
all and is probably a poor guide anyway) or by appeal to broad, abstract
theoretical considerations. I assume
there are no logical self-contradictions in any of these views, at least
insofar as they are well developed real contenders.
Is there some other means of settling
the matter that I am overlooking?
xii.
An Argument from
Cosmological Crazyism.
If a broad-reaching cosmological crazyism is true, then crazyism
in the metaphysics of mind is a natural consequence. If we don’t know how the universe works, we
don’t know how the mind fits within it.
I can’t defend cosmological crazyism in detail here, but a few remarks can highlight
its plausibility. Consider the
bizarreness of quantum theory and the lack of consensus about its
interpretation, including the fact that some interpretations treat mentality as
fundamental (such as the many minds view and some versions of the Copenhagen
interpretation[29]). Consider the bizarreness of relativity theory,
perhaps especially the relativistic concept of distance, and the apparent
willingness of a portion of the physics community in 2011 to contemplate its
overthrow given a single report of apparently faster-than-light neutrinos.[30] Consider, too, the apparent conflict between
relativity theory and quantum theory.[31] Consider that many cosmologies now posit
either a creator who set the physical constants at the time of the Big Bang so
as to support the eventual occurrence of life, or a vastly unlikely chance
setting of those variables, or some sort of dependence of the universe upon our
observation of it, or the real existence of a vast number of universes (or aeons of this universe) with different physical constants.[32] The last of these four views – broadly, multiverse theory – seems to be a recent favorite. Prima facie, multiverse
theory is both dubious and bizarre. Here’s
one among the bizarrenesses: If the number of
universes is infinite, or if there is even a single infinite universe, then
every event of finite probability will occur an infinite number of times (given
certain background assumptions about probability and cosmic diversity). The spontaneous congealment of a
molecule-for-molecule twin of any living person is often held to have a very
tiny but finite probability.[33] You would, then, be one among an infinite
number of actually existing molecule-for-molecule twins of yourself, of diverse
origin. Quantum cosmology has also been
interpreted as suggesting the backward causation of the history of the universe
by our current acts of scientific observation (e.g., Hacking and Mlodinow 2010, p. 140).
Shall we look, then, to religion for
non-bizarre cosmologies? That seems an
unlikely source. Creation stories,
accounts of the afterlife – especially in the hands of those who would attempt
to work out the full ontological implications – seem only a source of further
bizarreness.
Another difficulty is this: If
consciousness can be created within artificial networks manipulated by external
users – for example, but not necessarily, in computer programs run by children
for entertainment – and if the beings inside those networks can be kept
ignorant of their nature, then there could be beings in the universe who are
vastly deluded in fundamental matters of metaphysics. Such beings, perhaps, might think they live in
a wide world of people like them when in fact they have three-hour lives,
isolated from all but their creator and whatever other beings are instantiated
in the same artificial environment.
There is, I think, a non-negligible possibility that we (I? you?) are such beings.[34] Suppose in the year 2200 a new computer game
is released, Sims 2012, and it’s a huge hit.
A hundred million children buy it.
Each instance of Sims 2012, when run, creates a hundred thousand actually
conscious simulated people, each of whom thinks she is living in the early 21st
century and has an appropriate range of apparent memories and apparent sensory
experiences. In reality, these people
serve mainly to provide entertaining reactions when, to their surprise,
Godzilla tromps through. Possibly, if
the economics of technology plays out right, there are many more such simulated
beings in the universe than there are non-simulated beings. The details don’t matter of course, whether
the outside agents are children or historians or scientists, Earthly beings or
gods or aliens running an Earth fiction.
Might we be Sims of broadly this sort?
To think that we are in fact Sims is, I concede, crazy. But is the possibility too crazy to figure in a disjunction of live cosmological options? Is it more than one order of magnitude
crazier than multiverse theory or the typical well
developed religious cosmology? There are
no commonsense cosmologies left.
Further support for cosmological dubiety
comes from our (apparently) miniscule cosmological perspective. If mainstream scientific cosmology is
correct, we have seen only a very small, perhaps an infinitesimal, part of
reality. We are like fleas on the back
of a dog, watching a hair grow and saying, “Ah, so that’s how the universe
works!”
There seems to me to be sufficient
cosmological uncertainty to cast into doubt any metaphysics of mind with
cosmological commitments. And all well
developed metaphysical accounts of the mind will have cosmological commitments,
if only in the choice between materialism, dualism, idealism, or a
compromise/rejection view. For example,
if it might be the case that an immaterial entity fashioned the physical
constants, then we cannot justifiably rest assured that materialism is
true. If there might really exist
universes (not just “possible worlds” but actual universes) so radically
different from our own that cognition transpires without the existence of
anything we would rightly call material, then materialism is at best a
provincial contingency. If we are
created within a simulation by outside agents, our experience of objects as
necessarily laid out in space and time might be a feature of our programming
environment that doesn’t reflect the fundamental ontology of the universe (Kant
meets cyberpunk).
Scientific cosmology is deeply and
pervasively bizarre; it is highly conjectural in its conclusions; it has proven
unstable over the decades; and experts persistently disagree on fundamental
points. Nor is it even uniformly
materialist. If materialism draws its
motivation from being securely and straightforwardly the best scientific
account of the fundamental nature of things, materialists ought to think twice. I focus on materialism, since it is the
dominant view in contemporary metaphysics of mind, but similar considerations
cast doubt on dualism, idealism, and at least some of the compromise/rejection
views.
xiii.
Certain
fundamental questions about the metaphysics of mind cannot be settled by
science, in its current state, or by abstract formal reasoning. To gain purchase on these questions we must
depend to a considerable extent on common sense. If we then have good reason to think that
common sense, too, is no reliable guide, we are unmoored. Without common sense as a constraint, the
possibilities open up, bizarre and beautiful in their different ways; and once
open they refuse to shut. This is crazyism.
Does it follow that you don’t know that
you are on Earth, reading philosophy?
Does crazyism collapse into radical
skepticism? I hope not. Earth might actually be SimEarth,
or nothing but a constellation of ideas in the mind of God – its fundamental
nature might be very different than you are inclined to suppose – but even in
such transparently bizarre metaphysical or cosmological stories, Earth exists.[35] In even more stories, the computer screen or
piece of paper you are looking at exists.
Nothing I have said implies, I think, that it is unreasonable to
distribute most of your credence to Earth-involving stories over Earth-denying
ones. And then, maybe, if Earth does
exist, and if your belief that it does has arisen in the right manner or has
the right kind of support, you will qualify as knowing that fact.[36]
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[2]
Critiques of the role of common sense or philosophical intuition as a guide to
metaphysics and philosophy of mind can be found in, for example, Churchland 1981; Stich 1983; Gopnik
and Schwitzgebel 1998; Kornblith 1998; Dennett 2005; Ladyman and Ross 2007; and Weinberg, Gonnerman,
Buckner, and Alexander 2010. Hume
1740/1978 and Kant 1781/1787/1998 are also interesting on this issue, of
course. Even metaphilosophical
views that treat metaphysics largely as a matter of building a rigorous
structure out of our commonsense judgments often envision conflicts within
common sense so that the entirety of common sense cannot be preserved: e.g.,
Ayer 1967; Kriegel 2011.
[3] DeWitt,
for example, writes:
I still recall vividly the shock I
experienced on first encountering this multiworld
concept. The idea of 10100+ slightly imperfect copies of oneself all
constantly splitting into further copies, which ultimately become
unrecognizable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense (1970, p. 33).
[4] Recent
reviews of the difficulties in settling among various bizarre interpretations
include Penrose 2004; Wallace 2008.
[5] See, e.g., Hempel 1980; Chomsky 1995; Montero 1999; Stoljar 2010.
[6] Although
Searle rejects the dualism-materialism distinction, I believe he is materialist
in the vague sense of the previous paragraph.
See, e.g., Searle 1995, pp. 6-7.
[7] In the
General Social Survey of Americans in
2010 (http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website; accessed September 16, 2011), 72% of
respondents reported believing in life after death and 17% reported disbelieving;
75% reported believing in God, 11% reported belief in an impersonal “Higher
Power”, and only 3% reported atheism. We
can probably safely assume that most contemporary American theists are not
materialists (though some may be: Baker 1995; Murphy 2006). Some other industrialized Western nations are
more secular than the U.S., but even in those societies religiosity is
widespread (Zuckerman 2007), and religiosity or belief in entities not
tolerated by materialism might even be something like a cultural universal
(Brown 1991; McCauley 2000; Boyer 2001).
Paul Bloom (2004) has argued on developmental and cross-cultural grounds
that it is innately natural to human beings to think of mental life as the
product of an immaterial soul, even if some of us reject dualism on an “airy
intellectual level” (see also Richert and Harris 2006; Hodge 2008; Slingerland and Chudek
2011). In David Bourget’s and David
Chalmers’ 2009 PhilPapers survey of faculty in
leading Anglophone philosophy departments, 62% of respondents reported
accepting atheism and another 11% reported “leaning toward” it. Yet even in this remarkably secular group,
only 35% reported accepting and 22% reported leaning toward physicalism
(http://philpapers.org/surveys; accessed September 19, 2011).
[10] See,
e.g., Churchland 1981; Stich 1983; Metzinger 2003; Dennett 2005; Mandik and Weisberg
2008.
[11] Gray,
Gray, and Wegner 2007; Knobe and Prinz 2008; Huebner,
Bruno, and Sarkissian 2010; Sytsma
and Machery 2010; Buckwalter and Phelan 2011.
[12] This
thought is central to early functionalist arguments against identity theory
materialism, e.g., Putnam 1965; Fodor 1974.
For discussion and criticism see Bechtel and Munsdale
1999; Shapiro and Polger forthcoming.
[13] See
also Adams and Dietrich 2004. See Hill
2009 for a rather different argument that the folk metaphysics of pain is
incoherent.
[14] Admittedly,
the willingness of English-language speakers to ascribe mental states of
various sorts to corporate entities is empirically complex. See Knobe and Prinz
2008; Sytsma and Machery
2009; Arico 2010; Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian 2010.
[15] E.g., Fodor
1987, 1990; Dennett 1987, 1991; Churchland 1984/1988;
Dretske 1988, 1995; Lycan
1996; Tononi 2004; Carruthers
2005; Rosenthal 2005; Hill 2009; Humphrey 2011.
Even materialists who emphasize the identity of mental states and brain
states will normally see functional or causal structures of this sort as what
it is that makes brain states the kinds of states that are conscious while the
internal states of, say, a toaster are not: e.g., Armstrong 1968; Bechtel and Mundale 1999. Searle
(1984, 1992) seems to be an exception to the tendency described here, though I
find his positive position on the biological causes of consciousness too
indeterminate in its commitments to fully evaluate on the present issue.
[17] “Immaterial
soul” is intended here in a fairly broad but traditional sense. By this criterion, some metaphysical systems
that call themselves substance dualist, notably Lowe’s (2008), do not
qualify. Despite Lowe’s choice of label
his system is very different from traditional substance dualist approaches and
for current purposes is probably better conceived as a compromise position.
[19] The
same quadrilemma arises if immateriality is regarded
as essential to life, as on the types of vitalist
theories that were discarded in the early 20th century and on
immaterialist views of the “vegetative soul”.
As Pierre Bayle nicely articulates, even accepting something like a
sharp-boundaried immaterialist vitalism
about life doesn’t prevent this complex of issues from arising concerning the
“rational soul”, or mindedness, or conscious experience (1697/1702/1965, “Rorarius”; see also Des Chene
2006).
[20] See
especially La Mettrie (1748/1994). The power of these two examples is that
alcohol and caffeine appear to affect the reasoning process itself and not only
the passions and bodily movements, contra Descartes’s
picture of how bodily influences can oppose reason (1649/1985, esp. §47).
[21] See
especially the Indian Advaita Vedanta and Yogacara traditions – though these traditions present some
of the same interpretative challenges as Hegel, probably involving strands
better interpreted as a type of compromise or rejection view. See Deutsch 1969/1973; Deutsch and van Buitenen, eds., 1971; Collins 1998; Lusthaus
2002; Trivedi 2005.
[22] However,
despite Searle’s self-description I would classify Searle as broadly speaking a
materialist (see note 6).
[23] This
might seem a broadly Wittgensteinian position, but
it’s probably not Wittgenstein’s own position; see esp. 1945-1949/1958, p. 178,
and 1947/1980, vol. 1, §265.
[25] On
the epistemology of peer disagreement see, e.g., Foley 2001; Kelly 2005;
Feldman 2006; Enoch 2010.
[28] For
example, Dennett 1991 vs. Searle 1992. I
suspect that most readers will find the medium-term irresolvability
of this latter dispute to be less plausible prima facie than in the
between-species case. I defend my
pessimism about this issue at length in Schwitzgebel 2011.
[30] Neutrino
result reported in OPERA collaboration 2011.
For some scientific community reaction see Brumfiel
2011; Matson 2011.
[31]
Famously noted in Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935
and Bell 1964. For a recent discussion
see Maudlin 1994/2002.
[32] The
is the “fine-tuning” issue. See Barrow,
Morris, Freeland, and Harper, eds., 2008; Hawking and Mlodinow
2010; Penrose 2010; and contra Stenger 2011.
[33] For discussion:
Bousso and Freivogel 2007; Page
2008; De Simone, Guth, Linde,
Noorbala, Salem, and Vilenkin
2010. Such people, or brains, or
people-plus-sections-of-environment, have been dubbed “Boltzmann babies” or
“Boltzmann brains” after the 19th century physicist, Ludwig
Boltzmann, who argued that in a universe of sufficient size any arbitrary
low-entropy event – including presumably the congealment of a person – could be
expected to occur by chance (e.g., Boltzmann 1897).