The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief

Eric Schwitzgebel
Department of Philosophy
University of California at Riverside
Riverside, CA 92521-0201
USA

October 3, 2016

The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief

Abstract: Suppose someone intellectually assents to a proposition but fails to act and react generally as though that proposition is true. Does she believe the proposition? *Intellectualist* approaches will say she does believe it. They align belief with sincere, reflective judgment, downplaying the importance of habitual, spontaneous reaction and unreflective assumption. *Broad-based* approaches, which do not privilege the intellectual and reflective over the spontaneous and habitual in matters of belief, will refrain from ascribing belief or treat it as an intermediate case. Both views are viable, so it is open to us to choose which view to prefer on pragmatic grounds. I argue that since "belief" is a term of central importance in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology, we should use it to label most important phenomenon in the vicinity that can plausibly answer to it. The most important phenomenon in the vicinity is not our patterns of intellectual endorsement but rather our overall lived patterns of action and reaction. Too intellectualist a view risks hiding the importance of practical behavior, especially when that behavior does not match our ideals and self-conception, and it thus invites us to noxiously comfortable views of ourselves.

The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief

1. Introduction.

Who you are is how you live. Your attitudes, including the attitudes that make you the interesting and wonderful person you are, are not just revealed by, or correlated with, or the inner causes of, but *constituted by* how you tend to act and react, both actually and counterfactually, to the people and things around you. This essay will defend a piece of that general picture.

In thinking about our personality and attitudes – for example, in thinking about what we *believe* – most of us depend too trustingly on the stories we tell ourselves. We say "I believe that my children's happiness is far more important than their academic or financial success" or "I think that black people are just as honest as everyone else" or "I believe that everyone is basically good at heart". When we say such things, we usually feel sincere and well-intentioned. We think that we really do believe what we say we believe. We pat ourselves on the back a little, maybe, if we think that these attitudes reflect well upon us.

On one approach to belief, the sincere endorsement of a proposition is sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to qualify as believing it, if you really do wholeheartedly judge it to be true when you reflect upon it.[1] On an alternative approach – the one I will defend – it is not enough to sincerely embrace such propositions in reflective moments. To qualify as someone who genuinely believes such things, you must *live* that way. Your actual behavior, including your

---

[1] For example, Cohen 1992: "belief that *p* is a disposition, when one is attending to issues raised, or items referred to, by the proposition *p*, normally to feel it true that *p* and false that *not-p*, whether or not one is willing to act, speak, or reason accordingly" (p. 4); and Kripke's 1979/1988 "disquotational principle": "If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to '*p*', then he believes that p" (p. 112-113). See also Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri 2015 on "thin belief". Some view of this sort also appears to be implicit the practice, standard in survey methodologies and also just in everyday interaction, to ascertain people's attitudes by asking them what they believe and then treating their answers as authoritative.

spontaneous and unreflective behavior, as well as your dispositions to respond in various ways to counterfactual circumstances, must also fit. On this second approach, someone who believes that their children's happiness is more important than their academic or financial success must not only sincerely *say* that that is so, but also tend to act and react accordingly. Someone who believes that black people are just as honest must not only embrace that idea in the study, but also actually tend to trust black people as much as she trusts other people.

I will call these two competing views *intellectualist* and *pragmatist,* respectively. Intellectualism treats sincere endorsement as central to belief. Pragmatism treats one's day-to-day choices and habits as more central. I will argue against intellectualism on the grounds that it encourages us to turn our eyes away from our actual choices and actions, permitting us too easily to paint ourselves in flattering colors, while the pragmatic approach encourages unpleasant but salutary self-examination.[2]

The approach I favor is pragmatist in two ways. First, it fits with the pragmatist tradition of Bain (1868/1973), Peirce (1877, 1878), James (1896/1912, 1907/2004), and Dewey (1920/1957, 1938[3]) in emphasizing behavioral patterns as the core of belief. Second, it is metaphilosophically pragmatist in relying on pragmatic criteria to choose among competing metaphysical approaches, as I will now explain.

2. Pragmatic Metaphysics Generally.

---

[2] See also Marley-Payne 2015 for a related critique of intellectualism which has influenced my thinking about these issues.

[3] However, Dewey tended to prefer the terms "judgment", "knowledge", or "assertability" to "belief" (see 1938, p. 7). See also Brown 2015.

Sometimes the world divides into neat types – neat enough that you can more or less just point your science at it and straightforwardly sort the As from the Bs. Sometimes instead the world is fuzzy-bordered, full of intermediate cases and cases where plausible criteria conflict. When the world is the latter way, we sometimes face *antecedently open cases*. In antecedently open cases, the world does not force a classification scheme upon us. More than one classificational option fits things well enough; you could legitimately go either way. You could classify the case as an A, without doing too much violence to the phenomena, or you could classify it as a B, or maybe you could just leave it indeterminate or intermediate.

Antecedently open cases are, or can be, decision points. If there's more than one way to build a legitimate metaphysics or classificational scheme, you have some options. You can consider, do you *want* to classify the thing in question as an A? Would there be some advantage in thinking of category "A" so that it sweeps in the case? Or is it better to think of "A" in a way that excludes the case or leaves it intermediate? Such decisions can reflect, often do at least implicitly reflect, our interests and values. Such decisions can also shape, often do at least implicitly shape, future choices and values, influencing both how we think about that particular type of case and how we think about the As in general.

Pragmatic metaphysics is metaphysics done with these thoughts explicitly in mind. For instance: There are lots of ways of thinking about what a *person* is. Usually the cases are not antecedently open. You are a person, I am a person, this coffee cup is not a person. It wouldn't be reasonable to adopt a classificational scheme that yielded a different result than that! However, some interesting cases seem to be antecedently open, breaking in different directions depending on what criteria are emphasized: a fetus, a human without much cortex, a hypothetical conscious robot, a hypothetical enhanced chimpanzee. The world does not seem to force a

classificational scheme that sorts these types of cases neatly into persons and non-persons. We can *choose* to think of personhood in a way that includes such cases, or excludes them, or leaves them intermediate. In doing so we both express and buttress certain values, for example, about what sorts of being deserve the highest level of moral consideration.

In characterizing pragmatic metaphysics in this way, I draw upon three strands of thought in recent philosophy. One is the self-avowed later pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty (1980/2010, 1993/2010) and Hilary Putnam (1990), who saw all classificational decisions as pragmatically governed, but who are also sometimes interpreted as embracing more radically open views about the classificational possibilities than the view I intend.[4] Another strand is the pragmatic strand in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, especially in the "Stanford school" thinkers, who see the world as sufficiently complex that it defies simple modeling, with the result that we can only choose, on practical grounds, between competing scientific models with different tradeoffs in terms of simplicity, accuracy (to a certain extent, over a certain range of phenomena of interest), social utility, and other virtues (Cartwright 1983, 1999; Dupré 1993; Horst 2016; relatedly, Carnap 1950 on "explication"). A third strand is the view in metaethics and meta-metaphysics that treats some of the debates in these areas as linguistic disputes but not therefore trivial. Given how much can ride upon choices of language, disputants can sometimes be interpreted as (implicitly or explicitly) disagreeing not about non-normative facts but instead about the normative issue of how the terms in question, such as "person" or "torture", *should* be used (Varzi 2011; Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Plunkett 2015; Thomasson forthcoming).

Pragmatic metaphysics requires that there not always be a single best way of classifying things, independent of our projects and interests. It requires enough fuzziness or multivocality

---

[4] See Page 2006 in defense of a relatively moderate reading of Rorty and Putnam.

that we can legitimately appeal to our projects and interests in pushing for one articulation of our metaphysical categories over another.

The human mind is a complex, fuzzy-bordered thing, right at the center of our values. Because it is complex and fuzzy-bordered, interesting classificational questions will arise, with lots of antecedently open cases – lots of cases that are intermediate or where the usual criteria point in different directions. And because the mind is at the center of our values, it matters how we classify such cases. Does being happy require *feeling* happy? Is deep compassionate concern that doesn't privilege its object as special *love*? Answers to these classificational questions aren't compelled by the phenomena. Instead, we can decide. What ranges of phenomena deserve such culturally important labels as "happiness" and "love"?

We might think of metaphysical battles over the definitions of important disciplinary terms such as "person", "happiness", and "love" – also, arguably, "name", "explanation", "harm", "justification", "cause", "reason", "knowledge", and "justice" – partly as *political* battles, between philosophers with different visions and priorities, for control of our common disciplinary language.

3. Intellectual Endorsement Versus Spontaneous Lived Behavior: The Case of Daniel.

Suppose someone intellectually assents to a proposition but fails to act and react generally as though that proposition is true. Does she *believe* the proposition? If cases of this sort are antecedently open, we face a pragmatic metaphysical question: How *should* we classify such cases? What values are expressed and buttressed in saying, about such cases, that we really do believe or really do not believe what we explicitly endorse? What vision of the world

manifests in these different ways of talking about belief, what projects are supported, what phenomena are rendered more or less visible?

The cases are familiar. Duy-Anh[5] sincerely says that God sees all and damns the wicked to Hell; but he does not tend to act and react in the way we would expect of someone who believes that to be true. Alejandro sincerely says that people in wheelchairs are just as smart as those who can walk easily without aid; but in fact he tends to act and react in ways more consistent with assuming people in wheelchairs to be intellectually inferior. Daniel sincerely says that low-wage workers deserve as much respect as people who are handsomely paid, maybe even more respect; but he neither distributes his own respect accordingly nor finds others' inegalitarian behavior jarring. Kennedy sincerely says that money doesn't matter much, above a certain basic income; but her choices and emotional reactions seem to tell a different story. Nancy sincerely says that her underachieving adult son will soon become one of the best salespeople in his company, but lots of her other behavior seems more realistically pessimistic.

Let me sketch Daniel's case in more detail. Politically, Daniel tilts left. Let's say he's thirty years old, an advanced graduate student in philosophy. He votes liberal Democrat. When political candidates say that existing social structures give working-class people a raw deal, he cheers them on. He went to an elite undergraduate university, and he admires his classmates who chose personally meaningful careers over money-oriented careers. He makes it his policy to tip generously. He says, to friends and family – especially in arguments with his right-leaning uncle Jordan – that undocumented farm laborers and hotel staff, people who work at the lowest

---

[5] Names in all examples were selected randomly, after the examples were already written, from lists of former lower-division students in my classes. To avoid confusion or offense, I exclude "Jesus", "Mohammed", and very uncommon names. See Schwitzgebel 2015 for discussion.

levels in food service and retail, day-laborers and custodians, deserve as much respect as do lawyers and engineers and professors of philosophy. Maybe they deserve even more respect. Life's full of hard knocks for them, he says. They don't have the same safety net. It's a struggle for them just to get by. Viewed properly, they are often more admirable, overall, than are full professors cozily ensconced in tenure. He says this passionately, maybe too passionately. He feels immensely confident that he is right. He doesn't feel at all ambivalent about it. He even tries to be especially nice to these people.

Here's the twist. He *tries* to be nice. Usually there is something ill-tuned in the way he goes about this. He doesn't find it natural to be nice to them, to think of them as equals. He has to work his way toward it. It's forced, maybe even condescending. "Oh, bussing tables at Denny's diner is more valuable than writing philosophy!" he says to a busser he has somehow cornered. He's not deliberately lying or misrepresenting himself – he means it in a way – but it has the air of inauthenticity, and both he and the busser know it. He's trying to be respectful but he's failing, and this failure is typical of him.

Daniel admires eminent professors. He is spontaneously deferential to doctors, lawyers, managers, engineers. He does not admire or respect food service staff in the same way. He loathes the most vapidly ostentatious Maserati drivers, but of course that's only a small portion of the wealthy. If someone who looked like a well-dressed engineer and someone who looked like a migrant laborer were both sitting in the coach section of an airplane, the laborer spread out comfortably in an exit row aisle seat with extra leg room, the engineer jammed into a tiny middle seat, he'd think something was wrong about that situation. Maybe after a second thought he'd decide it was fair turnabout – but it would require an actual second thought, which he wouldn't usually give. Who will Daniel listen to more respectfully, who will he step aside for in the

hallway, whose approval or disapproval matters to him more? Always the well dressed, financially successful person, never a member of the working poor. Or rather, almost never. Sometimes, if the situation is right, he can really connect with a poor person, in an admiring and respectful way, if he stops and listens, notices some common ground, hears a story about some impressive obstacles she has overcome. When he does this, maybe he feels a little proud of himself in retrospect.

Likewise, usually but not always, when *other* people show more deference and respect to the socially powerful, that seems entirely appropriate to Daniel, while the reverse does not. In a department store, it would not seem jarring to him to watch a well-dressed man interrupt a conversation between an employee and a poorly-dressed customer; whereas if the poorly-dressed customer were to interrupt the well-dressed man, that would strike him as rude.

Daniel, let's suppose, knows all this about himself, or at least suspects it. Let's also suppose that it's not a matter of temporary back-and-forthing: He has all of these tendencies stably and can manifest different ones simultaneously – for example pontificating against classism in a way that manifests disrespectful classism toward the housekeeper to whom he is speaking.

I like Daniel. I don't mean to be harsh. I see a lot of myself in him – how much of myself, exactly, I'm not in a great position to judge.

So here's the question: Does Daniel believe that the working poor deserve at least as much respect as do people of higher social status?

We can imagine similarly convoluted cases for Duy-Anh's attitude about the existence of a punitive God, for Alejandro's attitude about the intelligence of wheelchair riders, for

Kennedy's attitude about the unimportance of money, for Nancy's attitude about her son's prospects.

The first thing I want to suggest about all these cases is that they are *antecedently open*. There's room for a pragmatic metaphysician to do some work. We can, if we want, craft a metaphysics of belief that counts Daniel as someone who genuinely believes that the working poor deserve equal respect, though he has some other psychological features that are regrettably misaligned with that belief; or we can craft a metaphysics that does not credit Daniel with that belief, or at least does not fully credit him with that belief. I am going to assume this openness rather than argue for it, though for a few reflections see this note.[6]

4. Intellectualist Versus Broad-Based Views.

We can sort reactions to Daniel's case into two rough classes. What I will call *intellectualist* views privilege the intellectual, the consciously endorsed, the reflective, and the

---

[6] Here are three ways in which the case might be *covertly closed* rather than open as I suggest:

(1.) There might be a difficult-to-discover fact about whether the proposition or representation "low-wage workers deserve as much respect as though who are handsomely paid" (or similar) is contained in a belief-like way in Daniel's mind (for example, stored in Daniel's functionally-defined "belief box"), even in cases of apparently mixed or conflicting functional role. Against this view, see Schwitzgebel 2002 and 2013 against "belief box" models of belief and Schwitzgebel 2010 for an argument that that even on stored-representation or belief-box models, cases like Daniel's rarely admit neat resolution, given the apparent failure of the putatively stored representations to operate consistently in stereotypically belief-like functional roles.

(2.) Common sense might so decisively favor intellectualism that no alternative view is even minimally viable. See my discussion in Section 8.

(3.) Metaphysics might be highly resistant to stipulative or pragmatic negotiation of terminological boundaries, even in apparently vague or borderline cases, and even with respect to complex structures like the human mind. I doubt that many readers would find this general view attractive on reflection.

See also Zimmerman 2016 for metaphilosophical defense of a pragmatic approach to the metaphysics of belief.

explicitly reasoned, in matters of belief. Intellectualist approaches entail that Daniel believes that the working poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid, since this is the proposition he sincerely endorses when he stops to think about it. An alternative approach is *broad based*. (I will eventually call the approach "pragmatic" but I'd rather earn that label than stipulate it.) On a broad-based view, the intellectual, conscious, reflective, explicitly reasoned side of Daniel is not privileged. What matters is his *overall* approach to or cognition about the world – how he is disposed to act and react generally, or the possibly implicit or nonconscious brain states or representations or associations that govern his cognition broadly speaking.

My own preferred metaphysics of belief is one way of developing a broad-based view. On my view, to believe is to be disposed to act and react in ways that ordinary belief ascribers would regard as characteristic of or stereotypical of the belief in question (Schwitzgebel 2002, 2010, 2013). I analogize to personality traits. To be courageous or extraverted is nothing more or less than to be disposed to act and react in characteristically courageous or extraverted ways. Similarly, to believe that the working poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid is nothing more or less than to be disposed to act and react in ways that ordinary people would regard as characteristic of that attitude. Among the relevant dispositions, in my view, are not just dispositions toward outwardly visible behavior but also *phenomenal* and *cognitive* dispositions – dispositions to have certain emotional reactions, feelings of surprise, and inner speech, and also dispositions to leap more readily along certain paths in one's private reasoning than along other paths (for example, to be readier to regard a certain type of behavior as rude when it's aimed at a formally dressed person than when it's aimed at someone in dusty work jeans).

Personality traits permit a wide range of mixed-up and in-betweenish cases, if different dispositions point in different directions. Consider someone who has great physical courage but

who is a social coward. Is she courageous full stop? If we're on the battlefield and physical courage is all we care about, then maybe it's fine simply to say she is courageous. If we're at a social gathering and someone needs to step forward and risk disapproval to prevent an injustice, then maybe it's fine to say she's not courageous. But if we care broadly about how she deals with risk, we might want to refrain from simple yes-or-no attribution and instead dive into the details of the case: She is courageous in these ways, cowardly in these other ways. If forced to make a summary assessment, we just have to say it's kind of intermediate – but really, any summary assessment would be somewhat misleading. On my approach to belief, this is how we should handle the case of Daniel, too: It's an intermediate, mixed-up case that resists summary assessment.

However, it is not my goal now to convince you to accept my dispositional approach to belief, and I will not rely on it in this essay. Other approaches to belief that are broad based in the relevant sense include other forms of liberal or "broad-track" dispositionalism (e.g., Ryle 1949; Marcus 1990; Hunter 2011), Daniel Dennett's (1987) "interpretationist" approach,[7] and functionalist and representationalist views that do not privilege the intellectual aspects of functional and representational role over the less intellectual aspects (which is how I prefer to understand Loar 1981; Millikan 1984, 1993; Fodor 1987, 1990; Dretske 1988; and Carruthers 2015).

Among the philosophers I read as implicitly or explicitly advocating intellectualist views, I would include three groups:

---

[7] See especially Dennett's distinction between "belief" and the more verbal "opinion" (1978). The interpretationism of Davidson (1984) is a less clear case, given his emphasis specifically on linguistic interpretation.

1. Philosophers who explicitly endorse principles on which conscious endorsement or sincere utterance of a proposition P is normally sufficient for belief that P, such as L. Jonathan Cohen and Saul Kripke (see note 1 for quotes).

2. Philosophers who endorse highly optimistic principles of first-person privilege or first-person authority, according to which self-attribution of a belief is normally sufficient for possession of that belief (Shoemaker 1988; Byrne 2005; Boyle 2011).

3. Philosophers who explicitly consider cases like Daniel's and argue that only the reflectively endorsed attitude ("the working poor deserve as much respect") reflects the person's *beliefs* (Gendler 2008a&b; maybe Zimmerman 2007, 2016[8]). On such views, behavior at odds with the person's reflective assessments is explainable by appeal to non-belief causes such as habit, association, emotional reaction, or (in Gendler's terminology) "alief".

Clearly, this is a broad class of views, rather than a single view. What these views share in common, which I think merits describing them as "intellectualist", is that in matters of belief attribution they privilege the intellectual, the consciously endorsed, the reflective, or the attentive

---

[8] In his 2016 manuscript, Aaron Zimmerman argues extensively in defense of "pragmatism" against "intellectualist" views that deny belief to non-human animals, so it might seem odd to list him here. Zimmerman does reject the necessity, for belief, of the *most intellectual* of intellectual dispositions, such as the disposition to say or think P linguistically and to self-attribute P; but he nonetheless privileges the attentive and self-controlled, and one's best judgment upon considering the matter carefully, over the spontaneous, inattentive, uncontrolled, and seemingly thoughtless – and Zimmerman appears to classify cases similar to Daniel's in the characteristic intellectualist manner. In this essay, I have presented the dialectic as between two positions, one which privileges the intellectual and one which looks at the whole wide swath of actions and reactions. But an intermediate position might also be possible, which extends beyond the intellectual but still excludes the habitual and inattentive. Perhaps this is Zimmerman's position. Schwitzgebel 2010 critiques that view on the grounds the habitual and spontaneous tend not to be separable from the thoughtful and attentive, since thoughtful and attentive behaviors inescapably involve habitual and spontaneous elements.

best judgment of the person about the matter in question, and they downplay or disregard the habitual, automatic, unguarded, unreflective, and spontaneous.

So here's where I hope to have brought you so far:

A. In an interesting range of cases, like Daniel's, people will sincerely intellectually endorse one proposition while having a broad range of other dispositions, especially spontaneous, habitual, and unreflective reactions and assumptions, that appear to manifest quite the opposite attitude.

B. Two viable metaphysical approaches are (i.) an *intellectualist* approach on which, in such cases, belief aligns with sincere intellectual endorsement, and (ii.) a *broad-based* approach on which spontaneous, habitual, and unreflective reactions and assumptions are no less central.

C. The matter is *antecedently open:* We can legitimately choose, on pragmatic grounds, between the two approaches.

I will now argue that the broad-based approach is pragmatically better.

5. The Trunk Argument Against Intellectualism.

My argument has a trunk and three branches.

The Trunk Argument. *Belief* is one of the central and most important concepts in all of philosophy. It is central to philosophy of mind: It is the most commonly discussed of the "propositional attitudes". It is central to philosophy of action: It's standard to view actions as arising from the interaction of beliefs, desires, and intentions. It is central to epistemology: Much of epistemology concerns the conditions under which beliefs are justified or count as

knowledge. Religious belief is also a major topic in philosophy of religion, and "belief reports" are a major topic in philosophy of language.

A concept this important to philosophical thinking should be reserved for the most important thing in the vicinity that can plausibly answer to it.

The most important thing in the vicinity is *not* our patterns of intellectual endorsement and our most thoughtful, attentive behavior. It is our *overall* patterns of action and reaction. Although what we say matters and what we do when we are most on our guard matters, what we do in general and how we live our lives overall matters even more. Since the general pattern matters more, we should attach this powerful word, this very central word in our discipline, to that general pattern.

We can use a different word to capture the intellectual side of ourselves. I recommend "judgment". We can say that Daniel *judges* and is *disposed to judge* that the working poor deserve equal respect. "Judgment" is an important term too in philosophy, even if not as important as "belief", and it sounds a bit conscious and intellectual, well suited to capture the thoughtful, intellectual side of Daniel.

Let me repeat this thought, since it is the main idea of the essay. It is open to us to ascribe belief in a way that primarily tracks one's patterns of intellectual endorsement and conscious judgment. Alternatively, it is open to us to ascribe belief in a way that tracks the whole wide swath of one's actions and reactions. Since the latter is more important than the former, it makes better pragmatic sense to attach this disciplinarily central word to the latter.

I will now elaborate this trunk argument with three branches.

6. Three Branch Arguments Against Intellectualism.

Branch 1. Too intellectualist a view invites us to adopt noxiously comfortable opinions about ourselves.

Daniel asks himself, "Do I believe that the working poor deserve equal respect?" He finds that he is inclined to sincerely judge that they do deserve equal respect. If intellectualism about belief is correct, he can rightly conclude that he has that belief. If self-knowledge of attitudes is generally easy and reliable, then Daniel ought to have self-knowledge. Daniel can say to himself, then, that he has the attitude that philosophers care about most – that attitude so central to philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology – *belief*. Maybe he lacks something else. He lacks *alief*, maybe, or the right habits, or something. But based on how philosophers usually talk, and based on where their professional attention is generally directed, you'd think that's kind of secondary. Daniel appears to have the most important thing straightened out.

Intellectualist philosophers can deny that Daniel does have the most important thing straightened out. They can say that how Daniel treats people matters more than what he explicitly endorses upon reflection. But if this is their view, their choice of language mismatches their priorities. They ought instead to join me in building the importance of people's general patterns of action right into the foundational terms of the discipline.

Branch 2. Too intellectualist a view hides our splintering dispositions.

Here's another, maybe deeper, reason Daniel might find himself too comfortable: He might not even *think to look* at his overall patterns of behavior in evaluating his attitude toward the working poor. In Branch 1, I assumed that Daniel knew that his spontaneous reactions were out of line, and he only devalued those reactions because he didn't think of them as central to whether he believes. But how would he come to know that his spontaneous reactions are out of

line? If he's a somewhat reflective, self-critical person, he might just happen to notice that fact about himself. But an intellectualist view of the attitudes doesn't *encourage* him to notice that fact about himself.

In contrast, a broad-based view of belief encourages Daniel to cast his eye more widely. It encourages him to think about his patterns of behavior, including his spontaneous behavior. It encourages him to think about his emotional reactions and implicit assumptions. In doing so, he might learn, or at least remind himself of, something important. The broad-based approach *brings our non-intellectual side forward into view* while the intellectualist approach tends to hide our non-intellectual side. Or at least these views do so to the extent we are talking specifically about belief – which is a large part of what philosophers do in fact actually talk about in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology.

Another way intellectualism hides our splintering dispositions is this: Suppose Suleyma has the same intellectual inclinations as Daniel but unlike Daniel her whole dispositional structure is egalitarian. She really does, and quite thoroughly, react to custodians and food-service workers as though they deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid. An intellectualist approach treats Daniel and Suleyma as the same in any discussion where what matters is what they believe about the working poor. They both count as believing that the working poor deserve equal respect, so now let's talk about how that belief couples with desire to beget intentions, let's talk about whether that belief is justified, let's talk about what set of possible worlds would make that belief true – for all these purposes Daniel and Suleyma would be modeled in the same way. The difference between them is obscured unless we make an additional effort to bring it to light.

If you think that Daniel's and Suleyma's differences are sufficiently important that they should not be treated as equivalent in the matter of what they believe about the respect owed to the working poor, then an intellectualist view should be unappealing to you. Of course, the differences matter for some purposes and not for other purposes. The question is whether on balance it's better to put those differences in the foreground or instead to tuck them away as a nuance.

Branch 3. Too intellectualist a view risks downgrading our responsibility.

It's a common idea in philosophy that we are responsible for our beliefs. We don't choose our beliefs in any straightforward way, but if our beliefs don't align with the best evidence available to us, we are epistemically (and maybe morally) blameworthy for that failure of alignment.[9] In contrast, our habits, spontaneous reactions, those sorts of things – it's commonly said – are not in our control, at least not directly, and so we are less praiseworthy or blameworthy for them; our true selves, our "real" attitudes, the beings we most fundamentally are, the locus of our freedom and responsibility and human awesomeness, is constituted by the aspects of ourselves that we endorse upon reflection.[10] This class of views fits naturally with an intellectualist approach to belief. It's a nice package deal: Unless we would endorse an attitude

---

[9] For a review of this literature, see Chignell 2010/2016.

[10] Versions of this class of views run from Frankfurt 1971 through at least Levy 2014, 2015. Levy is especially helpful in addressing implicit bias cases similar to the case of Daniel. Contrary views, with which I am largely sympathetic, include Arpaly 2002 and Smith 2005, 2008. Nietzsche (1886/1966) and Freud (1923/1960; 1933/1933), of course, also downplay the centrality of what we consciously endorse. Another reference point is Arendt's (1963/1965) treatment of the notorious Nazi Adolf Eichmann as tending to endorse high-sounding phrases that give him a feeling of "elation" when he says them, but which bear little connection to his actually lived values and choices. We all have shades of Eichmann in us.

Some recent treatments of implicit bias emphasize that even if we don't have direct control and responsibility for our biases, we do have substantial indirect control over time, and we can be responsible and blameworthy on those grounds (esp. Holroyd 2012). I worry that this already concedes too much to the intellectualist picture.

upon reflection, we neither believe it nor can be held directly responsible or blameworthy for it. Daniel might excuse himself by saying something like, "I can't help it if some of my spontaneous responses and assumptions are classist! That's not my true opinion. That sort of stuff is subpersonal, automatic, out of my control, not the real me, and it's unfair to blame me for it."

I think that view is almost exactly backwards. Our intellectual endorsements, when they don't align with our practical behavior, count for little in assessing our moral character. What matters more is how we spontaneously live our way through the world, how we actually treat the people we are with, the actual practical choices that we make. If there's any "real" us, that's it. If Daniel says, however sincerely, that he is an egalitarian, but he doesn't live that way, I don't think we should call him a straight-up egalitarian. I don't want to excuse him by saying that his inegalitarian reactions are mere uncontrollable habit and don't reflect the real him.

It's easy to talk. It's hard to change your life. I don't want to let you off the hook just because you feel sincere when you say certain handsome things, and I don't want to let myself off the hook. I don't want to say that I really believe all the lovely truths I tell myself I believe, that my unlovely habits and reactions are somehow alien from me, fail to speak for me. If I don't walk the walk, it's more appropriately condemnatory to say that my attitude, my belief state, is pretty mixed up.

Few of us reliably live according to the opinions and values we intellectually endorse in the matters we care about most. Indeed, it is this very caring about what our attitudes are that tempts us into splintering self-deception and wishful thinking, and which makes frank self-examination so unpleasant. I am stunned by the breadth and diversity of our failures. How do we really treat our family, our colleagues, our students, strangers in the world around us? What

do we really prioritize in our choices? What we sincerely say we believe about ourselves and about the people around us, what we sincerely say we find valuable, and how we actually live our way through the world – so often they are so far out of line with each other![11] I see no better way to highlight this important and disappointing fact than to refuse to place the intellectual side of ourselves at the center of philosophy.

7. Is This Too Harsh?

Here's a practical worry: Daniel might react negatively to being spoken of, or spoken to, in the way I recommend. He might react defensively, angrily, feel that his authority to speak for himself has been undercut if we describe him as not entirely or unambiguously believing what he intellectually endorses. We might do better, if our aim is actually to help him see and change his behavior, if we use a lighter touch, if we say instead something like "of course you *believe* that the working poor deserve equal respect, but look at all these reactions you have that are out of line with that belief".[12]

---

[11] Nietzsche and Freud are again relevant, as is the body of work in recent social psychology on "attitude-behavior consistency" (for reviews see Knobe and Leiter 2007; Fabrigar, Wegener, and MacDonald 2010). Although some early reported findings of almost no relationship between expressed attitudes (for example about racism) and lived behavior are probably overstated, the modern consensus favors median correlations typically in a range of about $r = .3$ to $.4$ between people's expressed attitudes and their attitude-related behavior (Kraus 1995) – a rather modest effect size, consistent with a large degree of counter-attitudinal behavior. (At $r = .3$-$.4$, about 10-15% of the variance in behavior would be predictable from variance in expressed attitude.) Schwitzgebel and Rust 2014 found similarly modest correlations between the expressed norms, self-reported behavior, and measured behavior, with respect to ten different moral issues, among professors, including ethics professors. An important qualification: Most of the empirical research examines the relationship between behavior and expressed opinions about what one *should* do; less commonly studied is the relationship between behavior and factual opinions or expressed opinions about value.

[12] Tamar Gendler, Karen Jones, and Aaron Zimmerman have all independently suggested this objection to me.

This is an open empirical question. Although some evidence suggests that it can be helpful to ascribe positive traits or virtues to people aspirationally, even if they don't yet entirely live up to those traits (Alfano 2013), other evidence suggests that frank confrontation can be more effective than too soft a touch, and it remains unclear what level of aggression or assertiveness is most effective in dealing with prejudice, for example (Czopp, Monteith, and Mark 2006; Becker and Barreto 2014). The empirical case is not clear enough either way, I suggest, to overcome the considerations I've advanced in my trunk-and-branch argument.

Another softening move is this. Once we recognize how pervasive cases like Daniel's are, the blame we feel toward Daniel ought to lose some of its sting. Blame will, or should, be tempered by sympathetic understanding. If *all* we cared about were elitism, and if we see ourselves as non-elitist, then when we hold Daniel blameworthy for his spontaneous reactions and say that his attitude is less egalitarian than he probably thinks it is, we raise ourselves above him and distance ourselves. But when we see that Daniel's condition is just the normal human condition, including in ourselves, the blame and holding responsible take a different color. We might not be (we think!) half-elitist in the way Daniel is, but it would be a rare person who was immune to Daniel-like manifestations of sexism, racism, ageism, and the many forms of ableism. Do you think that you respond in the same way to people you regard as physically beautiful as you do to people you regard as physically unappealing, in matters on which physical appearance should have no bearing?[13] Broadening our focus away from issues of egalitarianism, consider

---

[13] On the relationship between judgments of beauty and other traits such as academic intelligence, see Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, and Smoot 2000; Talavas, Mavor, and Perrett 2016. From the Langlois et al.: "Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is strong agreement both within and across cultures about who is and who is not attractive. Furthermore, attractiveness is a significant advantage for both children and adults in almost every domain of judgment, treatment, and behavior we examined. The magnitude of attractiveness effects is roughly the same as or larger than that of other important variables in the

other idealistic attitudes that you intellectually endorse. Maybe you're a professor, like me. You probably endorse a generous attitude toward the welfare of your students, a generous attitude toward other members of the department, a positive attitude toward the balance between work life and home life, and so forth. But do your spontaneous reactions and actual lived choices consistently reflect these aspirational attitudes, which are so pleasant to express and flow so easily from the tongue?

Thinking these thoughts and looking at myself, I sympathize with Daniel. I still want to hold him responsible. I still want to blame him rather than excuse him, and say that his belief state might not be as handsome as he thinks it is. But I have no desire to do this in a stinging way. After all, what kind of model am I?

8. Two Roles for Belief Attribution.

Here's another concern. If we ask Daniel, "Do you believe the poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid?", Daniel should answer with an unqualified "yes". If he said, "kind of" or "it's complex", he would give his conversation partner the wrong idea. If he went into detail into fact about his spontaneous reactions to people, he would seem to be missing the point.[14] Concurrent belief self-attribution seems to concern judgment or sincere endorsement and to have little to do with reporting one's general patterns of action and reaction.

---

social sciences. In most cases, the benefits of attractiveness are large enough to be "visible to the naked eye" and are of considerable practical significance" (p. 404 with in-line citations removed).

[14] See also the literature on "Moore's paradox" (Williams 2015 gives a review). Gertler (2011) and Frances (2016) suggest ways in which seemingly Moore-paradoxical sentences can be sincerely and rationally uttered.

In the terminology I'm recommending, when we ask people what they believe and when we tell others what we believe, normally we are asking for and telling our *judgments*, not (or not necessarily) our beliefs. I have no expectation that this practice would change. I concede that it is a substantial pragmatic cost of my view that we need to reinterpret what is going on this type of discourse. (Perhaps it is a small pragmatic advantage that someone with a view like mine, in saying "I believe that P" in such contexts, might tend to nervously wonder if her general way of living reflects that judgment.)

However, I want to emphasize that this kind of testimonial self-attribution is only one way of using the term "belief". Another major role of belief attribution is in predicting and explaining behavior. The prediction and explanation of behavior is a large part of what exercises philosophers of mind and philosophers of action when they discuss belief. And if *that* is our aim, then attributing the belief to in Daniel-like cases is apt to generate wrong predictions and goofed up explanations unless additional apparatus is trotted out. If, in Frank Ramsey's (1931) metaphor, beliefs are the maps by which we steer – well, Daniel is not steering through the world in an egalitarian manner. If, in Annette Baier's (1985) metaphor, an attitude is a "posture of the mind", Daniel lacks a consistently egalitarian posture. Suleyma (the person who shares Daniel's intellectual dispositions but who is also thoroughly egalitarian in her spontaneous reactions) is the one with the truly egalitarian posture and map.

Consider also Daniel's grandmother. She scolds him: Do you *really* believe that the working poor deserve equal respect? You sure don't act that way, for all your fine talk. Or consider a couple of custodians Daniel has just treated disdainfully. They are gossiping about Daniel behind his back. They say, with some justice, that Daniel doesn't really think people like them deserve much respect. Or consider Daniel at age sixty, after a miserable experience in

academia as a long-term adjunct, followed by a series of disappointing jobs, under horrid bosses, as a bartender and low-level librarian. His visceral respect for the social elite is long gone. He can say, looking back: When I was thirty, I didn't deep-down believe that the working poor deserved equal respect. Now I finally do believe that.

It is a simplifying assumption in our talk of "belief" that these two roles of belief attribution – the testimonial and the predictive/explanatory – are treated as converging upon a single thing, what one *believes*. Typically, such convergence is a fine simplifying assumption: What I testify that I believe ("class starts at 10:00") also predicts my behavior (I show up at 10:00). When this simplifying assumption breaks down, though, as in the case of Daniel, something has to give, and not all of our talk can be preserved without reinterpretation.

9. A Few More Concerns and Replies.

9.1. Is this an unrepresentative selection of beliefs? You might ask: What about mathematical beliefs? The belief that snow is white? The belief that there's a coffee cup here in front of me? The belief that Pluto is no longer classified as a planet? You might be concerned that my approach is driven too much by an unrepresentative selection of beliefs.

Response: I have focused on beliefs that we care about having (beyond just having a general desire for true beliefs). Often these are the beliefs are about norms and values: We care that we are the types of people who believe that certain things are more important than others, such as family over work or happiness over money. But other of my examples are closer to purely factual in content: that all the races are equally honest or intelligent, that God exists, that our children are capable of certain things. Empirically, I think it's the case that the intellectualist and the pragmatist approaches yield similar results for most beliefs, which is part of how

intellectualism has been able to keep its traction as a view (especially given philosophers'

tendency to focus on trivial beliefs like "it's raining" or "snow is white"); it's mostly in the big-

picture beliefs that are important to people's self-conception where the models come apart. In

principle, though, the models might come apart even for mathematical beliefs. Consider the

belief that the number of points in a line segment is the same cardinality as the number of points

in all of space. If someone assented to that proposition upon reflection and yet regularly drew

geometric or algebraic inferences that depended upon its falsity, then it might be a mixed or in-

between case on a pragmatic view but a straight-up belief on an intellectualist view.

9.2. Might philosophical fruitfulness diverge from overall importance? Although overall

patterns of behavior might be more important than the intellectual side of ourselves, philosophers

might still have sufficient pragmatic reason to focus on the latter. For example, in philosophy of

language or logic, maybe the most valuable thing is to look at relationships among endorsed

judgments. If philosophers adopted the broad-based view of belief, they might end up then not

caring so much about "belief" and mostly talking about "judgment" instead – an empty

terminological change.

Response: I accept that different terminological choices might better serve different

philosophical projects, and different idealizations or simplifications of our models of the mind

might be preferable for different ends. However, I think that philosophy of action and

philosophy of mind in particular have suffered from too quickly assimilating the two roles of

belief attribution I mention in Section 8, and that this has impaired our understanding of not only

cases like Daniel's but also cases of self-deception, gradual learning and forgetting

(Schwitzgebel 1999, 2001), and "belief fragmentation" (Elga and Rayo 2015; Greco 2015). If I

am right about this, then hopefully a disruption of intellectualist usage would have the long-term

effect of improving our thinking about such cases, and the result would not be simple a shift to back to *status quo ante,* only with "judgment" replacing "belief".

    9.3. Could we just urge more attention to behavior while retaining intellectualist usage for "belief"? This is probably Tamar Gendler's (2008a-b) intended strategy. She emphasizes the intellectual and explicitly reasoned in belief but then points to the huge part of our psychology that are often discordant with that, which she labels with a new term "alief".

    Response: Possibly this could work. I have no objection in principle. But my guess about the sociology of the discipline is that a reduction of the intellectualism in philosophy would be more swiftly and thoroughly achieved by intervening on this central term, "belief", emphasizing the non-intellectualist strands that it already contains, than by *reinforcing* the intellectualist strands in our concept of belief while also saying, "look over here at this other important stuff!"

    9.4. Could we decide to say there are two types of belief, one for which intellectual endorsement is sufficient and the other which requires more? For example, we might call the first "thin belief" and the second "thick belief" (Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri 2015); or we might call the first "superbelief" and the second "basic belief" (Frankish 2004).

    Response: I'm inclined to think that deviations from the broad-based dispositional or functional role of belief do not splinter as cleanly as a simple two-types-of-attitude model appears to suggest (see Schwitzgebel 1999, 2001, 2002, 2011). But to the extent we can distinguish two different attitude types in Daniel-like cases, it's confusing to call them both "belief" with different adjectival modifiers. Since we don't normally use adjectival modifiers in our belief attribution, that practice threatens to make unmarked uses of "belief" ambiguous. Why not use "judgment" and "belief" instead, as I recommend?

10. Conclusion.

We have a choice in constructing a metaphysics of belief. We can emphasize our patterns of intellectual endorsement, our most thoughtful responses, what we would say or judge upon reflection. Alternatively, we can emphasize the overall pattern of lived behavior, spontaneous as well as thoughtful, implicit as well as explicit. The latter pattern, being the more important, is the better choice as referent for this word, "belief", which is so central to our discipline.

I am particularly concerned about our tendency to sincerely endorse handsome attitudes – egalitarianism of various sorts, the unimportance of money and prestige, the importance of the welfare of people around us – while we behave in ways that align poorly with those attitudes. My empirical, pragmatic conjecture is that it better helps us to frankly confront our regular failure to live up to these handsome ideals if we demote intellectual endorsement from the center of philosophy, that is, if our basic philosophical terminology does not treat intellectual endorsement as the decisive thing. The broad-based view of belief is also the *pragmatic* view.

Wang Yangming, the 16th-century neo-Confucian philosopher, argued for the unity of knowledge and action: To know a truth, especially a moral truth, is to act accordingly. If you claim to know but do not act, you don't really know (Wang Yangming, circa 1600/2009). There is a type of moral excuse-making that Wang Yangming saw as common: the excuse of saying that although you know what is right to do, you are having trouble putting that knowledge into action. To say this is to claim a kind of half-credit. It is to suggest that you are on the path toward full moral goodness, though you still have some way to go – maybe you have your heart in the right place, but are just a bit weak or need some practice. Wang Yangming does not want

to give people that half-credit. To know the Confucian way to treat your parents is just to treat your parents that way. Your lived choices express your knowledge. If you really knew that it was wrong to neglect your parents, you would not neglect them.

Our affirmations and avowals, our heartfelt judgments in our most reflective moments, they do matter at lot. Maybe they *are* worth half or quarter credit – especially if we feel genuine guilt, shame, and regret when we act contrary to those espoused values. But if our affirmations and avowals are important it's not because of anything about them that makes them especially speak for us, or that makes them especially central to who we are. Rather they matter because they are one interesting piece of what it is to live a rich human life, neither more nor less.[15]

References

Alfano, Mark (2013). *Character as moral fiction.* Cambridge: Cambridge.

Arendt, Hannah (1963/1965). *Eichmann in Jerusalem, revised ed.* New York: Penguin.

Arpaly, Nomy (2002). *Unprincipled virtue.* Oxford: Oxford.

Becker, Julia C. and Manuela Barreto (2014). Ways to go: Men's and women's support for
aggressive and nonaggressive confrontation of sexism as a function of gender
identification. *Journal of Social Issues, 70,* 668-686.

Brown, Matthew J. (2015). John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance
dichotomy. *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 53,* 62-70.

Bain, Alexander (1868/1973). *Mental science.* New York: Arno.

Boyle, Matthew (2011). Transparent self-knowledge. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
supplementary vol. 85,* 223-241.

Buckwalter, Wesley, David Rose, and John Turri (2015). Belief through thick and thin. *Noûs,
49,* 748-775.

Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. *Philosophical Topics, 33,* 79-104.

Carnap, Rudolf (1950). *Logical foundations of probability.* Chicago: University of Chicago.

*Carruthers, Peter (2015). *The centered mind.* Oxford: Oxford.

Cartwright, Nancy (1983). *How the laws of physics lie.* New York: Oxford.

Cartwright, Nancy (1999). *The dappled world.* Cambridge: Cambridge.

Chignell, Andrew (2010/2016). The ethics of belief. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
Spring 2016 edition. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/

Cohen, L. Jonathan (1992). *An essay on belief and acceptance.* Oxford: Oxford.

Czopp, Alexander M., Margo J. Monteith, Margo J., and Aimee Y. Mark (2006). Standing up

    for a change: Reducing bias through interpersonal confrontation. *Journal of Personality*

    and Social Psychology, 90, 784-803.

Davidson, Donald (1984). *Inquiries into truth and interpretation.* Oxford: Oxford.

Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). How to change your mind. In *Brainstorms*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Dennett, Daniel C. (1987). *The intentional stance.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Dewey, John (1920/1957). *Reconstruction in philosophy, enlarged ed.* Boston: Beacon.

Dewey, John (1938). *Logic: The theory of inquiry.* New York: Henry Holt.

Dretske, Fred (1988). *Explaining behavior.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Dupré, John (1993). *The disorder of things.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard.

Elga, Adam, and Augustin Rayo (2015). *Fragmentation and information access.* Manuscript.

Evans, Gareth (1982). *Varieties of reference.* Oxford: Oxford.

*Fabrigar, Leandre R., Duane T. Wegener, and Tara K. MacDonald (2010). Distinguishing

    between prediction and influence: Multiple processes underlying attitude-behavior

    consistency. In C.R. Agnew, D.E. Carlston, W,G, Graziano, and J.R. Kelly, eds., *The a*

    miracle occurs. Oxford: Oxford.

Fodor, Jerry A. (1987). *Psychosemantics.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Fodor, Jerry A. (1990). *A theory of content.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Frances, Bryan (2016). Rationally held 'P, but I fully believe ~P and I am not equivocating'.

    Philosophical Studies, 173, 309-313.

Frankfurt, Harry (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *Journal of*

    Philosophy, 68, 5-20.

Frankish, Keith (2004). *Mind and supermind.* Cambridge: Cambridge.

Freud, Sigmund (1923/1960). *The ego and the id,* trans. J. Riviere, ed. J. Strachey. New York: Norton.

Freud, Sigmund (1933/1933). *New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis,* trans. W.J.H. Sprott. New York: Norton.

Gendler, Tamar S. (2008a). Alief and belief. *Journal of Philosophy, 105,* 634-663.

Gendler, Tamar S. (2008b). Alief in action, and reaction. *Mind & Language, 23,* 552-585.

Gertler, Brie (2011). Self-knowledge and the transparency of belief. In A. Hatzimoysis, ed., *Self-Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford.

Greco, Daniel (2015). Iteration and fragmentation. *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 91,* 656-673.

Holroyd, Jules (2012). Responsibility for implicit bias. *Journal of Social Philosophy, 43,* 274-306.

Horst, Steven W. (2016). *Cognitive pluralism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Hunter, David (2011). Alienated belief. *Dialectica, 65,* 221-240.

James, William (1896/1912). *The will to believe and other popular essays in philosophy.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

James, William (1907/2004). *Pragmatism.* Project Gutenberg: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5116/5116-h/5116-h.htm

Knobe, Joshuan and Brian Leiter (2007). The case for Nietzschean moral psychology. In B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu, eds., *Nietzsche and morality.* Oxford: Oxford.

Kraus, Stephen J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21,* 58-75.

Kripke, Saul A. (1979/1988). A puzzle about belief. In N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds.,

    Propositions and attitudes. Oxford: Oxford.

Langlois, Judith H., Lisa Kalakanis, Adam J. Rubenstein, Andrea Larson, Monica Hallam, and

    Monica Smoot (2000). Maxims or myths of beauty? A meta-analytic and theoretical

    review. *Psychological Bulletin, 126,* 390-423.

Levy, Neil (2014). *Consciousness and moral responsibility.* Oxford: Oxford.

Levy, Neil (2015). Neither fish nor fowl: Implicit attitudes as patchy endorsements. *Noûs, 49,*

    800-823.

Loar, Brian (1981). *Mind and meaning.* Cambridge: Cambridge.

Marcus, Ruth B. (1990). Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing. *Philosophy &*

    Phenomenological Research, 50, 132-153.

Marley-Payne, Jack (2015). Against intellectualism about belief. *Minds Online* conference:

    http://mindsonline.philosophyofbrains.com/author/marley_pmit-edu

Millikan, Ruth G. (1984). *Language, thought, and other biological categories.* Cambridge, MA:

    MIT.

Millikan, Ruth G. (1993). *White queen psychology and other essays for Alice*. Cambridge, MA:

    MIT.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886/1966). *Beyond good and evil,* trans. W. Kaufmann. New York:

    Vintage.

Page, Sam (2006). Mind-independence disambiguated: Separating the meat from the straw in

    the realism/anti-realism debate. *Ratio, 9,* 321-335.

Peirce, Charles S. (1877). The fixation of belief. *Popular Science Monthly, 12* (Nov), 1-15.

Peirce, Charles E. (1878). How to make our ideas clear. *Popular Science Monthly, 12* (Jan), 286-302.

Plunkett, David (2015). Which concepts should we use?: Metalinguistic negotiations and the methodology of philosophy. *Inquiry, 58,* 828-874.

Plunkett, David, and Timothy Sundell (2013). Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms. *Philosophers' Imprint, 13* (number 23).

Putnam, Hilary (1990). *Realism with a human face,* ed. J. Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.

Ramsey, Frank P. (1931). *The foundations of mathematics, and other logical essays.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Rorty, Richard (1980/2010). Pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism. In C.J. Vorparil and R.J. Bernstein, eds., *The Rorty reader.* Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Rorty, Richard (1993/2010). Putnam and the relativist menace. In C.J. Vorparil and R.J. Bernstein, eds., *The Rorty reader.* Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Ryle, Gilbert (1949). *The concept of mind.* New York: Barnes & Noble.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Gradual belief change in children. *Human Development, 42,* 283-296.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2001). In-between believing. *Philosophical Quarterly, 51,* 76-82.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. *Noûs, 36,* 249-275.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2010). Acting contrary to our professed beliefs, or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91,* 531-553.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2011). Knowing your own beliefs. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35*, supplement 41-62.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2013). A dispositional approach to attitudes: Thinking outside of the belief

box. In N. Nottelmann, ed., *New essays on belief.* New York: Palgrave.

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2015). Names in philosophical examples. Blog post at The Splintered Mind

(Nov. 25). http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2015/11/names-in-philosophical-

examples.html

Schwitzgebel, Eric, and Joshua Rust (2014). The moral behavior of ethics professors:

Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly

observed behavior, *Philosophical Psychology, 27,* 293-327.

Shoemaker, Sydney (1988). On knowing one's own mind. *Philosophical Perspectives, 2,* 183-

209.

Smith, Angela (2005). Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. *Ethics,*

115, 236-271.

Smith, Angela (2008). Control, responsibility, and moral assessment. *Philosophical Studies,*

138, 367-392.

Talavos, Sean N., Kenneth I. Mavor, and David I. Perrett (2016). Blinded by beauty:

Attractiveness bias and accurate perceptions of academic performance. PLoS One 11 (2).

Thomasson, Amie (forthcoming). Metaphysical disputes and metalinguistic negotiation.

Analytic Philosophy.

Varzi, Achille C. (2011). Boundaries, conventions, and realism. In J.K Campbell, M. O'Rourke,

and M.H. Slater, eds., *Carving nature at its joints.* Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Wang Yangming (circa 1600/2009). Wang Yangming. In P.J. Ivanhoe, trans., *Readings from*

the Lu-Wang school of neo-Confucianism. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Williams, John N. (2015). Moore's paradox in thought: A critical survey. *Philosophy Compass,*

10, 24-37.

Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2007). The nature of belief. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14* (11),

61-82.

Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2016). *The nature of belief: A pragmatic picture.* Manuscript.