The Problem of Known Illusion and the Resemblance of Experience to RealityEric Schwitzgebel
Philosophy of Science 81 (2014), 954-960
Abstract: Are objects in convex passenger side mirrors "closer than they appear"? If one adapts
to inverting goggles, does the world go back to looking the way it was before, or does
the world look approximately the same throughout the course of adaptation, only losing
its normative sense of wrongness? The answers to these empirical, introspective
questions might help cast light on the classic philosophical debate about the degree of
resemblance between our visual experience of reality and things as they are in themselves.
Official published version in Philosophy of Science.
By following any of the links below, you are requesting a copy for personal use only, in accord with "fair use" laws.
Or email eschwitz at domain: ucr.edu for a copy of this paper.
Return to Eric Schwitzgebel's homepage.