Eric Schwitzgebel

eschwitz at domain- ucr.edu

Professor of Philosophy (Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 1997)

Areas of interest: philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral psychology,

classical Chinese philosophy, epistemology, metaphilosophy, metaphysics,

science fiction....

My Blog:

is here.

A Broad-Ranging Interview on My Work:

is here.

Books:

• Perplexities of Consciousness, MIT Press (2011).

Here at Amazon and here at Barnes & Noble.  For an abstract and access to chapter drafts from 2009 see here.

Philosophical Studies is publishing a symposium on the book, consisting of my Precis, commentaries by Uriah Kriegel, by Declan Smithies, and by Maja Spener, and my reply. 

• Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, with Russell T. Hurlburt, MIT Press (2007).

Here at Amazon and here at Barnes & Noble.  For an abstract and access to chapter drafts from 2006 see here.

Journal of Consciousness Studies devoted an issue to ten commentaries on this book, with 100 pages of replies by Russ and me: See here.

Essays Sorted by Theme:

Belief:

• "The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief" (in draft).
• "Against Intellectualism about Belief" (2015).  [A commentary on Jack Marley-Payne's "Against Intellectualist Theories of Belief"]
• "The Intrinsic Value of Self-Knowledge" (in draft).
• "A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box" (2013), in Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), Belief (Palgrave).
• (with Blake Myers-Schulz) "Knowing That P Without Believing That P", (2013), Nous, 47, 371-384.
• "Mad Belief?" (2012), NeuroEthics, 5, 13-17.  [A commentary on Lisa Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (2010).]
• "Knowing Your Own Beliefs" (2011), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35, supplement 41-62.
• "Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief" (2010), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 531-553.
• "Belief" (2006/2010/2014), entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief" (2002), Nous, 36, 249-275.  [This is my central essay on the topic.]
  • "In-Between Believing" (2001), Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 76-82.
  • "On Containers and Content, with a Cautionary Note to Philosophers of Mind" (not for print publication).
• "Gradual Belief Change in Children" (1999), Human Development, 42, 283-296.

Our Poor Knowledge of Our Own Conscious Experience:

• "Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage" (2016), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, 11-12, 224-235.  (This is a commentary on Keith Frankish, "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness").
• "If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious" (2015), Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721.
• Objection by Francois Kammerer (2015); and reply by me.
• "Introspection, What?" (2012) in Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford).
• "Self-Ignorance" (2012) in JeeLoo Liu and John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge).
• "Introspection" (2010), entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "The Unreliability of Naive Introspection" (2008), Philosophical Review, 117, 245-273.  [This is my central essay on the topic.]
  • "No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience -- Contra Dennett?" (2007), Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 107-113.  (For further thoughts in response to an exchange with Dennett, see here.)
• "Descartes Inverted" (2007), from Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic (with Russell T. Hurlburt).
• "Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or Is Experience Limited to What's in Attention?" (2007), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, no. 3, 5-35.
• "Do Things Look Flat?" (2006), Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 72, 589-599.
• "Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual" (2004), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, no. 7-8, 58-76..
  • "Difference Tone Training: A Demonstration Adapted from Titchener's Experimental Psychology" (2005), Psyche, 11, no. 6.
• "Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White?" (2002), Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 33, 649-660.  
  • "Do People Still Report Dreaming in Black and White? An Attempt to Replicate a Questionnaire from 1942" (2003), Perceptual & Motor Skills, 96, 25-29; and 
  • (with Changbing Huang and Zhou Yifeng) "Do We Dream in Color? Cultural Variations and Skepticism" (2006), Dreaming, 16, 36-42.
• "How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery" (2002), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, no. 5-6, 35-53.
• (with Michael S. Gordon) "How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation" (2000), Philosophical Topics, 28, 235-246.

The Relationship Between Moral Reflection and Moral Behavior:

• (with Jonathan Ellis) "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought" (2017), Moral Inferences, ed. J.-F. Bonnefon and B. Tremoliere (Psychology Press).
• (with Joshua Rust) "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists" (2016), Companion to Experimental Philosophy, ed. J. Sytsma and W. Buckwalter (Wiley-Blackwell).
• (with Fiery Cushman) "Philosophers' Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection" (2015), Cognition, 141, 127-137.
• "Cheeseburger Ethics: Are Professional Ethicists Good People?" (2015), Aeon Magazine (July 14 featured article).
• "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists and the Role of the Philosopher" (2014), Experimental Ethics, ed. H. Rusch, M. Uhl, and C. Luetge (Palgrave).
• (with Joshua Rust) "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists and the Power of Reason" (2014), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology.
• "A Theory of Jerks" (2014), Aeon Magazine (June 4 featured article).
• (with Joshua Rust) "The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior" (2014), Philosophical Psychology, 27, 293-327.
• "Do Ethics Classes Influence Student Behavior?", (2013 manuscript).
• "Are Ethicists Any More Likely to Pay Their Registration Fees at Professional Meetings?" (2013), Economics & Philosophy, 29, 371-380.
• (with Joshua Rust) "Ethicists' and Non-Ethicists' Responsiveness to Student Emails: Relationships among Expressed Normative Attitude, Self-Described Behavior, and Experimentally Observed Behavior" (2013), Metaphilosophy, 44, 350-371.
• (with Fiery Cushman) "Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers" (2012), Mind & Language, 27, 135-153.
• (with Joshua Rust, Linus Huang, Alan Moore, and Justin Coates), "Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences" (2012), Philosophical Psychology, 35, 331-340.
• (with Joshua Rust) "Do Ethicists and Political Philosophers Vote More Often Than Other Professors?" (2010) Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 189-199.
• (with Joshua Rust) "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists: Peer Opinion" (2009) Mind, 118,1043-1059.
• "Do Ethicists Steal More Books?" (2009) Philosophical Psychology, 22, 711-725.
• "Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau" (2007) History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24, 147-168.

Foundational Issues in Cognitive Development:

• (with Victoria McGeer) "Disorder in the Representational Warehouse" (2006), Child Development, 77, 1557-1562.  [This is a commentary on an essay by Jacqueline Woolley, but it is written so as to be comprehensible without knowledge of Woolley's paper.]
• "Gradual Belief Change in Children" (1999), Human Development, 42, 283-296.  [Also listed under "Belief" above.]
• "A Difficulty for Simulation Theory Due to the Close Connection of Pretense and Action in Early Childhood" (2000, not for print publication)
• "Children's Theories and the Drive to Explain" (1999), Science & Education, 8, 457-488.
  • "Theories in Children and the Rest of Us" (1996), Philosophy of Science, Supplemental Issue, 63, s202-s210.
• "Representation and Desire: A Philosophical Error with Consequences for Theory-of-Mind Research" (1999), Philosophical Psychology, 12, 157-180.
• "Difficulties in Davidson's Arguments Against Belief Without Language" (1997, not for print publication)

Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Skepticism, and Cosmology:

• "1% Skepticism" (2017), Nous, 51, 271-290.
• "Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage", Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, 11-12, 224-235.  (This is a commentary on Keith Frankish, "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness"). [Also listed under "Our Poor Knowledge of Our Own Conscious Experience" above]
• (with Alan T. Moore) "Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World" (2015) Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1, 564-582..
• "If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious" (2015), Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721.
• Objection by Francois Kammerer (2015); and reply by me.
• "The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind" (2014), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92, 665-682.
• "The Problem of Known Illusion and the Resemblance of Experience to Reality" (2014), Philosophy of Science, 81, 954-960.
• (with Alison Gopnik) "Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway?  The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology" (1998),  in M.R. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield).
• "Zhuangzi's Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism" (1996), in P. Kjellberg and P.J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi (SUNY Press).

Chinese Philosophy:

• "The Unskilled Zhuangzi: Big and Useless and Not So Good at Catching Rats", in draft.
• "Death, Self, and Oneness in the Incomprehensible Zhuangzi" (forthcoming) in P.J. Ivanhoe, O. Flanagan, R. Harrison, H. Sarkissian, and E. Schwitzgebel, eds., Oneness in Philosophy, Religion, and Psychology (Columbia University Press).
• "Human Nature and Moral Development in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau" (2007) History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24, 147-168.  [Also listed under "The Relationship Between Moral Reflection and Moral Behavior" above.]
• "Why Don't We Know Our Chinese Philosophy?" (2001), APA Newsletter on the Status of Asian & Asian-American Philosophers & Philosophies, 1, 26-27.
• "Zhuangzi's Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism" (1996), in P. Kjellberg and P.J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi (SUNY Press).  [Also listed under "Metaphilosophy" above.]

Other:

• (with Carolyn Dicey Jennings) "Women in Philosophy: Quantitative Analyses of Specialization, Prevalence, Visibility, and Generational Change" (forthcoming) Public Affairs Quarterly.
• (with Mara Garza) "A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences" (2015), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 39, 98-119.
• (with Josh Dever) "The Two Envelope Paradox and Using Variables Within the Expectation Formula" (2008), Sorites, 20, 135-140 -- also see our Simple Explanation of the Two Envelope Paradox.

Dissertation:

• Words about Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology (U.C. Berkeley, Philosophy Department, 1997).

Philosophical Fiction:

• "THE TURING MACHINES OF BABEL" (2017), Apex Magazine, issue #98.
• "Fish Dance" (2016), Clarkesworld, issue #118. 
• "The Dauphin's Metaphysics" (2015), Unlikely Story, issue #12.  (Locus recommended by Lois Tilton.)
• translated into Hungarian: Galakika, issue 316 (2016).
• translated in Chinese by Fan Yilun, Science Fiction World, issue 367 (2016).
• "Momentary Sage" (2015), The Dark, issue #8, 38-43.
• "Out of the Jar" (2015), Magazine of Fantasy & Science Fiction, 128, 118-128.
• "Philosophical Science Fiction / Speculative Fiction: Recommendations from 41 Philosophers" (2015)
• abbreviated version as "Recommended Viewing" (2015), The Philosophers' Magazine, issue #71, 101-106.
• abbreviated version in Susan Schneider, ed., Science Fiction and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2016, Wiley).
• "The Tyrant's Headache" (2015), Sci Phi Journal, issue #3, 78-83.
• "What Kelp Remembers" (2014), Weird Tales, Flashes of Weirdness (April 14).
• (with R. Scott Bakker) "Reinstalling Eden" (2013), Nature, 503, 562.
• podcast in StarShipSofa (2015), #392.
• reprint in Susan Schneider, ed., Science Fiction and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2016, Wiley), 19-21.
• Annual ranking of science fiction and fantasy magazines, based on awards nominations and appearance on prominent "best of" lists.

Selected Op-Eds:

• "Does It Matter If the Passover Story Is Literally True?" -- Los Angeles Times, Apr. 9, 2017.
• "Like the Oscars, #PhilosophySoWhite" (with Myisha Cherry) -- Los Angeles Times, Mar. 6, 2016.
• "Will Your Driverless Car Kill You So That Others May Live?" -- Los Angeles Times, Dec. 6, 2015.
• "We Have Greater Moral Obligations to Robots Than to Humans" -- Aeon Opinions, Nov. 12, 2015.
• "What's Missing in College Philosophy Classes? Chinese Philosophers" -- Los Angeles Times, Sep. 13, 2015.
• "Philosophy Via Facebook? Why Not?" -- Los Angeles Times, Jul. 17, 2015.

Miscellaneous Thoughts:

• Conjugal love.
• Marilyn Vos Savant on Goliath and Lump1.
• Wundt's Selbstbeobachtung und innere Wahrnehmung

Recent Courses:

Lower Division: 

Evil (Fall 2016, Fall 2015, Fall 2014, Fall 2013, Winter 2013, Spring 2012, Fall 2010)

Upper Division: 

Philosophy of Science (Spring 2013, Spring 2011)

Philosophy of Mind (Winter 2016, Spring 2013, Fall 2011, Fall 2010)

Classical Chinese Philosophy (Spring 2014)

Senior Seminar: Proofs of the External World (Winter 2011)

Graduate Seminars:

Monster Rights, Robot Rights, Alien Rights (Spring 2016)

Radical Skepticism (Winter 2014)

What Is the Use of Ethics? (Fall 2012)

The Psychology of Metaphysics (Winter 2012)

Dissertations completed under my direction:

• Alan T. Moore (2016): The Experience of Reading.
• Nick Baiamonte (2008): On The Possibility of Being Virtuous in a Wicked World: The Nature, Character, and Power of Genuine Moral Reflection.
• Joshua Rust (2005): John Searle's Ideal Type: Max Weber and the Construction of Social Reality.
• Ted M. Preston (2005): Bridging the Gap Between Normative Beliefs and Actions.

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