

FROM FREGE TO WITTGENSTEIN: PERSPECTIVES ON EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

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(A) ENTIRE COLLECTION:

ABSTRACT: In recent years, analytic philosophy has gained a new historical self-consciousness. A considerable amount of work, both historically informed and philosophically subtle, is being done now on its origins and development. This is especially true for early analytic philosophy (roughly 1880-1930) and the corresponding works of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. In this collection, fifteen previously unpublished essays explore different facets of this period, with special emphasis on the vital intellectual relationship between Frege and the early Wittgenstein. The essays examine a number of important issues: the content and the analysis of thought, the nature of truth, the special status of logic, the foundations of mathematics, the basis of linguistic representation, the distinction between sense and nonsense, and the peculiarities of philosophical elucidation and understanding.

KEYWORDS: analysis, early analytic philosophy, language, logic, mathematics, sense, thought, truth; Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein

(B) INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES:

1) Erich Reck: "Wittgenstein's 'Great Debt' to Frege: Biographical Traces and Philosophical Themes"

ABSTRACT: It is well known that Frege and his writings were an important influence on Wittgenstein. There is no agreement, however, on the nature and scope of this influence. In this paper I clarify the situation in three related ways: (1) by tracing Frege's and Wittgenstein's actual interactions, i.e., their face-to-face meetings and their correspondence between 1911 and 1920; (2) by documenting Wittgenstein's continued study of Frege's writings, until the very end of his life in 1951; and (3), by constructing, on that basis, a new framework for understanding the themes that connect Wittgenstein to Frege, both in his early and his later works.

KEYWORDS: context principle, correspondence, debt, influence, meetings, philosophy; Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein

2) Gottfried Gabriel: "Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy"

ABSTRACT: In recent years it has been acknowledged increasingly that the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy is one of complementarity rather than opposition, as previously often assumed. In this essay I will argue that, in fact, early

analytic philosophy has its roots in the tradition of continental philosophy. The essay will focus on Hermann Lotze's influence on Frege and on Frege's relationship to the Neo-Kantians Otto Liebmann and Wilhelm Windelband. It will provide new evidence for the claim that Frege's philosophy should be seen as belonging to the tradition of Neo-Kantianism and, along the way, exhibit the continental roots of Frege's context principle.

KEYWORDS: analytic philosophy, British Neo-Hegelianism, context principle, continental philosophy, holism, monism, Neo-Kantianism; Bradley, Frege, Liebmann, Lotze, Russell, Windelband, Wittgenstein

3) Steve Gerrard: "One Wittgenstein?"

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue, contrary to the traditional interpretation, that dividing Wittgenstein's career into "The Early Wittgenstein" and "The Later Wittgenstein" is a serious distortion. The main task of the paper is to outline a reading of the *Tractatus* that will give us one Wittgenstein. Building on the work of James Conant, Cora Diamond, Juliet Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, John McDowell, and Hilary Putnam, I will argue that throughout his career Wittgenstein argued against metaphysical realism. I offer a reading of the *Tractatus* in which that book is a retelling of the history of early analytic ontology.

KEYWORDS: early analytic philosophy, metaphysics (metaphysical), ontology, realism; Conant, Diamond, Floyd, Goldfarb, McDowell, Putnam, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

4) Hans Sluga: "Frege and the Indefinability of Truth"

ABSTRACT: One of Frege's most original insights is the claim that the concept of truth is simple and undefinable. This paper seeks to show how Frege reached that doctrine and what role it plays in his thinking. It then goes on to confront Frege's argumentation with Tarski's theory of truth and concludes that, far from being made obsolete by Tarski, these arguments remain of the greatest significance for understanding the philosophical problem of truth.

KEYWORDS: fact, undefinability (undefinable), philosophy (philosophical), state of affairs, truth; Frege, Tarski

5) Sanford Shieh: "On Interpreting Frege on Truth and Logic"

ABSTRACT: This essay analyzes a controversy between a recent, revisionary style of interpretation of Frege's conception of the relation between logic and semantics and the received interpretation that it opposes. I argue that, properly understood, the revisionary interpretation, especially that of Thomas Ricketts, differs less from such established interpretations as that of Dummett than the proponents of the former have claimed. However, the arguments underlying the revisionary interpretation have suggestive consequences for the idea of a foundation of logic.

KEYWORDS: assertion, foundation, interpretation, logic, semantics, truth; Dummett, Frege, Ricketts

6) Marco Ruffino: "Logical Objects in Frege's *Grundgesetze*, Section 10"

ABSTRACT: In this paper I discuss three main issues concerning Frege's arguments in *Grundgesetze*, Section 10. (1) I argue against the view according to which Frege's procedure is insufficient to guarantee that names of extensions (or, more generally, names of value-ranges) are really referential. (2) I discuss whether Frege meant to include other kinds of objects besides truth-values and value-ranges in the range of first-order variables of his logical system. Finally (3), I challenge the view according to which Frege's decision to make some stipulations concerning the identity of value-ranges is incompatible with his alleged Platonism. Central to my approach is an elucidation of Frege's views on logical objects.

KEYWORDS: extension, logic, objects, Platonism, reference, value-range, truth-value; Frege, *Grundgesetze*

7) Joan Weiner: "Frege's Elucidations: Section 31 of *Grundgesetze* Revisited"

ABSTRACT: In section 31 of his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, Frege argues that all the simple names in his logical notation have *Bedeutung*. Most contemporary philosophers have found Frege's argument deeply mysterious. While the argument is certainly difficult to interpret, I argue that its apparent fallaciousness and circularity are largely artifacts of the standard interpretation. On that interpretation, the early sections of *Grundgesetze* are meant to set out a metatheoretic (proto-soundness) proof, and section 31's burden is to establish the basic case of an inductive proof that all Begriffsschrift symbols have *Bedeutung*. But there are compelling reasons for rejecting the metatheoretic-proof reading; for it conflicts with many of Frege's actual statements in these sections. I offer a reading that fits Frege's statements, and one upshot is a new understanding of section 31 on which its argument is neither fallacious nor circular.

KEYWORDS: *Bedeutung*, elucidation, inductive proof, logic (logical), metatheory, soundness; Frege, *Grundgesetze*

8) Warren Goldfarb: "Wittgenstein's Understanding of Frege: The Pre-*Tractarian* Evidence"

ABSTRACT: It is beyond argument that the two great influences on the young Wittgenstein were Frege and Russell. What is less clear is the relative weight of those influences. About Wittgenstein's relation to Russell there is much documentary evidence, while matters are more difficult to puzzle out with respect to Frege. Nevertheless, recently some interpreters (Geach, Diamond, Ricketts) have claimed for Frege an influence far surpassing that of Russell. While I have sympathies with their overall readings of Frege and Wittgenstein, in this paper I cast doubt on this claim about influence. I do so by reviewing the evidence we have of Wittgenstein's pre-*Tractarian* understanding of Frege, especially in his 1913 "Notes on Logic", Moore's 1914 "Notes", and the 1914 and 1915 *Notebooks*.

KEYWORDS: evidence, influence, notes, pre-*Tractarian*; Diamond, Frege, Geach, Ricketts, Russell, Wittgenstein

9) Danielle Macbeth: "Frege and early Wittgenstein on Logic and Language"

ABSTRACT: According to Frege, logic is a science and its laws are truths like any others. According to Wittgenstein, the laws of logic contrast with truths in being *sinnlos*, without sense. The Wittgensteinian conception is generally regarded as a much-needed corrective to Frege's view, but, as I show, this assessment rests on a misunderstanding of Frege's (mature) distinction between the *Sinn* and the *Bedeutung* of an expression. Frege's mature conception of a logical language is not a confused precursor of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* conception, but instead a rigorous, and deeply illuminating, alternative to that later view.

KEYWORDS: Bedeutung, language, laws, logic (logical), sense, truth; Frege, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

10) Thomas Ricketts: "Wittgenstein against Frege and Russell"

ABSTRACT: The paper examines Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frege's and Russell's views of logical segmentation encapsulated at *Tractatus* 4.431 and 4.063. These criticisms proceed from Wittgenstein's 1913 conception of atomic sentences as models of reality and the distinctive conception of sense embedded in this conception. While Russell mistakenly assimilates the structure of truth-functionally compound sentences to that of atomic sentences, Frege mistakenly makes the converse assimilation.

KEYWORDS: function-argument segmentation, logic, multiple relation analysis, negation, picture, sense, truth-value; Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein

11) Cora Diamond: "Truth before Tarski: After Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and van Heijenoort"

ABSTRACT: I start from Hans Sluga's paper "Truth before Tarski", in which he argues that the establishing of Tarski's approach to truth brought loss as well as gain to analytic philosophy: what was lost was our understanding of the problem of truth. To recover what was lost, he says, we must examine the variety of pre-Tarskian views. My paper picks up that task and focuses on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. I interweave ideas borrowed from Thomas Ricketts, P.T. Geach, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Hylton and Juliet Floyd, and thereby try to explain the relation between Wittgenstein's conception of sense and his view of truth.

KEYWORDS: duality, logic, negation, sense, truth; Floyd, Frege, Geach, Goldfarb, Hylton, Ricketts, Russell, Tarski, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

12) Ian Proops: "The *Tractatus* on Inference and Entailment"

ABSTRACT: In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell for maintaining that 'laws of inference' justify inferences (*Tractatus* 5.132). I argue that what lies behind this criticism is a rejection of attempts to analyze the relation of logical entailment in other terms—for example, Russell's 1905 analysis of logical entailment as the derivability from logical laws of the corresponding conditional. I conclude with an

examination of Wittgenstein's positive view of logical entailment as an internal relation between propositions.

KEYWORDS: entailment, inference, internal relation, logic; Bradley, Lewis Carroll, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

13) Juliet Floyd: "Number and Ascription of Number in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*"

ABSTRACT: Wittgenstein's treatment of number words and arithmetic in the *Tractatus* reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege's and Russell's analyses of number, Wittgenstein rejects their respective conceptions of function, object, logical form, generality, sentence and thought. He, thereby, surrenders their shared ideal of the clarity a Begriffsschrift could bring to philosophy. The development of early analytic philosophy thus evinces far less continuity than some readers of Wittgenstein, from Russell and the Vienna positivists to many contemporary readers of the *Tractatus*, have supposed.

KEYWORDS: ascription, number, function, logical form, Begriffsschrift, analytic philosophy; Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

14) Matthew Ostrow: "Wittgenstein and the Liberating Word"

ABSTRACT: I argue that the *Tractatus*' central distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown must be treated within the context of what I call a "dialectical" approach to the text. Rather than attempting to determine in general whether Wittgenstein holds that there are ineffable features of reality, or whether such a notion is to be described as nonsense, I seek to show that this issue cannot be settled apart from an understanding of the nature of the fundamental question that the *Tractatus* is concerned to characterize. The second half of the paper then serves to clarify that question through a detailed consideration of part of the picture theory.

KEYWORDS: dialectics (dialectical), nonsense, picture theory (picturing), saying, showing; Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*

15) James Conant: "The Method of the *Tractatus*"

ABSTRACT: Two standard readings of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* have shaped the ways in which contemporary philosophers think about nonsense. These readings might be termed the "positivist reading" and the "ineffability reading", respectively. In this paper, I argue (1) that these two mutually opposed readings of the *Tractatus* presuppose a common conception of nonsense, one which the *Tractatus* itself sought to undermine; (2) that the sources of Wittgenstein's own conception are to be found in the work of Frege; (3) that, once we trace this conception back to its sources, we will be in a better position to see what sort of criticism (of Frege and others) the *Tractatus* seeks to advance; and (4) that, once we see this, we will be in a better position to understand the relation between Wittgenstein's early and later work.

KEYWORDS: elucidation, ineffability (ineffable), nonsense, positivism (positivist); Carnap, Frege, Wittgenstein; *Tractatus*